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American involvement in World War I became an 
engrossing experience for all American citizens in the 
great crusade to make the world safe for democracy. 
While most Americans readily heeded the war call, the 
Mennonites, a Christian conservative people of German, 
swiss, and Dutch heritage who practiced nonresistance 
and nonconformity, envisioned the war not as a righteous 
crusade, but as a violent storm that would disrupt their 
nonconformist peaceful lives. When America reached out 
to pull the Mennonites into the war effort, they tried 
diligently to remain uninvolved. 
Mennonites were eventually forced to recognize, 
however, that they were inescapably part of a 
militaristic America and an angry world and that 
refusing to take up arms against the enemy would require 
an explanation to each other, the government, and a 
fervently patriotic public. 
This study examines the limited choices that 
Mennonites had for rhetorical action given their 
religious ideology and analyzes the four prominent 
rhetorical postures (deliberative, confrontative, 
apologetic, and reaffirmative) that Mennonites adopted 
during World War I. 
As long as the war remained in Europe, Mennonites 
engaged in their own form of deliberative rhetoric, 
assuming the role of moral authorities and political 
experts. When the United States entered the war, 
Mennonites attempted to divert attention from 
themselves by confronting the government about the 
legitimacy of compulsory military service. Acculturated 
to the American way of life, however, Mennonites wanted 
to prove their loyalty as upright, American citizens, 
and thus offered apologetic statements to the greater 
American public via their own church papers. Finally, in 
the face of public pressure to join the crusade, 
reaffirming the righteousness of Mennonitism became a 
crucial rhetorical posture for the church's integrity. 
Evaluations of these rhetorical postures are 
offered from a rational, effects, and dramatistic 
perspective. The thesis is advanced through the 
dramatistic perspective that Mennonite rhetoric in World 
War I is most clearly understood as an enactment of a 
paradoxical biblical dictum: Be ye in the world, but not 
of it. Further, it is proposed that Mennonites were 
rhetorically inventive at preserving a tragi-comic view 
of the world. 
They are not of the world, 
even as I am not of the world. 
As thou hast sent me into the world, 
even so have I also sent them into the world. 
John 17: 16, 18 
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It was perhaps only appropriate that the Mennonite 
history course offered during the Winter term met in the 
small, plain chapel on campus. Its high ceilings and old 
wood floors provided little buffer against the cold. We 
used to joke that the ascetic environment was always a 
vivid reminder of the hardships of the early church. 
This protestant denomination had had its share of trials 
and tribulations; Mennonites and martyrdom seemed 
inexorably linked. 
The final unit in the course, American Mennonites 
and War, made an indelible impression on me. The course 
culminated with a film that celebrated Mennonite 
steadfast devotion to faith in the face of war. The only 
note I took that day was a statement made by its 
narrator, a Mennonite historian. "War is good for 
Mennonites," he said. "It brings out their best." 
Scribbled in the margin, I wrote: "What would H.F. Fast 
think of that?" Fast is my 80 year-old neighbor at home, 
a Mennonite who has served in three wars as a 
conscientious objector. Earlier that week he had served 
as the guide for our class in a field trip to Camp 
Funston near Fort Riley, Kansas. Fast, along with many 
other Mennonites during World War I who refused to pick 
up arms, was stationed at those barracks. His 
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recollection of the place was painful. Mennonites were 
routinely ridiculed, threatened and abused by camp 
officials and the wider populace during the war. 
Treatment of the "cowardly" C. o. at Camp Funston was no 
different. My thoughts had drifted back to that now 
desolate camp site and Fast's sobering words as the film 
moved to survey other wars in other places. Was war 
really good for Mennonites? The question was not to be 
answered in that term. 
That was 1980. I was a sophomore at the oldest 
Mennonite school in North America, Bethel College. I was 
a Kansan. And I was a Mennonite. I had come a long way 
from my childhood roots. Ten years earlier, I had been a 
fifth grader at a school experimenting with 
desegregation. I was a Floridian. And I was Southern 
Baptist. The move turned out to be a good one. Mennonite 
people and principles have had a profound influence on 
my life. When I graduated from Bethel in 1982, I took 
Mennonite values with me. I also took my notebook from 
Mennonite history. The Mennonite experience in World War 
I still perplexed me. 
As a budding rhetorical critic in Communication 
Studies at The University of Kansas, I found faculty 
receptive to my critical inquiry of Mennonite rhetoric 
in World War I. My fascination with this topic grew as I 
discovered that even among Mennonite scholars, Mennonite 
rhetoric, for the most part, has remained enigmatic. 
Mennonites have been viewed as a nonrhetorical people 
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since their religious ideology severely restricts 
rhetorical inventiveness. 
This study attempts to correct the view that there 
is little rhetorical value in studying the Mennonites. 
Specifically, the study addresses how Mennonites used 
rhetoric to reconcile their loyalties to God and country 
in the midst of a war to make the world safe for 
democracy. 
Perhaps it is only fitting that 1987 marks the 
completion of a research interest that began at my Alma 
Mater. Founded in 1887, Bethel College celebrates its 
centennial this year. The one hundred years of higher 
education inspired by Mennonite vision will be 
commemorated in a variety of ways. This project 
commemorates the rhetorical inventiveness of American 
Mennonites during eighteen months of an international 
crisis that threatened to destroy the very existence of 
their faith. It is not, however, a glowing endorsement 
of Mennonite rhetorical sophistication. The world war 
was both good and bad for members of the faith. 
Rhetorically, it brought out their best and their worst. 
Review of Literature 
The Mennonite experience in the Great War has not 
been overlooked by historians and Mennonite church 
scholars. A few of these accounts have proved insightful 
for the study. J. s. Hartzler's Mennonites In The World 
1 
War published in 1921, was the first account of the 
3 
world war from the Mennonite perspective. Hartzler 
highlights his own experience, but also presents a 
comprehensive picture of the Mennonite conflict with the 
greater American public. Cornelius J. Dyck's An 
Introduction to Mennonite History and c. Henry Smith's 
The Story of the Mennonites provide historical overviews 
2 
of the Mennonite experience in the war. These sources 
have been useful for extracting significant statistical 
data and capsulized analyses of Mennonite attitudes. The 
works of the foremost authority on this subject, James 
C. Juhnke, are used extensively. In his book,~ People 
of Two Kingdoms, Juhnke includes an insightful chapter, 
"Crisis of Citizenship: Mennonites in the World War," in 
which he explains the irreconcilable conflict between 
Mennonitism and militarism, and provides an interesting 
analysis of the flaws in the Mennonite argumentative 
3 
strategy. Two of Juhnke's works that proved helpful in 
reconstucting the historical context of the period 
examine the rhetorical themes that bound the faithful 
together and capture the ugliness and the intensity of 
American aversion to the pacifistic stance in the midst 
4 
of a righteous war. Historian Allan Teichrow•s 
intriguing analysis of government tactics designed to 
deal with the Mennonites isolates the distorted 
perceptions held by government officials, the deceptive 
strategies they practiced, and the orders they carried 
5 
out against the Mennonites. His companion work on the 
Mennonite migration to Canada to avoid the draft is 
4 
equally enlightening, as it provides lucid explanations 
for why some Mennonites opted to flee the country while 
most did not, and why the press distorted and magnified 
6 
their escape efforts. 
While scholars have produced historical accounts of 
the Mennonite experience in the world war, no scholarly 
work exists that examines Mennonite discourse from a 
rhetorical perspective. This study isolates and 
evaluates the rhetorical postures adopted by Mennonites 
both before and in the course of America's involvement 
in World War I. 
Parameters of The study 
The parameters of this study were set by 
determining which Mennonite groups were most influential 
and kept records and by sifting through Mennonite 
writings in search of relevant war-related material. 
Although there are numerous Mennonite groups in the 
United States, only the two largest Conferences, the 
General Conference and the Mennonite Church, issued 
formal statements to the public on the Mennonite 
position. Furthermore, some of the smaller groups, such 
as the Mennonite Brethren, Krimmer Mennonite Brethren, 
Holdeman, and Defenseless Mennonites, concurred, at 
times, with General Conference policy, while groups such 
as the Old Order, and the Conservative Amish tended to 
support the Mennonite Church position. Complete 
descriptions of the General Conference (GC's) and the 
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Mennonite Church (MC's) are given in chapter two. This 
study charts their rhetoric from the beginning of the 
European crisis which ignited in 1914, but concentrates 
on their rhetorical action between the years 1917-1918, 
during America's involvement in the war. 
The primary sources of Mennonite rhetoric include 
official church records and yearbooks, Mennonite 
newspapers, selected personal correspondence, pamphlets, 
and tracts. Church records document the official 
Mennonite positions on Wilson Administration policy. Few 
formal gatherings of the various congregations within a 
conference were held between the years 1916-1918. Five 
of the official church newspapers, The Gospel Herald, 
The Mennonite, The Christian Evangel, The Christian 
Monitor and Der Herold were used most extensively. These 
sources served as the prime forum for drawing isolated 
Mennonite communities together. Personal correspondence 
between Mennonite leaders (an enormous amount of which 
is preserved intact at the Mennonite Library and 
Archives in Newton, Kansas, the Goshen College 
Historical Library, and Mennonite Church Archives, in 
Goshen, Indiana) was used where such information added 
insight and clarification to the arguments advanced in 
published material. Mennonites published a few pamphlets 
and tracts outlining their peace position, and defending 
themselves as patriotic citizens. These resources, like 
church records, are manageable as a whole. 
The study does not include analysis of individual 
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sermons addressed to home-town congregations. While the 
sermon notes of many influential ministers have been 
carefully preserved at the Goshen College Historical 
Library (GCHL), the Archives of the Mennonite Church 
(AMC), and the Bethel College Library and Archives 
(BCLA), problems arise in drawing generalizable 
conclusions on Mennonite preaching style. First, the 
sheer mass of sermons by each minister makes these 
documents unmanageable for a study of this scope. 
Second, and most problematic, the sermon notes are 
usually incomplete. Mennonite theologian James H. 
Waltner observes that it was typical of Mennonite 
7 
ministers to speak extemporaneously. Hence, 
reconstruction of these sermons is impossible. In order 
to draw accurate conclusions on Mennonite rhetoric, I 
referred to the five Mennonite periodicals in which 
sermons were reprinted with some regularity. 
Critical Perspective: 
By all outside accounts, Mennonite rhetoric in 
World War I was collectively an abject failure. 
Mennonites generally refused to promote themselves in 
print or person as patriotic citizens outside their 
remote communities; they failed to project a clear peace 
stance, and they failed to dispel the popular belief 
that they were pro-German, disloyal, slackers. Countless 
editorials from non-Mennonites, many of which will be 
examined in a later chapter, corroborate this 
7 
observation. Critical approaches which place great store 
on judging the effect a particular piece of rhetoric has 
on an audience would find nothing of rhetorical merit 
from the Mennonites of this era. Critics solely intent 
on documenting the efficiency of rhetorical discourse 
for an immediate audience would dismiss the Mennonite 
rhetorical efforts in the Great War as an embarrassment, 
an aberration, and as an abysmal rhetorical performance 
among an otherwise bright, articulate people. 
A critical method bent on judging the response that 
a rhetorical act produces is riddled with internal 
8 
problems. An effects standard is absorbed with 
phenomena dissociated from how language functions 
symbolically, and hence is a non-rhetorical evaluative 
measure. When judgments of rhetorical success 
or failure are made without ever scrutinizing the 
communicative transaction itself, such pronouncements 
can hardly be deemed rhetorical. Moreover, it is an 
imprecise tool for judgment. Effects can be immediate, 
delayed, or indirect. Exacerbating these problems are 
the nagging questions of what index will be used to 
measure audience response and how will communicative 
receptiveness be isolated, i.e., how does one know 
whether an audience has responded to that particular 
rhetorical act alone? More serious yet is the fact that 
an effects criterion invites a sort of ethical 
relativism. When critics dwell on audience response, 
they may well find themselves in the untenable position 
8 
of applauding the efforts of any rhetor who moves 
people. 
In the final analysis this approach to criticism 
fails to acknowledge that rhetoric is more complex than 
measuring the effect experienced by a particular 
audience on a particular occasion. Fundamental to any 
approach to criticism that attempts to reveal the 
ingenuity of human symbol users is, in the words of 
critic John Rathbun, a candid acknowledgement that "the 
irreducible element in speech criticism is still the 
speech itself. Critical tools," Rathbun continues, 
"serve us not as a means for judgment, but as a means to 
9 
gain a better insight into how a speech works." Applied 
to Mennonite discourse, critical pronouncements of 
failure are based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of 
to whom Mennonite rhetoric was primarily directed and an 
inattention to rhetorical obstacles they encountered. 
This study is influenced by dramatism--a critical 
approach to rhetoric that offers us a way to become more 
conscious of the structure and function of language as a 
social instrument. Developed by Kenneth Burke as both 
theory and method of the drama of human relations, a 
dramatistic analysis focuses on the inventional 
qualities of symbol users. Language analyzed from a 
Burkean perspective must be approached both in terms of 
its poetic and rhetorical uses, its function as 
expression and as inducement, if a critic intends to 
provide a full account of human motives. Burke explains 
9 
that motives are linguistic products. Therefore, an 
analysis of human beings through their language provides 
the critic with an understanding of human motives. 
Dramatism presumes that language and thought are modes 
of action because words are mediatory principles between 
ourselves and nature. Our reality is a product of our 
symbol-making behavior, which means that as rhetors we 
compete with others in defining our world. The way in 
which a person describes a situation reflects his or her 
perception of reality. If the critic can determine the 
motive of the rhetor, then he or she can determine the 
rhetor's view of reality. The way in which a person 
describes a situation also indicates what choices of 
action are available. Burke writes that nthe same act 
can be defined differently depending upon the 
circumference of the scene or the overall situation in 
10 
terms of which we choose to locate it." By analyzing a 
rhetor's discourse, the rhetorical critic may be able to 
reveal the pattern of a rhetor's attempts at persuasion 
or expression. The result should be a better 
understanding of the failures and successes of rhetors 
in their efforts to communicate with a wide variety of 
audiences. 
Unlike the names chosen to identify other 
perspectives, dramatism is not just a metaphor for 
communicative behavior; it best describes human action. 
Burke writes: "If action is to be our key term, then 
11 
drama is the culminative form of action." our symbolic 
10 
history can be viewed as a play. Humans are actors by 
the very fact that they use, misuse, and create symbols 
in constructing basic plots. But Burke wryly adds: "If 
Drama, then conflict. And if conflict, then victimage. 
Dramatism is always on the edge of this vexing problem. 
12 
II 
The "vexing problem" to which dramatism attends is 
the dialectical realm of an unresolved discordancy of 
conflicting voices, a tension between what or who is 
legitimized in the social order. The clamor for 
definitional rights to a system that binds people 
together in a series of rights and obligations and 
establishes the relationship between the haves and the 
have-nots, superiors and inferiors, and insiders and 
outsiders is central to our communicative interactions. 
Dramatism is especially well suited then for the 
analysis of rhetoric that stems from the motive of "No." 
As rhetors inevitably size up situations differently, 
such motives as guilt, dissatisfaction, and deprivation 
create moral conflict in the social arena. 
It is little wonder that the rhetoric of social 
movements has been a favorite subject for dramatistic 
analysis. As uninstitutionalized collectivities that are 
countered by the established order for attempting to 
bring about or to resist change in societal norms and 
values, movements are born when members rise up and say, 
"No." Movements thrive on conflict and identify victims 
13 
in their demands for legitimation. 
11 
American Mennonites living in the twentieth century 
did not constitute a religious movement per seas did 
their si~teenth century forebears. In a country that 
granted religious freedom, they were no longer 
considered an illegitimate group, and hence lost an 
essential component of movement status. And yet with the 
onset of war, the Mennonite peace position fell outside 
that which is defined by the status quo as appropriate 
behavior in times of war. In essence, the presence of 
war magnified the "out-group" status of Mennonites. 
Suddenly, the legitimacy of their Christian and civic 
identity was questioned. A discordancy of conflicting 
voices arose over the relationship between religious 
practices and secular interests. Sociologists Irving I 
Zaretsky and Park P. Leone observe that "when a practice 
of a group challenges and threatens deeply held secular 
norms, a conflict ensues that is ameliorated to 
manageable proportions by reason of the group's own 
change of doctrine and religious observance or by change 
14 
in secular norms of the community." As a case in 
point, Mennonitism is considered a legitimate religion 
in peace time and viewed as illegitimate in war time. 
The doctrine of nonresistance challenges militaristic 
patriotism, the secular norm adopted in war time, but it 
is non-threatening to benevolent patriotism, the norm in 
peace time. Mennonites' status as upright American 
citizens is jeopardized as their status as a "subversive 
group" is recognized. 
12 
I use dramatism to illumine the dialectical tension 
of the Mennonite-American drama in World War I. I 
examine that which is rhetorically inventive about 
Mennonite plots, explain the divergent interpretations 
of Mennonite rhetoric (outsiders perceived obvious 
omissions and inconsistencies in their rhetoric; 
Mennonites did not perceive such problems) and identify 
the divergent ways in which Mennonites and the wider 
American public fought for definitional rights to the 
Great War. My examination of Mennonite rhetoric from 
this approach is based upon the ground that no analysis 
can be adequate that does not attempt to understand 
discourse from the point of view of those who generated 
it. 
If language provides the critic with a window to a 
rhetor's world, then viewing Mennonite rhetoric on its 
own terms should reveal knowledge of the frame from 
which they operated. Burkean scholar A. Cheree Carlson 
writes: 
Frames are the symbolic structure by 
which human beings impose order upon their 
personal and social experiences. Frames serve 
as perspectives from which all interpretations 
of experience are made. In their broadest 
sense frames are applied as a chart for social 
action, because they constitute attitudes and 
motives. The frame fromw which a movement 




Dramatistically, a rhetor•s frame of reference can be 
discovered by examining how he or she expiates the guilt 
resulting from the violation of a particular hierarchy. 
In other words, when rhetors reject the established 
order (a system which binds people together around a set 
of rights and obligations based on agreed upon values or 
principles), or question a normative standard of the 
social order, they inevitably disrupt the human desire 
for order, security, and a cloaking of the alienation 
between people. Resolution of that guilt can take many 
forms, yet stem from two overriding frames: comedy or 
tragedy. 
Carlson describes the tragic and comic perspectives 
thus: The tragic frame "usually projects evil onto a 
scapegoat, lays the blame at its feet, and slays it." 
From the tragic perspective "no social change is 
possible without some form of violence." The comic frame 
regards the social order as a human creation and 
respects the fact that some order must exist for humans 
to function. "The social order can be changed," Carlson 
notes, "but never at the cost of the humanity of those 
on the other side. In sum, conflict exists, but it is 
humanized by the actor's consciousness of his own 
foibles •••• The comic frame identifies social ills as 
arising from human error, not evil, and thus uses reason 
16 
to correct them." Carlson further observes that the 
orientation of a movement will profoundly affect the 
14 
methods used by the movement to achieve its goals. 
There are strong parallels between Mennonite 
rhetoric in World War I and the strategies employed by 
movements of a comic and a tragic frame. Challenging the 
dichotomy that Carlson has posited, I shall argue that 
Mennonite rhetoric did not completely reflect a comic or 
a tragic perspective; rather, their frames of reference 
were peculiarly tragi-comic. Though many characteristics 
of the comedic frame were evident in Mennonite 
discourse, so, too, were elements of a tragic frame. 
This work seeks to show how Mennonites enacted a 
rhetorical paradox (being in the world but not of it) by 
operating from a tragi-comic perspective. Understanding 
that dual perspective gives the critic appropriate 
criteria by which to judge the success and failure of 
their rhetorical strategies. 
In order to provide further understanding and 
appreciation of a people bent on enacting a paradox, I 
analyze Mennonite discourse from the standpoint of 
rhetorical posturing, an inclusive term that subsumes 
the following rhetorical categories: purpose, 
strategies, tone, role, argument, and the target 
audience. This conception of posturing, however, is 
mine. Mennonites made no distinctions between their 
rhetorical stances. Arguments were intermixed in 
periodicals, correspondence and church records. 
Rhetorical postures were identified in this analysis in 
order to highlight the diversity of arguments. 
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Structuring this analysis around rhetorical postures, 
however, should not suggest that Mennonite rhetoric 
moved through stages. Mennonites formulated their 
rhetorical postures at the outset of the war and 
maintained such positions until the end. This should not 
be surprising considering that America's involvement in 
the international crisis was relatively short. 
Specifically, I argue that Mennonite rhetoric 
reveals the essential characteristics of apologetic, 
reaffirmative, deliberative, and confrontative address. 
Apologia, or a rhetoric of self-defense, is necessary 
when someone's character is attacked. The rhetor's aim 
is to rebuild or purify his or her character. Rhetors 
are motivated to engage in apologetic discourse when 
they feel pressure from an audience to respond to real 
17 
and serious accusations. A rhetoric of reaffirmation 
identifies rhetors' attempts to revitalize a faith 
already held by an audience. The rhetoric that members 
of a group use to address each other in order to 
maintain their membership aims to reinforce and renew 
18 
their commitment to a belief. Deliberative address 
refers to a rhetoric of counsel or advice on matters of 
the state. Deliberative rhetoric is concerned with the 
expediency and efficacy of domestic and foreign policy 
19 
issues. A rhetoric of confrontation is comprised of 
exposing wrongdoing, creating guilt, yet capitalizing on 
shared values. Rhetors amplify the differences between 




Each of these postures is grounded in a pivotal 
dramatistic term: identification. Burke writes that as 
individuals, we strive to form ourselves in accordance 
with the communicative norms of our society in order to 
be perceived as more influential communicators. To be 
persuasive, Burke argues, rhetors must establish common 
ground--articulate similarities they share with their 
audiences. By capitalizing upon shared values, traits, 
needs and desires, rhetors mask division and 
alienation and induce cooperation and unity in order 
to seek approval and acceptance. 
Identifcation is a key concept because in viewing 
humans as actors, one is also viewing how they act 
together. Moreover, identification is only necessary, 
Burke continues, because we are divided. If people were 
not apart from one another, there would be no need for 
21 
us to search for unifying appeals. We would not act 
together, induce cooperation, search for transcendent 
terms to resolve controversy, if it were not for the 
hierarchic motive that drives people to secure a more 
enviable stature in society. 
The need to identify with the larger community 
explains why Mennonites engaged in apologetic discourse. 
When Mennonites found themselves face to face with 
government officials, draft board interrogators, the 
Board of Inquiry, and angry American citizens demanding 
conformance to patriotic behavior as it was defined in 
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times of war, they, as never before, experienced a real 
desire to be understood. Mennonites tried desperately to 
remedy the state of division by pointing to the values 
that they shared with the wider American citizenry. 
Hoping to purify a tarnished image, Mennonites "bent 
over backwards" to align themselves rhetorically with 
their patriotic neighbors. In essence, Mennonite 
apologia became a search for rhetorical means to repair 
a damaged ethos brought on by the demands of war. 
Identification strategies with the wider American 
populace were complicated by the paradoxical biblical 
dictum by which Mennonites attempted to live. Devotion 
to Christ's tenet: "be ye in the world, but not of it," 
required a precarious balancing of multiple roles, acts, 
purposes, and strategies to adapt to multiple audiences. 
Mennonites understood that surviving the crisis meant a 
concerted effort to identify with fellow members of the 
faith A rhetoric of reaffirmation, speech aimed at 
bolstering group identity/ became essential for 
maintaining a 350 year old faith. 
The examination of a rhetoric of reaffirmation 
requires a broadly-conceived notion of audience, a view 
that does not presume an external audience exclusively. 
Dramatisim provides an all-encompassing view of 
audience. As Burke explains: 
[A] man can be his own audience, insofar as 
he, even in his secret thoughts, cultivates 
certain ideas or images for the effect he 
18 
hopes they may have upon him; he is here what 
Mead would call 'an I addressing its me,'and 
in this respect he is being rhetorical quite 
as though he were using pleasant imagery to 
influence an outside audience rather than one 
22 
within. 
Essentially, Burke gives rhetorical status to 
consumatory communication--a dimension of communication 
wherein symbolic acts function as an end in themselves; 
the purpose of the message is accomplished at the moment 
23 
of its consumption. In so doing, he calls into 
question the pragmatic view of rhetorical transactions. 
That self-directed communication fulfills a rhetorical 
function is an idea expounded upon by theorist Richard 
Gregg. The primary appeal of consumatory rhetoric, Gregg 
argues, is its affirming power for the rhetors who 
generated it. The repeated reaffirmation of one's 
selfhood through rhetoric serves the reflexive task of 
24 
"psychologically refurbishing" oneself. 
Mennonite rhetoric to a great extent served a 
consumatory function. Keeping the flock faithful during 
a crisis that threatened to weaken, if not destroy, 
Mennonitism was of paramount importance. If Mennonites, 
in articulating their position in their own newspapers, 
could reaffirm who they were, then such rhetorical 
efforts had intrinsic worth. This study identifies the 
ways in which Mennonite rhetoric served a consumatory 
function. 
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That apologetic discourse aims to purify an image 
and re-affirmative discourse aims to revitalize an image 
places these two rhetorical postures at odds. Mennonites 
struggled with how they could identify with non-
Mennonites and still remain true to the tenets of their 
faith. Could a Mennonite and an American identity be 
maintained during war time? Which identity was more 
important? The obstacles to rhetorical effectiveness 
that rhetors assume when they engage in both forms of 
address explain why Mennonites at first resisted 
creating both postures and why eventual attempts at 
identifying with Americans and their fellow members 
inevitably produced contradictions. 
I argue that Mennonites preferred to engage in 
reaffirmative rhetoric rather than apologetic rhetoric. 
They resisted defending themselves to outsiders, even in 
the face of false accusations, because defending their 
peace position required accounting for who they were 
and, ultimately, making themselves vulnerable to 
25 
questions about their very existence. And yet 
occasionally, Mennonite rhetors attempted to identify 
with Mennonites and non-Mennonites simultaneously. The 
results were a sometimes curious composition of apparent 
contradictions. One,Mennonite rhetor, for instance, no 
doubt shocked members and nonmembers alike, when he 
defended the patriotic actions of his biblical, 
unassuming, nonconformist people in secular, 
aggrandizing, and conformist terms. At the risk of 
20 
forfeiting Mennonite distinctiveness, and desperate to 
be perceived as upright American citizens in the 
public's eye, Mennonite rhetors tried to find acceptance 
26 
both as good Christians and good citizens. 
Subsumed within these two postures one finds 
deliberative rhetoric and confrontative rhetoric. 
Deliberative address was prominent in Mennonite rhetoric 
prior to United States intervention. Mennonites strongly 
dissuaded American policy makers from being drawn into 
the world crisis, criticized European governments for 
"warmongering" and recommended the continuance of a 
policy of isolationism. This work examines the ways in 
which Mennonites became moral authorities on the 
international conflict and offers the conclusion that as 
long as the war remained in Europe Mennonites did not 
see any inconsistency in claiming to be apolitical 
people and taking an active interest in foreign policy. 
Confrontative address was evident in Mennonite 
negotiations with the government. While not abrasive or 
threatening, as confrontative discourse often is, 
Mennonites exposed the ways in which the government had 
violated individual conscience while graciously thanking 
administration officials for hearing them out. This 
analysis explores the ways in which, constrained by 
ideology, Mennonites were still able, and surprisingly 
adept at, confronting the government. 
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Precis of Chapters 
What follows is organized around four rhetorical 
postures Mennonites adopted both before and during 
America's involvement in World War I. Before those 
postures are analyzed, however, Chapter two introduces 
the reader to the basic tenets and history of the 
Mennonite faith, giving a brief chronology of important 
events during America's involvement in the war, and 
highlighting the rhetorical role of newspapers for 
American Mennonites living in the twentieth century. 
Chapter three focuses on how Mennonites assumed the 
role of moral authorities and political experts in 
political commentaries that appeared sporadically in 
Mennonite publications prior to April 6, 1917. Despite 
the fact that their faith prescribed an inattentiveness 
to the political scene, Mennonites engaged in their own 
form of deliberative rhetoric. 
Chapter four examines the rhetorical constraints 
imposed by Mennonite ideology once the United States 
entered the international fray. Armed with an 
understanding of the limited choices that Mennonites had 
for rhetorical action, the critic can account for their 
reluctance to justify pacificism to outsiders and their 
practice of rehearsing arguments among themselves. 
Chapter five looks at how Mennonites attempted to divert 
attention from themselves by questioning the legitimacy 
of the government's policy of compulsory military 
service. In effect, rather than defend themselves to 
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outsiders initially, Mennonites adopted the more 
comfortable rhetorical position of reminding the 
government of its promises to the Mennonites and 
demanding that the government account for its 
"undemocratic" actions. 
Chapter six examines how Mennonites defended 
themselves to the greater American public. Because 
Mennonites had become acculturated to the American way 
of life, they desperately wanted to rectify the negative 
image Americans held of them. Using several strategies 
of redefinition, Mennonites attempted to prove their 
loyalty as upright, American citizens. 
The focus of chapter seven is how Mennonite 
rhetoric functioned to preserve the faith. In the face 
of public pressure to join the crusade to make the world 
safe for democracy, reaffirming the righteousness of 
Mennonitism became a crucial rhetorical posture for the 
church's integrity. 
Chapter eight evaluates the strengths and 
weaknesses of the rhetorical choices Mennonites made 
from the standpoint of the American people, the 
government, and the critic. From an outsiders 
perspective it was easy to condemn Mennonite rhetoric as 
grossly inappropriate in a national crisis that demanded 
the conformity of each citizen. From a dramatistic 
perspective, the inventiveness of the Mennonites' 
rhetorical choices can be appreciated. Through an 
examination of the ways in which their discourse 
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functioned to preserve a tragi-comic view of the world, 
I am able to show how their seemingly disparate 
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IN THE WORLD, YET NOT OF IT: 
MENNONITES AND THE STATE 
Origins of The Faith: 
Mennonitism has a long, rich, and troubled history. 
The inception of the faith can be traced to the 
sixteenth century in Switzerland, South Germany, 
Austria, and Holland. Believers were not originally 
called Mennonites, but "Anabaptists" (rebaptizers) by 
those who bitterly opposed their radical departure from 
infant baptism. The Anabaptist movement, as it was then 
conceived, believed that the church should be voluntary 
and composed of adult members who had entered into 
membership by baptism upon their confession of faith. 
Anabaptists dismissed infant baptism as a meaningless 
practice. How could infants give an intelligent life 
commitment based upon a knowledge of what true 
Christianity means, they asked. Church membership could 
only be based upon true conversion and commitment to 
holy living--a belief which stood in sharp contrast to 
1 
the Reformers' church. 
Anabaptists believed that they alone retained the 
2 
original and true vision of Luther and Zwingli. They 
did not agree with Luther that it was enough to believe 
in Christ's death and atonement to be a true Christian, 
nor did they believe that it was a good practice to 
baptize infants and support the idea of a state church. 
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Anabaptists also disagreed with Calvin, who attempted to 
Christianize the whole society and bring everyone under 
the authority of the church. The original founders of 
the Mennonites held that Christians are "called out" 
from the general society, mandating the separation of 
3 
church and state. Since Anabaptists believed that the 
Christian must withdraw from the world to create a 
Christian social order within the church brotherhood, 
they saw little chance of converting the masses to a 
4 
brotherhood with such high ideals. 
Specifically, Anabaptism was defined by three basic 
tenets. First, the essence of Christianity was 
discipleship. A true Christian life was patterned after 
the teaching and example of Christ. In fact, as 
Mennonite historian c. Henry Smith explains: "[T]he 
whole movement was an attempt to reproduce as literally 
as possible the primitive apostolic church in its 
original purity and simplicity; and restore Christianity 
5 
once more to a basis of individual responsibility." 
Anabaptists believed staunchly that each individual must 
be granted the liberty of conscience to decide the Bible 
message for him or herself and be a witness of it. The 
essence of Anabaptism was individualism. The movement 
did not believe that Christianity could make love or 
holiness a matter of doctrinal belief; rather members 
demanded an outward expression of the inner experience. 
In essence, Anabaptism was not merely a set of dogmas, 
6 
but a way of life. 
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Aside from holding in high esteem the practice of 
Christ-like discipleship, Anabaptists conceived of the 
church as a brotherhood separated from the "worldly way 
of life." Anabaptists realized that conflict with the 
world would be inevitable for the devout Christian. They 
envisioned the brotherhood as a "suffering church," 
taking literally the words of Jesus: "In the world ye 
7 
shall have tribulation." In 1524, the Swiss leader of 
the movement, Conrad Grebel, painted a bleak picture for 
the life of the devoted Christian. "True Christian 
believers," he wrote, "are sheep among wolves, sheep for 
the slaughter; they must be baptized in anguish, and 
affliction, tribulation, persecution, suffering, and 
8 
death." For most Anabaptists, at least, separation from 
the world and a calling out from the general society 
were coterminous with persecution and sometimes death. 
As one Mennonite theologian has observed: "Martyrdom at 
the hands of civil authorities constituted their 
9 
identity." 
An important corollary to the concept of the 
suffering church, which comprised the third tenet of 
Anabaptism, was the ethic of nonresistance. Menno 
Simons, the Dutch leader of the movement, (from whom 
Anabaptists later would adopt their present name) 
proclaimed in 1550: "The regenerated do not go to war, 
nor engage in strife. They are the children of 
peace who have beaten their swords into plowshares and 
their spears into pruning hooks, and know of no war. 
33 
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II Eighty-two years later, Simons' statement became 
the foundation for the Dordrecht Confession of Faith. 
Adopted at Dordrecht, Holland in 1632, the eighteen 
articles of the Dordrecht Confession have for more than 
350 years served as "a kind of brief doctrinal north 
11 
star." While the Anabaptists considered themselves a 
non-confessional people, fearing that confession might 
become normative or displace the Scriptures as the 
authority within the fellowship, The Dordrecht 
12 
Confession of Faith remained the exception. 
Of the fundamental Anabaptist doctrines, it is the 
doctrine of nonresistance which has throughout the 
movement's history led to the most trouble with 
government authorities. In the present age of 
intensifying nationalism and militarism, the only trait 
of Mennonitism known by non-Mennonites is the 
"unpatriotic" rejection of military service, which is 
based on an "antiquated" doctrine of nonresistance. 
In the four and one-half centuries of the church's 
history, Mennonites have had to pay an extreme price for 
believing in adult baptism, separation of church and 
state, and the righteousness of nonresistance. From its 
inception, state authorities in South Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland attempted to stamp out the 
rapidly spreading faith by invoking drastic measures. 
Anabaptists, wherever they could be rooted out, faced 
such atrocities as drowning, being burned at the stake, 
rotting in prison, decapitation, being broken on the 
34 
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rack, or being buried alive. In the first ten years of 
the Anabaptist movement alone, five thousand members 
were killed, and of the movement's pioneer leaders, few 
14 
died a natural death. Since religious toleration had 
not come of age, the organized churches of Catholicism, 
Lutheranism, and Calvinism gave full assistance in the 
brutal punishments, aiding the authorities in wiping out 
congregations. While zealous persecutors did succeed in 
driving the movement undercover and removing all 
possibility of its ever having a large, popular 
following, they never quite succeeded in snuffing out 
the movement completely. 
To escape the relentless persecution and, 
ultimately, to keep the faith alive, Mennonites trekked 
from country to country in search of religious liberty. 
In the mid-1600's, the Mennonites of Switzerland were 
the first to look at America as a land of religious 
toleration that would welcome Mennonite immigrants. 
After a small Swiss contingent of Mennonites founded the 
first permanent Mennonite colony in Germantown, 
Pennsylvania, in 1683, seven much larger "waves" of 
Mennonites from all over Europe and Russia embarked on 
15 
the great trek to the Sweet Land of Liberty. 
American Mennonites 
Separation from the world has always been the key 
to Mennonite identity, irrespective of time and place. 
For Mennonites of sixteenth and seventeenth century 
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Europe, separation meant persecution and suffering. For 
Mennonites living in early twentieth century America, 
separation meant something fundamentally different. It 
was difficult for American Mennonites to maintain a 
theology of suffering as a distinctive marker of 
Mennonitism amidst a climate of religious freedom. In a 
society characterized by pluralism, separatist beliefs 
are valued. Hence, the concept of separation underwent a 
major redefinition. Separation became increasingly a 
matter of particular cultural patterns, most notably of 
dress and language, rather than any major theological 
differentiation outside of nonresistance. Separation was 
defined in highly visible terms (plain coats, coverings, 
etc.) for some Mennonites, and by the German language 
16 
for others. An~hropologist Elmer s. Miller argues that 
"Mennonite congregations were assuming a denominational 
identity alongside a variety of other American 
/denominational groupings [and while] World War I could 
have provided a brief opportunity for a return to 
persecution as an essential mark of Mennonite identity. 
it would appear that most Mennonites were relieved 
17 
not to return to an identity of persecution." Juhnke, 
on the other hand, notes that the whole issue of 
military service strengthened Mennonite identity in that 
it sharpened the line between church and state. 
Mennonites once again saw themselves as a people 
separated from the general society by their refusal to 
18 
take up arms. 
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While marking the distinctiveness of the faith 
became increasingly difficult for American Mennonites, 
as the meaning of separation was ever-changing, so, too, 
were their attempts to maintain differences from each 
other. Mennonite groups in America today are proud of 
their common heritage, but they are also interested in 
maintaining their distinctiveness from other Mennonite 
groups. Mennonite diversity is reflected in different 
names, languages, dialects, and dress, but differences 
among Mennonites are also doctrinal. Such practices as 
missionary activities, secondary education, and Sunday 
School are accepted by some groups and rejected by 
others. An explanation for the differences among 
Mennonite groups is that Mennonites came from various 
countries over long intervals of time and were anxious 
to preserve their distinctive cultural practices as well 
as their fundamental beliefs. This study will focus on 
the two largest of the seventeen recognized Mennonite 
groups in the United States, the Mennonite Church and 
the General Conference. 
The Mennonite Church (MC's) organized in 1898 
comprises the largest body of Mennonites in North 
America. This group of Mennonites is almost entirely 
Swiss in origin, but they have two ecclesiastical 
backgrounds: Mennonite and Amish Mennonite. While not 
officially unified as a Conference until 1898, many of 
the Mennonite congregations that eventually joined the 
Mennonite Church had been established centuries earlier. 
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The earliest wave of Mennonite immigrants who settled in 
Pennsylvania in 1683, and the nearly 8,000 Mennonites 
who settled throughout Pennsylvania, Ohio, Virginia, 
Indiana, Iowa, and Illinois between the years 1707-1756 
and 1815-1860, eventually united to form the Mennonite 
19 
Church. By 1917, there were fourteen conferences of 
the Mennonite Church in the United States which included 
the Franconia, Lancaster, Washington, Franklin Virginia, 
Southwestern Pennsylvania, Eastern Amish, Ohio, Indian-
Michigan, Illinois, Missouri-Iowa, Western Amish, 
Kansas-Nebraska, and Pacific Coast conferences. The 
number of churches within the individual conferences 
20 
ranged from twenty to one hundred. 
There are a number of factors that differentiate the 
MC's from the General Conference (GC's). Since members 
of the Mennonite Church have Swiss roots, they are the 
more homogeneous group. The language spoken in the 
Mennonite Church up until 1900 was Palatine German. 
Church disciplinary standards are controlled by the 
"bishops" (ministers) of the congregation. In short, 
bishops are given much authority to govern their 
members. The more visible and influential bishops hold 
other posts as well, such as editor of the church paper, 
or president of a conference, or head of a mission 
board. Given the church polity of the MC's, the more 
powerful bishops can eventually come to speak for, and 
mold the character of, the church. 
Such was the case with Daniel Kauffman, a bishop of 
38 
the Mennonite Church from 1896 to 1944. At the height of 
his influence, he steered the Mennonite Church through 
the tumultuous crisis of World War I. An extremely 
learned and politically astute man, Kauffman secured a 
degree of Principal of Pedagogics at the Missouri State 
University, taught school in Missouri in the late 
1800's, and served as county commissioner from 1887-90. 
Kauffman's rise to prominence in the Mennonite Church 
was meteoric. He did not join the Mennonite Church until 
1890, and yet two years later he was an ordained 
minister and four years later named a bishop. His 
natural gifts as speaker, teacher, writer, mediator, and 
conciliator made him the outstanding leader of the MC's 
for over forty years. A visionary in many respects, 
Kauffman was instrumental in getting three Mennonite-
affiliated colleges started: Hesston College in Kansas, 
Eastern Mennonite College in Ohio, and Goshen College in 
Indiana. A prolific writer, Kauffman authored 20 books 
on church matters. But his greatest work as a writer 
came as editor of the official MC paper, The Gospel 
21 
Herald. 
Kauffman's influence is still felt today. Mennonite 
scholar Chester K. Lehman writes: "Daniel Kauffman may 
very properly be called the interpreter of the Mennonite 
faith to the Mennonite Church. For nearly fifty years he 
was the spokesman of the church in matters of doctrine 
22 
and practice." Mennonite theologian Harold Bender 
concurs: "In a real sense he molded the thought of the 
39 
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church of his time." 
Kauffman's influence on the Mennonite Church has 
contributed to its enduring conservative image. The MC's 
uphold many of the traditional religious and social 
practices of an earlier era. For example, women are 
required to wear prayer head coverings, while men are 
24 
typically clean shaven and wear plain coats. A final 
distinction that is particularly relevant to this study 
is that by the early 1900's, English had gradually 
replaced Palatine German as the standard language at 
home and in the church. Up to two centuries had passed 
since these Mennonites had left their Swiss homeland; 
hence, the cultural influences of their homeland had 
diminished considerably. By the time the European crisis 
erupted in 1914, members of the Mennonite Church had 
little or no sympathy for the German cause. 
The General Conference of the Mennonite Church of 
North America (more commonly called the General 
Conference or GC's) was organized in 1860 and remains 
the second largest body of Mennonites in North America. 
Unlike the more homogeneous background of the Mennonite 
Church, the GC's do not have a single national origin. 
Cultural backgrounds include Swiss, Polish-German, 
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Prussian, and, above all, Russo-German. Initially, the 
General Conference was composed of two groups: American 
Mennonites who had become dissatisfied with the 
traditional and conservative patterns of their swiss 
immigrant fathers and Mennonites who came from South 
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Germany in 1865. The Conference did not become a major 
force among the Mennonites until 1870, when large groups 
of Mennonites from Russia emigrated to the United 
States. From 1873-1884, some 18,000 Mennonites, largely 
of Dutch origin, left Russia for America because it 
appeared that Russia was backing out on its promise to 
grant Mennonites permanent military exemption. These 
Mennonites settled in Minnesota, South Dakota, Nebraska, 
Oklahoma, and Kansas, and soon joined the General 
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Conference, bolstering its membership considerably. By 
the turn of the century, the General Conference had 
established five districts in the United States: 
Eastern, Middle-Central, Northern, Western, and 
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Pacific. 
Unlike the rigid constitution of the Mennonite 
Church, which gives bishops authority to prescribe rules 
for how to conduct worship services and how to dress and 
act appropriately, the General Conference is loosely 
structured to accommodate the diverse cultural 
backgrounds of its churches. Each congregation and each 
district is autonomous. The General Conference assumes 
only an advisory, not a legislative, relationship to the 
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congregations and district conferences. In fact, H. 
P. Krehbiel, a leader in the General Conference in the 
early 1900's, explained that: "The churches constituting 
the General Conference have by their union not become 
something different from what they were before. Each 
church remains just what it was, and retains all the 
41 
29 
peculiarities she had if she chooses." The founding 
statement of the General Conference reflected the 
independence of GC polity. "Unity in essentials, liberty 
in non-essentials, and love in all things," was its 
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simple message. 
Although the General Conference aims to be merely 
an advisory board and is a means to further common 
religious efforts, it has a constitution that prescribes 
as a test of membership that congregations support 
baptism on confession of faith, avoid oaths, believe in 
and practice nonresistance, practice scriptural church 
discipline, and bar those members who are addicted to 
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drink and who belong to secret societies. Unlike the 
Mennonite Church, ministers of the General Conference 
are not given the special title of "bishop" nor their 
range of authority. Rather, the General Conference 
believes that the entire congregation should decide all 
major issues in the church. As a result, the GC's had no 
one individual to personify their mission, as did the 
MC's in the person of Daniel Kauffman. 
The large number of General Conference Mennonites 
who emigrated from Russia just before the turn of the 
century still retained fond memories of their homeland. 
Even by 1914, many of these Mennonites preferred their 
German mother tongue both at home and church. When the 
European crisis broke out, it was only natural that 
these Mennonites would sympathize with and support the 
efforts of the homeland. For them, cultural ties had not 
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yet been severed. 
Whether they eventually became members of the 
Mennonite Church, the General Conference, or some other 
Mennonite group, Mennonites who immigrated to America 
between 1600 and 1900 came for the same reasons: 
cultural autonomy, exemption from military service, 
freedom of conscience, and the promise of rich farmland. 
Though Mennonite communities thrived prior to the 
outbreak of World War I, increasing their population to 
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79,363 members, in all the years of rapid immigration 
no guarantees of isolation or exemption from national 
military conscription were ever granted. Yet many 
Mennonites assumed, nonetheless, that state laws passed 
to exempt them from military service were binding ever 
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after. Mennonites were unaware that national 
conscription legislation could supersede state 
legislation in a national emergency--a political reality 
they would shortly confront. Moreover, political naivete 
and cultural isolation became most evident when 
Mennonites refused to acknowledge the inevitability of 
U. s. intervention in the European crisis. Consequently, 
Mennonites were ill-prepared to speak out in a unified 
front against the war. 
Portents of Conflict 
When the war broke out in Europe in 1914, the 
average American reacted to it as something far away, 
mildly interesting, yet frightening and evil. Most 
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Americans, including the Mennonites, wanted nothing more 
than to be left in peace, believing in the "goodness" of 
34 
isolation and neutrality. 
The anti-war tenor of the country had not changed 
by 1916. President Woodrow Wilson was re-elected on the 
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popular campaign slogan: "He kept us out of war." 
Mennonites, too, perceived the importance of electing a 
candidate who espoused peace in these troubled times. 
Until 1917, Mennonites appeared to echo American 
sentiments. However, beneath the apparent similarities 
lay deep-seated, irreconcilable differences. During 
America's involvement in the Great War, those 
differences would be made public, and Mennonites would 
be forced to respond to bitter physical and verbal abuse 
from their fellow citizens. With little advance P,lanning 
Mennonites would begin to question the meaningfulness of 
freedom of conscience in America. Ultimately, they would 
face a crisis of how to articulate to non-Mennonites 
their religious beliefs, traditions, origins, and 
rationale for coming to North America. 
America's entrance into the Great War began with 
President Wilson's pronouncement: "The supreme test of 
the nation has come. We must all speak, act and serve 
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together." These words were warmly received by the 
American public. But by 1917, Americans had changed 
their minds about the international crisis. As historian 
James Juhnke notes: "Across the nation, pacifists became 
militarists, isolationists became interventionists, and 
44 
37 
Socialists became patriots." America was ready for the 
test of sacrifice, courage, and patriotism that a total 
war would demand. When, early in 1917, Germany began 
practicing unrestricted submarine warfare, and the 
telegram from Arthur Zimmermann, Germany's secretary of 
state, was intercepted--a coded message that instructed 
Mexico to become Germany's ally with a view to 
recovering Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona from the 
United states--the European crisis threatened to 
escalate dangerously out of control. Americans 
acknowledged along with President Wilson that "For us 
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there is but one choice--fight!" 
American involvement in the World War from April 6, 
1917, to November 11, 1918, did indeed become a "supreme 
test"--an engrossing experience for all American 
citizens. With the mobilization efforts, including 
increased taxes, warbond campaigns, and military 
conscription, America reached out to involve all its 
citizens in a great crusade to make the world safe for 
democracy. Wilson began the mobilization efforts by 
stating: "[T]he manhood of the country shall step 
forward in one solid rank in defense of the ideals to 
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which this Nation is consecrated." The response to 
Wilson's command was overwhelming. The Selective Service 
Act, which provided for a national draft, was 
implemented on May 18, 1917, and drew twenty-six million 
40 
young men. 
While most Americans readily heeded the war call, 
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the Mennonites envisioned the war not as a righteous 
crusade, but as a violent storm that would disrupt their 
nonconformist peaceful lifestyle. When America reached 
out to pull the Mennonites into the war effort, diligent 
efforts were made by Mennonites to remain uninvolved. 
Mennonites refused to concede that fighting was 
America's only choice. When the Selective Service Act 
instituted compulsory military service, Mennonites were 
stunned and felt betrayed. They sincerely believed that 
the war could not change their status as nonresisters. 
After receiving word that a National Defense Act had 
been passed in 1916, an act that would make significant 
changes regarding permanent military exemption for 
religious groups, one prominent Mennonite leader, c. E. 
Krehbiel said: "We did not believe that that was 
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possible in the United States." 
Mennonites were eventually forced to recognize that 
they were inescapably part of a militaristic America and 
an angry world. Recognizing that the world crisis would 
force Mennonite involvement, Mennonite leader H.P. 
Krehbiel expressed his fear of the impending 
confrontation between the Mennonites and the rest of the 
world: "The Mennonites will now be purified by fire," he 
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wrote, "what will become of us in the heat?" 
Mennonites would face a supreme test of a different 
nature=-a test that would have far-reaching implications 
for their small, tranquil communities. 
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A Chronology of War-Related Events 
From Germany's declaration of war in August of 
1914, to its surrender in June of 1919, American 
Mennonites were caught up in "worldly concerns" to 
varying degrees. Their attitudes vacillated in the 
intervening years on who should be supported as long as 
the war remained in Europe, on who would be the best 
candidate in the presidential election of 1916, on how 
they could support their country upon America's 
involvement, and on how they would explain themselves to 
the government and the American people. 
The sinking of the Lusitania in May of 1915 marked 
the beginning of their political involvement in an 
unprecedented way. Heretofore, Mennonites had remained 
neutral observers in their own church circulars, albeit 
vigorously opposing both sides. But with that dastardly 
act, even many German Mennonites grudgingly sided with 
the Allied forces. 
As the European crisis erupted closer to home, 
Mennonites began to tune in to the presidential 
elections of 1916 as never before. For the most part, 
Mennonites were attracted to Wilson's idealistic peace 
rhetoric. Like many Americans in 1916, they saw the 
importance of electing a peace candidate, and yet many 
Mennonites were not convinced that a vote for Wilson 
would ensure peace. But then they did not see the 
Republican candidate, Charles Evans Hughes, as an 
acceptable candidate either. Mennonites were generally 
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indifferent to the election results. Since they could 
not express their religious beliefs through the ballot, 
Mennonites began to question the meaning of the freedom 
to vote when there was no real choice. This would not be 
the first time, writes Juhnke, that Mennonites would 
have "reasons for questioning the meaningfulness of 
44 
American freedoms." 
Though seemingly disillusioned with the electoral 
process, Mennonites remained politically naive about 
legislative maneuvering in 1916. The National Defense 
Act passed in that year seriously threatened the 
military exemptions granted to Mennonites by President 
Grant in 1873. Under the new law the religious belief of 
the individual, not that of a religious group, was the 
decisive criterion for determining eligibility for 
exemption. Moreover, the law allowed the president to 
set regulations on who actually was nonresistent, and 
even such persons were required to serve in noncombatant 
capacities. In essence, there would be no exemption from 
military duty. Hence, when the Selective Service Act was 
implemented shortly after the United States declared war 
on Germany, Mennonites were taken unawares by a national 
draft that was compulsory. 
Nonetheless, when draft boards opened across the 
country on June 5, 1917, Mennonite men complied. 
Approximately 2000 Mennonites received draft notices, an 
overwhelming number of whom went to camp when such 
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training facilities opened up in August. However, a 
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small percentage of Mennonites, numbering around 500, 
feared serious repercussions from the government and 
their patriotic neighbors for registering as 
conscientious objectors, and fled to Canada. President 
Wilson soon thwarted such drastic action, by ordering a 
years imprisonment for anyone caught leaving the 
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country. Realizing that escaping the crisis would 
hamper negotiations with the government and make camp 
life all the more difficult for Mennonite draftees, most 
members of the faith remained decidedly optimistic that 
the government would respect a 350 year old faith that 
rested upon freedom of conscience, and allow Mennonites 
to work in civilian, not military, capacities. 
Mennonites furnished the largest number of conscientious 
objectors of any other religious group and for this 
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stance they expected legal protection. 
While Mennonites waited for Wilson to define 
noncombatant duty, they formed lobbying committees to go 
to Washington and meet with the Secretary of War, Newton 
Baker, and they published official statements outlining 
their peace position. The three prominent committees 
included: the Committee of Seven created on April 11, 
1917, and led by J. W. Kliewer, P.H. Unruh, and H.P. 
Krehbiel; the Citizenship Committee, formed on April 
29th, and composed of D. J. Brand, Jacob Snyder, N. B. 
Grubb, H. A. Alderfer, and U. s. Stauffer; and the War 
Problems Committee spearheaded by Aaron Loucks, on 
August 29th. Despite the fact that the Committee of 
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Seven was able to secure a meeting with Baker in mid-
June to present alternatives to military duty, Wilson's 
statement defining noncombatant service did not come 
until March 20th of the following year-- a full eight 
months after the first draftees had reported to camp. 
And to their disappointment, the long-awaited order 
failed to make provision for service outside the 
military for conscientious objectors. The order listed 
service in the medical corps, the quartermaster corps, 
and the engineer service as noncombatant. Some Mennonite 
men found these terms agreeable, but most did not. 
For those whose religious scruples would not allow 
any form of military service, combatant or noncombatant, 
Wilson arranged for his Secretary of War to devise an 
equitable plan. That plan, announced on May 30, 1918, 
provided for conscientious objectors who refused 
noncombatant service on religious grounds to be 
interrogated personally by a Board of Inquiry. This 
Board, headed by Major Richard c. Stoddard, a Federal 
Judge, and a Columbia Law Professor, did not get under 
way until June 1, 1918--five and one-half months before 
the war ended. It was their duty to judge the sincerity 
of the conscientious objector's attitude. If found 
sincere, special provisions were made by which the 
objectors could be furloughed without pay from the 
Government for agricultural service. Any man who was not 
recommended for furlough by this Board would be 
compelled to serve in noncombatant capacities, and in 
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the event of disobedience would be tried by court-
martial, and if found guilty, sentenced to confinement 
at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. A goodly number of 
Mennonites who refused noncombatant duty and went before 
the Board of Inquiry, were found sincere and relocated 
on farms. But of the 360 conscientious objectors who 
were courtmartialed and found guilty, 138 were 
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Mennonites. 
With few exceptions, Mennonite dealings with the 
War Department went smoothly. Such was not the case with 
the Justice Department or the American public. Long 
before the Board of Inquiry went into operation helping 
Mennonites, the Espionage Act went into effect hampering 
them. As of June 15, 1917, Mennonite publications came 
under immediate scrutiny for undermining or threatening 
national security in times of war. Three Mennonite 
tracts were cited for violating the Espionage Act, and, 
as founder of the Mennonite Publishing House, Aaron 
Loucks was held responsible. The mass trial of the 
Mennonites which began on August 20, 1918, never 
succeeded, however, because President Wilson halted the 
proceedings due to adverse publicity. 
Wilson was less effective in halting mob violence 
against the Mennonites. Despite his repeated pleas to 
the contrary, Mennonites became choice targets for 
slander, vandalism, tar and feathering, and other 
unpleasantries in the hands of local American Protective 
Leagues for failing to participate in Red cross and 
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Liberty Loan Drives. The uneasy relationship with the 
wider American citizenry never changed. Testament to 
that was a brutal near-lynching incident that occured in 
Burrton, Kansas on Armistice day. 
The Rhetorical Role of Church Papers 
One can only surmise what might have happened to 
Mennonites of the untroubled generation had the church 
press folded during the Great War. Without the guidance 
of the church paper, Mennonites would not have been able 
to articulate a consistent position to outsiders, 
establish contacts and maintain ties with other 
congregations, receive instruction as to how to survive 
the "test" of war, prioritize concerns, resist public 
humiliation, and ultimately preserve their identities as 
patriotic citizens and disciples of Christ. In short, 
the influence of the church paper was incalcuable. In a 
period in which newspapers were still the primary source 
of information and entertainment, the church paper took 
on added significance. Mennonites of both Conferences 
understood the power of the printed word, publishing 
some twenty-eight church-affiliated papers. Five of the 
most influential and official church papers are analyzed 
here. The Gospel Herald, a weekly periodical edited by 
Daniel Kauffman, was the official organ of the Mennonite 
Church with a circulation of 10,500. The central voice 
of the General Conference was The Mennonite edited by 
52 
s. M. Grubb. This publication found itself in 
approximately 950 Mennonite homes each week. For all 
German-speaking Mennonites, c. E. Krehbiel edited the 
weekly Der Herold. Although its readership was primarily 
confined to the Western District churches, it had a 
circulation of approximately 2,000. The Christian 
Evangel, a monthly paper with 800 subscribers, was 
edited by BenJamin Esch. This paper served the Central 
conference which was soon to become a district of the 
General Conference. Another monthly, The Christian 
Monitor, edited by H. Frank Reist, served the Mennonite 
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Church with 3,300 readers. 
The weekly periodicals deserve special attention 
because they were the most influential forums for 
Mennonite news. More than the monthly papers, they 
attempted to be a complete information source for church 
members. The Gospel Herald began publication in 1908 
under the editorship of Daniel Kauffman--a post the 
influential bishop of the MC held for thirty-nine years. 
Kauffman essentially used his post to mold the life and 
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thought of the MC's. The first editorial in the first 
issue of The Gospel Herald expressed its editor's high 
expectations: 
It shall be the aim of the Gospel Herald to 
I 
defend and promulgate the doctrines of the 
Bible and of the Mennonite Church; to labor 
for the promotion of love, unity, peace, 
piety, and purity in the home and in the 
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church; to encourage the spreading of the 
Gospel by means of pure literature, mission 
work and evangelistic efforts; to serve as a 
medium through which the whole brotherhood may 
keep informed as to the condition, work, and 
progress of the church; to stand by and 
encourage all efforts put forth for the 
upbuilding of the cause and the salvation of 
the lost, whether such efforts are by 
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individuals or institutions. 
Eight years later as the European crisis proliferated, 
Kauffman again saw fit to articulate the paper's 
mission. Keenly aware that the war was a disturbing, and 
seemingly overwhelming, concern, Kauffman emphasized the 
paper's ability to solidify group identity and provide 
strength for individuals: 
The object of a church paper ought to be not 
only to defend and to promulgate the principles 
and doctrines for which the Church stands but 
also to strengthen every individual, every 
congregation every institution, and every 
conference in the church. The way to 
strengthen is not only to enlighten and support 
but also to influence for truth and 
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righteousness. 
Under Kauffman's direction, the Gospel Herald was, as 
one Mennonite scholar has observed: "always sane, 
constructive, unifying, never factional, sensational, or 
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destructive. What it may have lost thereby in color and 
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interest, it gained in dignity and respect." 
Specifically, the Gospel Herald provided news and 
promotional matter of special interest to Mennonites, 
including editorials, mission reports, church school 
updates, church music, peace material, church history, 
conference reports, Christian education, a family circle 
page, a devotional column, a guide to the Sunday-school 
lesson, book reviews, poems, prayers, and comments on 
the world religious scene. Its only form of advertising 
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was for the Mennonite Publishing House. 
The official English language organ of the GC's, 
The Mennonite was first conceived by N. B. Grubb in 1885 
for the purpose of uniting "the younger generation [of 
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GC's] who did not read German." In 1915, Silas (S. M.) 
Grubb, a son of the first editor, took over its 
editorship, holding that post for the next twenty-one 
years. Since its inception, The Mennonite had carried 
the motto: "Other foundation can no man lay than that is 
laid, which is Jesus Christ," using the Corinthian 
passage to remind readers of Menno Simons' efforts to 
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found the Mennonite faith on this very principle. Like 
Kauffman, Grubb saw the need to call attention to the 
paper's ability to provide security and group cohesion 
during the European crisis. He wrote in late 1916: 
The purpose of The Mennonite is to provide a 
paper for the Mennonite people which represents 
their interests and brings to them information 
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concerning the various activities of the 
brotherhood •••• It is not too much to 
expect that everyone be interested in building 
up and supporting so important an institution 
as the church paper. The Mennonite is not 
conducted for profit •••• If subscriptions 
to be what they should be, every subscriber 
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must be a 'booster.• 
The Mennonite was more liberal than its MC counterpart. 
In addition to including devotional articles, GC 
activities, mission and relief work, and news of GC 
congregations and schools, it made room for a full-page 
"News of the Week" wherein secular concerns were 
highlighted. Characteristic of its progressive 
tendencies were advertisements for various and sundry 
products reserved for the last page. Recognizing the 
ethnic diversity and perhaps a greater degree of 
progressivism among General Conference Mennonites, Grubb 
intended for his publication to accurately reflect its 
readership. The synthesis of sacred and secular 
materials was just one indication. 
The German companion to The Mennonite was even more 
of a journalistic experiment for Mennonites. Described 
as "a pioneer in Mennonite journalism" by some 
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scholars, Der Herold was devoted to combining 
religious and secular interests in a far more equitable 
way than even The Mennonite. Moreover, the weekly was 
dotted liberally with advertisements. One is struck by 
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the seeming irony of a German language newspaper 
appearing more American than its English language 
counterparts. Presumably, the existence of a German 
church paper was attributed to the desire on the part of 
General Conference Mennonites to preserve their cultural 
heritage. This certainly was one of its functions as 
envisioned by its editor, c. E. Krehbiel. But a more 
accurate assessment of Der Herold's mission was that it 
truly aimed to appeal to the hyphenated Mennonite. 
General Conference members were German-Americans and Der 
Herold was, "a barometer of the vitality of sectarian 
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distinctiveness" and of the successfulness of the 
great melting pot experiment. Mennonites of the central 
plains were products of their homeland who were slowly, 
and sometimes grudgingly, becoming tempered by their new 
home. Der Herold functioned to preserve cultural 
identity but not at the expense of insulating Mennonite 
communities from all American influences. 
As its editor from 1909-1920, Krehbiel personified 
German Mennonite distinctiveness tempered by an 
ecumenical and worldly outlook. Krehbiel was born in the 
Palatinate in Germany. He received his schooling at the 
Mennonite Preparatory School at Halstead, Kansas and at 
the Kansas State Normal at Emporia. He entered 
Presbyterian Theological Seminary in New Jersey, and 
attended the University of Berlin, Germany before taking 
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over the editorship of Der Herold. Krehbiel brought to 
the rural paper a rich German background, a sharp mind, 
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and a "worldly" education. Given Krehbiel's background, 
it was not incongruous for this rural church paper to 
feature secular news on the front page. As the war 
progressed, Krehbiel gave his readers brief factual 
updates on the war front from all corners of the globe. 
Mennonites who did not subscribe to Der Herold had to 
read about such worldly events in their city, not 
church, paper. 
The three weekly and two monthly church papers 
served an extremely important rhetorical role. 
Mennonites of both conferences obeyed the command found 
in I Tim. 4:13: to give attendance to reading. In his 
book The Conservative Viewpoint published in 1918, 
Daniel Kauffman espoused the belief that reading good 
works would preserve Mennonitism. "Reading maketh a full 
man--and it depends upon the character of our reading 
matter as to what the nature and effect of our fullness 
is," he began. "The literature of a church should cover 
a wide range," Kauffman continued, because "this world 
is flooded with literature of all kinds of types. We 
are in a reading age [and] the best antidote to 
poisonous literature is to keep the homes well supplied 
with literature that is wholesome, pure, instructive, 
edifying, and exerting a positive influence for truth 
and righteousness." Kauffman concluded by observing 
that: "As a rule, the loyalty of any membership may be 
accurately gauged by its loyalty to the literature of 
61 
the church." In essence, subscribing to church 
58 
literature better insured both the MC's and the GC's 
that Mennonitism would not only survive but flourish in 
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CHAPTER THREE 
MORAL AUTHORITIES FROM AFAR: 
MENNONITES PASS JUDGMENT ON THE EUROPEAN CRISIS 
The Untroubled Generation 
Mennonites were not untouched by the social 
optimism, economic success and religious vitality of the 
Progressive era {1900-1917). Their farms prospered, 
their ideal of peace was espoused by non-Mennonites, 
their churches grew, mission activity soared, and their 
leaders were growing politically conscious as never 
before. Prominent scholars, like c. Henry Smith, began 
to identify Mennonitism with American democracy, 
claiming that both were overlapping movements of the 
1 
common people. Mennonites living in America in the 
early years of the twentieth century were, as historian 
James Juhnke has aptly identified, members of "the 
2 
untroubled generation." Unlike the tortured history of 
their Anabaptist forefathers, and unlike the nomadic 
existence of their immigrant ancestors, Mennonite 
communities prior to World War I were stable, 
comfortable, even tranquil. Juhnke portrays the 
Mennonites of this generation as "not greatly troubled 
by the problems of being Mennonite, German, and 
American," and as having "an unquestioning confidence 
that it was both possible and right to enjoy the fruits 
of American citizenship while preserving the German-
3 
Mennonite culture and religious heritage." 
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Such confidence and optimism in the Mennonite 
community carried over to their attitudes on the 
European crisis. As one country after the other became 
drawn into the powder keg that Germany had ignited, 
Mennonites continued to harbor the belief that the 
United states could not possibly become involved. When 
Daniel Kauffman, editor of the Gospel Herald, posed the 
question to his readers in early 1915: "Will the United 
States be dragged into the desperate struggle in Europe 
before it is all over?" He answered almost 
apologetically: "[I]t is not that we feel any special 
alarm that these lines are penned. We are glad for the 
widespread conviction in favor of peace, and our prayers 
ascend to God that this awful carnage may never reach 
4 
the shores of America." Even after the sinking of the 
Lusitania, Mennonites remained convinced that their 
country would not abandon neutrality. Shortly after the 
incident, s. M. Grubb consoled readers of The Mennonite 
with the encouraging remark: "We prefer, even at this 
time, to be optimistic. Matters have not yet gone so far 
that they cannot be amicably settled if there remains a 
sincere desire on the part of those in whose hands 
5 
Providence has placed the destiny of nations ...• " 
Not only did Mennonites think that the United 
States would continue in their role as interested 
observers of the European conflict, but they wanted to 
believe that it would end quickly. Mennonites were 
prepared to give their own quick fix solution. Kauffman 
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proposed: "If all people professing to be followers of 
the Prince of Peace would live true to their profession 
it would so deplete the armies of Europe that the rest 
6 
would in all probability stop fighting." 
As the crisis proliferated in the early months of 
1917, Mennonites watched with unparalleled interest the 
debate over compulsory military service in their own 
country. Eight weeks before America entered the war, 
Mennonites predicted the defeat of the Chamberlain bill 
that would make military service compulsory for all 
able-bodied young men between the ages of eighteen and 
twenty-one. "We are glad to note that there is still a 
healthy public sentiment against such a law," wrote 
Kauffman, adding for good measure: "There is a clause in 
the u. s. Constitution prohibiting Congress from passing 
any law abridging the freedom of religion on the part of 
7 
any of its subjects." In short, Mennonite rhetoric 
between the years 1914 and early 1917 showed little 
evidence of an impending crisis prior to Wilson's 
declaration of war. 
With such certainty that their boys would not be 
called to fight for their country, Mennonites remained 
silent on how the church should prepare for war. 
Specifically, they paid scant attention to the war in 
their English language church newspapers, worried little 
about articulating that which was distinctive about the 
Mennonite peace position, and made no efforts to 
establish a lobbying voice with other peace churches. 
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Had Mennonites even contemplated United States 
intervention, their spokespersons might have addressed 
these three concerns rather carefully. 
In the three years before u. s. involvement, The 
Mennonite published only ten editorials relating to the 
European crisis, four in 1915 and six between the years 
1916 and April of 1917. The Gospel Herald did only 
slightly better, reporting on the war eight times in 
1915 and five times thereafter. The Christian Monitor, 
more than the other two newspapers, downplayed the 
significance of the war, printing only two editorials in 
all of 1916. It would seem that the editorial policy of 
each of these periodicals was to minimize the war. The 
political world had very little relevance when more 
pressing church matters were at hand. Besides, 
Mennonites were nonconformists. Their faith dictated a 
devotion to sacred, not secular, concerns. 
Peace issues dominated Mennonite newspapers as they 
had for centuries in times of peace and war. What is 
striking, however, about much of the peace literature 
that appeared prior to 1917, was that it was drawn from 
that of other religious groups, and secular newspapers. 
A few of the articles were from other branches of 
Mennonites, but many were from other denominations. This 
practice was evident no less than twenty-five times in 
the three years that preceded the United States 
8 
entanglement in the war. 
A good example was the March 16, 1916 edition of 
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the Gospel Herald. The entire Doctrinal Section--a 
section which occupied the premiere position in the 
paper--was devoted to an article that appeared in the 
North American Review entitled: "Was Jesus A 
9 
Militarist?" No analysis or application to Mennonitism 
followed. Apparently, Mennonites felt that their own 
peace position was clear enough. Nonetheless, that 
Mennonites so frequently consulted outside sources to 
support a peace stance was curious. As Mennonite scholar 
Karl Kreider states: "It is almost paradoxical that a 
Mennonite paper should seek teachings on a subject such 
10 
as nonresistance in papers that are not Mennonite." 
That this practice stopped so abruptly after the 
declaration of war was a result of other religious 
bodies dropping their peace positions and the exigencies 
of war making a more distinctly Mennonite teaching 
11 
necessary. 
Despite borrowing heavily from other denominations 
to document the viability of nonresistance, Mennonites 
did not establish formal ties with any other peace 
churches before the war. No ties were drawn with the 
Quakers or Brethren in anticipation of defending 
themselves to interventionists. Their faith was secure, 
or so they believed. Forming ties with other peace 
churches in order to build an effective lobbying voice 
in Washington seemed pointless at the time. After war 





Though Mennonites doubted that America would go to 
war and generally downplayed the events of war in their 
English language newspapers, they did not dismiss the 
European skirmish as merely signs of sin in the world. 
Between 1915 and early 1917, editors of Mennonite papers 
adopted three disparate roles. True to Mennonite 
principles, they often became apolitical moral 
authorities, indicting the actions of all warring 
parties as morally reprehensible. Yet, at times, they 
abandoned their apolitical position. Editors 
occasionally joined the fray over national preparedness 
and voiced intense opposition to United States foreign 
policy. Finally, Mennonite editors sometimes dropped all 
pretense of neutrality and Mennonite unity by offering 
tacit support to either the Allied or the Central 
Powers. These roles did not unfold chronologically; 
rather, they are analyzed here in a descending order of 
faithfulness to Mennonite ideals in order to illumine 
Mennonite rhetorical choices and to foreshadow the 
eventual problems that Mennonites would encounter in 
preserving Mennonite identity and unity. 
The editors of Mennonite newspapers did not 
hesitate to protest the warring nations and their 
leaders. Such moral reprehension was entirely consistent 
with Mennonitism as long as the attacks applied to all 
parties involved. Mennonite writers portrayed themselves 
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as authorities in the moral sphere. From the safe 
distance of American shores, Mennonites felt comfortable 
invoking epithets to describe the European scene. "What 
a horrid thing this is," preached Kauffman in 1915, "men 
and nations drunk with commercialism, grasping after 
this world's wealth and glory, maddened that some rival 
dared to oppose them in their selfish ambitions, 
sacrificing thousands of innocent boys upon the altar of 
greed though many of them had to be forced to go to 
13 
war." Such a passage was representative of the 
dramatic flair with which the Gospel Herald exposed the 
moral bereftness of warring people and the immeasurable 
damage they reaped. A year later the Gospel Herald 
described in detail the savagery of the soldier: 
Think of the soldier on the field, with gun in 
hand or revolver and sword at his side, his 
heart is filled with excitement and hatred, 
fired to a still greater pitch by seeing that 
his best friend is falling, killed by a bullet 
from the enemy's guns, his conscience seared, 
his heart hardening, his moral qualities 
dying. He is determined to kill as many as 
possible to save his own life. The brute 
nature is developing as the moral nature is 
14 
receding. 
The moral lesson was all too clear. War is ugly, 
terrifying, and dehumanizing. The graphic detail and 
sweeping claims appealed to readers on an emotional 
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level. Moreover, in discussing the European crisis in an 
ahistorical context, Mennonites could reaffirm their 
belief that all war was the same; this war like every 
war that had preceded it was sinful. As good Christians 
Mennonites could only "[p]ray for the deluded monarchs 
and others responsible for the war" in the hope that 
"their eyes may be opened to the monumental folly they 
15 
are perpetuating .•• 11 
Joining Kauffman in passing judgment on the 
"awfulness of war" was s. M. Grubb of The Mennonite. But 
rather than denounce the war in abstract biblical 
teachings, Grubb offered a sophisticated critique of the 
shallowness of this particular war. "The apologists for 
the present great war, now in its third year of horrors, 
pretend to see some good things in it and insist that in 
the end it shall be a great blessing, [but] are valor 
and patriotism best illustrated on the battle field 
where the individuals are nothing but so many senseless 
pawns in the hands of those who play the game?" Grubb 
inquired. Then, using a series of rhetorical questions 
to refute any meritorious points about the present war 
and to expose the racist and classist attitudes of its 
warring leaders, Grubb charged: "[F]or whose country are 
the black men on the French battle fields dying? For 
whom have the Poles been shedding their blood? Whose 
country's fate is at stake when negroes in Africa under 
Boor officials fight other negroes in Africa under 
German officials?" Grubb's keen scrutiny of the affairs 
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in Europe led him to boldly conclude: "It is nothing but 
16 
murder." 
Strong talk from a quiet people was perfectly 
acceptable when their primary purpose in life was to be 
moral exemplars of Christ's teachings. But when moral 
reprimand turned to political debate, Mennonites tred 
outside their own prescribed sphere of authority. In 
several instances, Mennonite writings wandered into 
specific policy attacks on national preparedness, 
compulsory military service, and the idea of peace with 
honor. In opposing military preparedness, for instance, 
The Mennonite carried the caustic remark: "It seems that 
our politicians (we will refrain from dignifying them 
with the name of statesmen) have been so blind that they 
could not see the fallacy of the doctrine, -~he way to 
insure peace is to prepare for war• •••• We protest. 
17 
The only way to insure peace is to prepare for peace." 
A year later the same paper was more aggressive in 
protesting the folly of preparedness: 
'To insure peace we must prepare for war' now 
proves itself to have been a mere handful! of 
dust thrown into the eyes of the people to 
blind them to awful results of a military 
program prepared and carried out by the 
'jingoes' of nearly every nation. The policy 
of holding the nation ready to defend its 
rights or even its life, has now resolved 
itself into a policy of 'Be ready so that you 
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can take your neighbor unawares and rob him 
of his possessions, kill his soldiers, starve 
18 
his little ones and ravish his women. 
So opposed were Mennonites to national preparedness 
that one church took the unprecedented step of writing 
the President to register their disapproval. 
Demonstrating rhetorical sensitivity, Mennonites in Ohio 
adopted a calm, cerebral approach. Their letter began: 
"Knowing that there are differences of opinion 
concerning military preparedness for the maintenance of 
peace and knowing the desire of his excellency to 
execute the wishes of the people, we hereby voice our 
19 
disapproval of greater military preparedness." Still 
unfamiliar with American protocol in addressing the 
president of the United States, it was not atypical for 
some Mennonites to rely on titles like "his excellency," 
or "your highness," titles their European ancestors had 
used for the monarchy in power. Mennonites did not fully 
understand, nor feel comfortable in taking part in 
democratic procedures, like the right to petition, 
because active attempts to influence national public 
policy were shunned by the tenets of their faith. An 
occasional protest of greater military preparedness, 
they must have reasoned, would not make them political 
activists. 
But obJections to United States foreign policy 
continued, though sporadically. Cornelius c. Wedel, 
pastor of a large church in Goessel, Kansas and leader 
73 
of many General Conference activities, appealed to 
readers of Der Herold to write letters to President 
Wilson to keep the United States out of war. "Use the 
right of petition," Wedel urged, "Tell the president to 
use the power given him by Congress to stop the export 
20 
of war materials from our country." Such an unusual 
command to become active in the affairs of state was, no 
doubt, shocking to some. 
Mennonites showed an unprecedented awareness of 
politics between the years 1914-1916, in part, because 
prior to the national elections they had confidence in 
Woodrow Wilson and had supported his idea of strict 
neutrality. Writing on the front page of the Gospel 
Herald, in May of 1915, Kauffman commended Wilson's 
efforts: 
Just now the President of the United States is 
setting a worthy example to the rules of other 
countries by declaring himself for peace, 
although the United States has suffered 
greater provocation than some other nations 
that allowed themselves to become involved in 
war. We would be glad to see President Wilson 
go farther and declare himself against war 
under any circumstances, but we are grateful 
21 
for his resolute stand for peace .. 
After the Lusitania affair when Wilson issued an 
ultimatum to Germany, c. E. Krehbiel, writing in Der 
Herold, judged it to be "the most significant document 
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written since the outset of the war because it stood so 
22 
clearly for justice and humanity." Grubb, too, 
championed Wilson's diplomatic handling of Germany: 
"[W]ere it not for the sane deliberation of our 
President, [we] would have by this time been fanned into 
a fury that could have only one end, or rather 
beginning--the plunging of the American people into the 
awful nightmare of bloodshed now possessing half of the 
23 
earth's population." Grubb remained a solid supporter 
of Wilson through 1917. When other Mennonites had grown 
dissatisfied with Wilson's peace position, Grubb 
defended him. "The president, Mr. Wilson, did more than 
any ruler before him ever did to bring about peace and 
in so doing he risked the contempt and ridicule of most 
of his countrymen, to say nothing of that of the rest of 
24 
the world." 
Although Mennonites took the unusual step of 
politicizing their concerns, supporting Wilson in his 
stance of neutrality, and disapproving of military 
preparedness and the sending of arms to fan the crisis, 
these were measures that only reflected a genuine 
yearning on the part of an increasingly acculturated 
people who still believed in unconditional nonresistance 
that their country not go to war. 
What is more difficult to understand is why a 
nonresistant people abandoned their neutral position on 
the combatants in Europe. It is difficult to imagine a 
peace-loving people in sympathy with one side of the 
75 
conflict or the other. c. E. E. Krehbiel strained to 
retain a position of neutrality when he wrote: "If we 
believe in nonresistance, we will not prescribe for the 
good Lord to whom He must give the victory in order to 
25 
be "neutral.'" But German-Mennonites, including 
Krehbiel, had difficulty repressing their pride in the 
German nation. Though Krehbiel attempted to transcend 
his identity as a hyphenated American with such 
diplomatic remarks as: "All parties in the Lusitania 
tragedy were guilty--the English for transporting 
munitions on a passenger ship, the Americans for 
traveling on such a ship, and the Germans for having 
26 
done the destructive deed," Der Herold's sympathy for 
Germany was usually thinly veiled. Juhnke notes that 
"Until the United States' entry into the war, Der Herold 
••• provided Mennonite readers with a weekly fare of 
apologies for the fatherland from German correspondents 
27 
and from the German-American press." While American 
newspaper headlines screamed of atrocities by German 
barbarians, Mennonites were reading in their newspaper, 
Der Herold that: "The treatment of the Germans in France 
and Belgium is flatly horrible," and "The causes of the 
present war are the expansionism and lust of [sic] power 
of barbaric and despotic Russia, the desire for revenge 
28 
of France, and the economic jealousy of England." 
Krehbiel made it a policy to print letters from friends 
in Germany, many of whom were still moved by the 
defensive reassurance of Heinrich Heine's famous line: 
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"Lieb Vaterland magst ruhig sein. Fest stecht und treu 
29 
die Wacht am Rhein.!" 
Even the advertisement section of Der Herold was 
affected by a pro-German bias. In late 1914, an 
advertisement appeared for the book Germany and the Next 
War by German General Friederich von Bernhardi. The 
book, available for thirty-five cents from the Herold 
Book Store, was a glorification of war as a political, 
30 
biological, and moral necessity. Though it is unknown 
how many German-Mennonites supported their fatherland 
with the purchase of books like these, it is known that 
between the years 1914 and 1916, Mennonites contributed 
sizable sums of money to the German Red Cross. Der 
Herold served as a collecting center for contributions 
for the German Red Cross and regularly published names 
of contributors. Such lists indicated that support for 
Germany was not isolated, but a community enterprise 
because the greatest contributions came through 
31 
collective church donations. 
Though German patriotism flowed freely in the 
Mennonite press, it did not receive immediate attention 
from the larger public. This is not surprising since Der 
Herold was printed in German, it did not circulate 
beyond isolated Mennonite communities, and since only 
the German Mennonites who most recently immigrated to 
the United States championed the German war efforts. 
But still the question remains as to why a 
nonresistant people supported any country at war. Juhnke 
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explains that in addition to their cultural ties with 
Germany, many Mennonites assumed that the war would 
remain in Europe. Thus, "they saw no contradiction 
between their religious belief in the gospel of peace 
and their cultural commitment to the advance of the 
32 
German nation through war." Perhaps it was just as 
true that German-Mennonites opposed United States 
intervention for ethnic, more than religious 
convictions. 
Mennonites of the Mennonite Church stood in sharp 
opposition to their General Conference German-Mennonite 
counter-parts. MC Mennonites of Swiss ethnicity wanted 
nothing to do with supporting Germany, even through 
humanitarian means. But like the GC's of German descent, 
Mennonites of the MC conference had difficulty retaining 
a neutral stance. Their sympathy was with the Allied, 
33 
not Central, powers. Even GC Mennonites who spoke 
English as their first language resented the German 
patriotism of Der Herold, one of their official 
conference papers for German-speaking Mennonites. They, 
too, found the German war machine indefensible and 
tended to sympathize with those countries Germany had 
attacked. The Mennonite had only harsh words for Germany 
in the fall of 1916: 
The teutons struck the first blow, they 
invaded and made a desert of little Belgium, 
they plowed through Servia with swords, they 
annihilated Montenegro and they seized a large 
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portion of France before these nations had a 
chance to realize that the war was on. Yet, 
the German press and people assume an injured 
air whenever the suggestion is made that 
34 
theirs is not strictly a war of defense. 
Even the hyphenated Americans of German descent did 
not escape the ire of The Mennonite. "The hyphenated 
Americans," Grubb began, "are showing an inclination to 
spell America with a little a, insisting at the same 
time, that they get their so-called right to demand 
particular partiality from the American public for the 
country they preferred to abandon when they made the 
35 
United States their home." Calling their demands 
"confusing" and "unsettling," Grubb's dissatisfaction 
with German-Americans could have applied to German-
Mennonites within his own conference, even though he was 
more than likely referring to supporters of the German 
American Alliance. 
No doubt, Grubb and other anti-German Mennonites 
were relieved that the Mennonite stance of pro-Germanism 
evident in Der Herold was little known prior to 
America's entrance in the war. Unfortunately, it was not 
a stance that Mennonites could dismiss or downplay once 
America declared war and Mennonites came under public 
scrutiny. It was a position for which all Mennonites, 
whether they had embraced German patriotism or not, 
would have to pay a stiff price. Had Mennonites 
envisioned that America would be drawn into the 
79 
international crisis, they might have avoided this 
fateful blunder by speaking in a unified voice. 
Mennonites did not register any real forboding of danger 
until shortly before the declaration of war. The early 
February edition of The Mennonite ventured so far as to 
say: "Should events progress, as they threaten to do, 
the American Mennonites are sure to get their fiery 
36 
trial of persecution." That very scenario was soon to 
unfold. But as part of their last-ditch efforts to 
inform the government of their "historic peace position" 
just days before United States intervention, Mennonites 
of the untroubled generation continued to cling to an 
optimistic outlook that their future would be bright. 
Even were their country to be drawn into the war, they 
reasoned, their placid existence would remain 
uninterrupted and their peace principle understood. 
Testament to that was the letter drawn up by MC bishops 
in Pennsylvania to their Congressman on March 29, 1917: 
"You are familiar with the position which the Mennonites 
take with reference to carnal warfare," they began, "our 
attitude is usually called 'nonresistance.' We might 
explain this attitude at greater length, but we believe 
that you are fully acquainted with our position and need 
37 
no further explanation." Mennonites of this generation 
had truly forgotten what it was like to live in a 
country at war. Americans were not fully acquainted with 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A MYRIAD OF RHETORICAL OBSTACLES 
IN THE WAKE OF UNITED STATES INTERVENTION 
When war officially came in early April, Mennonites 
were ill-prepared. Having harbored an unrealistic, but 
comforting, hope that the war in Europe would end before 
the United States had to fire a single shot, Mennonites 
created an unfortunate situation for themselves. Their 
deliberative rhetoric and naive optimism prior to United 
States intervention made the rhetorical challenges they 
would confront during the war all the more difficult. 
How would they present themselves as loyal American 
citizens and a quiet, apolitical people when they had 
vigorously debated American foreign policy and even 
sympathized with Germany prior to the war? More 
specifically, how would they combat the accusations of 
pro-Germanism when many of them spoke German and read 
only their German church paper? How would they defend 
their historic peace position after failing to emphasize 
it before the war began? 
News of America's intervention sent shock waves 
through tranquil, isolated Mennonite communities. 
Mennonites were completely unprepared for the war 
mentality that transformed the country overnight. 
Shortly after April 6, a special meeting of the Western 
District church leaders of the General Conference was 
hurriedly arranged to discuss how Mennonites should 
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respond to the inevitable demands from their country. In 
an attempt to subtly retract their earlier political 
interest in the war, the meeting was advertised in Der 
Herold as a gathering whose purpose "naturally is not 
political, or to decide who is right in this war that is 
going on. The intention of this meeting is to look at 
1 
the Biblical stance." The minutes of that meeting, 
however, reflect the failure of all Mennonites to keep 
abreast of the escalating international crisis, and to 
publicize their peace position. One spokesman at the 
meeting expressed the collective concern of the 
Mennonite community: "No one would have thought, at 
least would have expected, that everything would change 
so suddenly, blow upon blow. Yes, it is like a dream 
2 
what has happened." C.E. Krehbiel's early report on the 
meeting's proceedings accurately guaged the lack of 
preparedness in articulating basic tenets of the faith. 
"[T]his week we just happened to come up on some notes, 
a referendum of defenselessness, which Dr. s. s. Haury 
wrote in the year 1894, and presented it at a Sunday 
School Convention, and we are going to print a part of 
that" at the meeting, Krehbiel told readers of Der 
3 
Herold. 
The manner in which news of America's entrance in 
the war was reported in Mennonite newspapers reflected 
the same surprise reaction. Members of the Mennonite 
Church read in the April 12, edition of the Gospel 
Herald an article by the editor that continued to foster 
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the hope of a quick return to peace: "We are still 
praying that, even though war has actually been 
declared, something may happen that will bring to an end 
the awful world conflict of the past few years before it 
4 
can spread much farther. II 
While the Gospel Herald gave front page coverage to 
the news of United States intervention, articles on this 
subject are conspicuously absent from the front page of 
the April 12 issue of The Mennonite. In giving the 
biggest news of the century no more than two columns on 
the fourth page, the editor of The Mennonite was 
perpetuating an historic Mennonite position concerning 
war: We should not devote attention to, nor become 
involved in, the sinful practice of carnal warfare. The 
General Conference companion for German-speaking 
Mennonites had only slightly more foresight on u. s. 
intervention. "War will be declared," Der Herold 
reported almost matter-of-factly on April 5th, adding 
"The United States of America in a war against Germany," 
as if the reality of the previous statement had not 
quite registered. Consistent with the editorial policies 
of other Mennonite papers, Der Herold did not break the 
news of war with screaming headlines or lengthy 
analysis. But perhaps more so than the other church 
papers, Der Herold recognized the difficult rhetorical 
burdens of justifying Mennonitism in a country at war, 
especially if one were also a German-Mennonite. Resigned 
from the beginning at the prospect of dealing with the 
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war, Krehbiel wrote: "We wished they would have done 
things differently. It's all past •••• How thousands 
of us feel will never be known ••• We see so much 
5 
tragedy coming. 
Mennonites saw "so much tragedy coming" because 
they were constrained in publicizing their position to 
outsiders by their religious principles. Their 
rhetorical problems can be viewed from a psycho-
sociological, historical, and ideological perspective. 
Psycho-Sociological Constraints 
Philosopher Maurice Natanson writes that in 
argument we rarely abandon the comfortable posture of 
uninvolvement because we do not like to take the risks 
necessary to explore our convictions. We would rather 
win or lose an argument without putting our selves at 
issue. In impersonal argument anyone can take the place 
of one of the participants, just as any bridge player 
can take over the hand of another player and make use of 
6 
certain bidding possibilities. As long as the war 
remained on distant soil, Mennonites could enjoy the 
comfortable posture of editorializing about the 
disputants. Mennonites were not, after all, being forced 
by their fellow citizens to stand up for their own 
convictions. However, when, as Natanson continues, our 
core beliefs are at issue, and the argumentative 
-
situation demands the confrontation of both parties, 
then argument is intensely personal. It becomes what 
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Natanson terms "genuine argument." Genuine argument "is 
immanently directed to the risking of privacy itself" 
because it means that we open ourselves to the 
possibility that our interlocutor will make us see 
something of the structure of our world that we have 
8 
never seen before. Metaphorically, Natanson suggests 
that "risking the self in argument is inviting a 
stranger to the interior familiarity of our home, not 
merely the living room of the floor plan but the living 
9 
space of a private sphere." 
Natanson's theory provides an insightful 
psychological perspective on the initial reluctance of 
Mennonites to engage in genuine argument once America 
entered the war. Mennonites chose to live in isolated 
communities in order to preserve their distinctive world 
view and to avoid any confrontative situation with 
outsiders that might invite existential risk. 
Several statements from Mennonite periodicals 
illustrate the Mennonites' unwillingness to become 
personally involved in their justification of 
nonresistance. On August 29, 1917, the MC's adopted an 
official statement of their position on military 
service. In this document, the bishops, deacons, and 
delegates of various congregations recommended that 
Mennonites "avoid heated controversy with those who do 
not agree with us on points of doctrine •• 
recommendation reflected the unwanted risk of 





arguments. A similar attitude was expressed in The 
Christian Evangel, the official organ of the Central 
Conference of Mennonites. When the Secretary of War, 
Newton Baker, issued instructions to nonresisters in 
September of 1917, editor Benjamin Esch cautioned 
Mennonite ministers on publicizing such information 
outside the church. "Let ministers give out this 
information to their people in a quiet and unassuming 
manner, so as not to create any unnecessary local 
11 
prejudices or uprisings," he urged. Yet perhaps the 
most candid statement on the futility of explaining the 
Mennonite position to outsiders was made by editor S. 
M. Grubb of The Mennonite. "I cannot see how we can 
impress this feeling upon our countrymen now when they 
are angry and smarting under unprovoked injuries imposed 
upon them by a devilish foe." Grubb continued to express 
his pessimism about dealing with outsiders by stating: 
"Getting into peace arguments just now may mean getting 
12 
into jail with nothing accomplished." 
Mennonites voiced reluctance at defending their way of 
life to a patriotic public throughout the course of the 
war, but they eventually realized that ignoring the 
situation was untenable in light of the passage of the 
Selective Service Act on May 18, 1917, and the numerous 
Red Cross and Liberty Loan campaigns that attempted to 
I 
gain the support of every American citizen. Jonas s. 
Hartzler, a prominent leader in the Mennonite Church, 
reluctantly voiced what all Mennonites were forced to 
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acknowledge: "To say that we will not do anything that 
in any way is connected with the war is folly. We can 
13 
not get away from it." Nor could Mennonites get away 
with constructing justifications of nonresistance based 
on superficial argument. Since Mennonitism is a way of 
life, any attempt to explain their rejection of military 
service to outsiders necessarily entailed explicating a 
world view, and, ultimately, exposing the very meaning 
of their lives. Mennonites grudgingly acknowledged that 
they had no choice but to become personally involved in 
their arguments. Mennonites realized, however, that by 
exposing the meaning of their lives, they put themselves 
in a position of extreme vulnerability. If counter-
arguments by their fellow citizens proved unanswerable, 
then, in Natanson's words, an "existential disruption" 
14 
of their "affective worlds could result"; Mennonites 
could find themselves re-examining their whole way of 
life. 
Although Mennonites gradually felt that they had to 
explain their world view, they predicted that their 
beliefs would be judged unacceptable by the greater 
American public. Viewed from a second psycho-
sociological angle, Mennonites would experience the same 
problems that all movements encounter when they try to 
explain their practices to outsiders. Members of 
movements typically act in accordance with a reality 
that is distinct from the reality of the larger social 
order. As a result, sociologist Joseph Gusfield 
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explains: "The beliefs of any social movement ••• 
amount to a paradigm of experience by which the ideology 
and program of the movement appear right, just, and 
proper only to a particular segment of society, because 
it alone has undergone the experiences which could make 
15 
the ideology seem both relevant and valid." Gusfield's 
statement capsulizes the problem that Mennonites faced 
in communicating to the public. The central beliefs of 
the Mennonite faith are "right, just, and proper" to 
individuals who are witnesses to the ideology. How 
could Mennonitism be made relevant to those who had not 
been exposed to their "paradigm of experience"? 
Complementing Gusfield's view, is the sociological 
explanation that Americans simply did not want to 
understand a conflicting ideology in the throes of war. 
Americans had made a total commitment to supporting the 
war by giving their time, their money, and their lives 
in order to preserve freedom throughout the world. No 
matter how sound the arguments were in support of 
nonresistance, the Mennonite position could not hold up 
against a fever pitch of militaristic patriotism. With 
Americans preoccupied with winning the war as quickly as 
possible, Mennonites recognized that their patriotic 
neighbors were hardly inclined to be sympathetic, 
patient listeners. Yet they also knew that an accurate 
explanation for their belief in unconditional 
nonresistance would take time--time on their part to 
explain why nonresistance was a central Mennonite tenet 
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and how it is consistent with other Mennonite tenets, 
and time on the part of the American public to listen, 
read, and absorb their arguments. 
Not only did the emotionalism generated by the war 
prevent Americans from listening to the Mennonites' 
self-defense, but it created a backlash of anger which 
was often released at those who balked at supporting the 
war. Americans had little tolerance for "un-American" 
beliefs when the President was urging unanimous support 
for a righteous, flag-waving cause. As a religious group 
removed from the mainstream of protestantism, the 
Mennonite church has always fluctuated between 
legitimacy and non-legitimacy--a status that 
Sociologists Irving I. Zaretsky and Mark P. Leone claim 
is entirely dependent upon whether the church challenges 
deeply held secular norms. With the doctrine of 
nonresistance, Mennonites violated the secular norm 
adopted in war times for championing militaristic 
patriotism. Therefore, their status became illegitimate. 
Zaretsky and Leone further note that the only way such 
groups can regain their legitimacy is to change their 
doctrines or to wait for some change in the secular 
16 
norms in society. Given their limited choices, 
Mennonites could not convince non-members of the 
"rightness" in their position as long as the war 
continued. In short, while some Mennonite arguments were 
convincing per se, most Americans had already committed 
themselves to the war, and, thus, any attempt by 
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Mennonites to explain biblical nonresistance fell on 
deaf ears. 
Historical Constraints 
The historical situation in which American 
Mennonites found themselves sheds light on yet another 
rhetorical problem. Mennonites were, to some degree, 
sympathetic to their fellow citizens' demands of 
sacrifice for the war. When Mennonites came under public 
scrutiny for their "un-American" resistance to war, they 
showed signs of discomfort and embarrassment. For the 
first time in the church's history, American Mennonites 
were concerned that claiming exemption from military 
service would place their citizenship in jeopardy. The 
founders of the Mennonite faith, and their followers for 
centuries after, had always refused to address war 
questions, preferring instead to flee the country, or to 
remain and endure punishment, even if it be death, 
rather than look for non-military ways to remain 
faithful citizens of their warring countries. But 
American Mennonites of the twentieth century were 
strikingly different from their European ancestors in 
this regard. American Mennonites had become 
acculturated, to some degree, to the American way of 
life and saw themselves as American citizens. Juhnke 
writes that Mennonites had absorbed the belief that it 
was natural and right for the country to expect 
17 
sacrifices from its citizens in wartime. 
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Mennonites wanted the best of both worlds; they 
wanted to convince their fellow citizens that they were 
patriotic Americans even though they could not support 
the war militarily. Yet rhetorical efforts at appeasing 
a country at war had never been attempted by their 
forefathers. American Mennonites were the first to 
express patriotic ties to their homeland. If Mennonites 
in the United States could make the American public 
understand their position without diluting the integrity 
of their faith, they would set a precedent in the 
church's history. 
While American Mennonites of the twentieth century 
expressed national loyalties unprecedented in their 
church history, the world war placed unique and 
extraordinary pressures on anyone who resisted its 
demands. After all, America was engaged in its first 
world war. The crusading spirit that swept the country 
had never been evidenced by so many Americans, nor had 
previous wars demanded the total commitment of this war. 
America had just issued its first Selective Service Act. 
Mennonites, like all conscientious objectors, did not 
know how to respond. In the last war that Mennonites 
could remember, the Spanish-American war of 1898, 
Mennonites were spared from having to deal with a 
national conscription law. America had just discovered 
the power of propaganda, and Mennonites were forced to 
compete with this daunting new threat. Americans were 
subject to a barrage of anti-German material which 
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heightened emotionalism about the war. In short, the war 
created an intense, unifying militaristic patriotism in 
America for which there was no comparison in American 
history. 
Ideological Constraints 
From an ideological perspective, the particular 
constraints placed on Mennonite rhetorical choices can 
be identified and accounted for. The church's adherence 
to a biblical paradox and four central religious 
principles created rhetorical obstacles that prevented 
Mennonites from developing a strong justification. 
Throughout the war, Mennonites insisted on enacting, not 
just affirming in some abstract sense, a biblical dictum 
that required disciples of Christ "to be in the world 
but not of it." Such a precarious enactment of this 
tenet of their faith produced rhetorical strategies that 
ostensibly were contradictory, inconsistent, even 
nonsensical to most Americans. Living in the secular 
world, but for the sacred world, meant that Mennonites 
believed that it was entirely possible to remain loyal 
to God and country, to be Good Samaritans, but not good 
soldiers. Convincing non-members that a biblical paradox 
should be interpreted literally, and in such a way that 
explains seemingly disparate rhetorical choices, 
however, proved to be an insurmountable task. 
The daunting task that Mennonites faced in publicly 
enacting a biblical paradox beyond the confines of their 
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isolated communities can be understood more clearly by 
examining the specific religious principles of 
Mennonitism. First, the doctrine of nonresistance is an 
unconditional belief in biblical pacifism. In times of 
peace, the belief that Christians do not kill but are 
the children of peace is espoused by most believers of 
the Bible. An absolutist stance, however, is deemed 
unrealistic because it fails to discriminate between 
"moral and "immoral," "defensive" and "offensive" wars. 
A literalist account of Matt. 5: 21: "Thou shalt not 
kill" is untenable, and must be abandoned in extreme 
circumstances. With such fundamental differences of how 
to interpret Scripture, Mennonites were faced with an 
overwhelming problem: How could they hope to persuade 
militaristic Americans that a doctrine of nonresistance 
was not un-American in war time? 
Second, the doctrine of nonconformity, to 
Mennonites of the early twentieth century, referred to 
outward appearance--dressing so as not to be noticed. 
Writing in his book, The Conservative Viewpoint, 
Kauffman explained that modesty and simplicity in dress 
should be the rule among people who are separated from, 
and not subject to, the vanities and follies of the 
world. "No gaudy apparel, no flashy colors, no 
superfluities, no sudden changes so as to advertise 
certain parts of the physical form, and no jewelry," 
18 
Kauffman reminded his followers. In essence, anything 
that smacked of popularity was renounced in Mennonite 
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circles as dangerous; anything peculiar was championed 
as godly. As Kauffman explained: "There is nothing that 
upsets a man or a church so quickly and so completely as 
a taste of popularity. That church is safe so long as it 
succeeds in keeping both itself and the body of its 
members out of the popular current of this world. And 
elsewhere: "Peculiarity is a natural consequence of 
19 
refusing to follow the world." An adherence to the 
principle of nonconformity has meant that Mennonites 
have had few ties with the secular world. Because the 
Mennonite faith is an exclusive one, in which members 
are "called out" from the larger social order to 
practice Christ-like discipleship amid a brotherhood of 
believers, Mennonites have never felt it important to 
gain a large popular following. Thus, Mennonites were 
not in the habit of communicating the righteousness of 
their ideology to outsiders. Moreover, one of the 
reasons that Mennonites immigrated to America was the 
hope that they could maintain cultural autonomy. This, 
of course, involved maintaining only minimal ties with 
their neighbors. 
Nonresistance and nonconformity were difficult to 
explain to militaristic Americans on a theological 
level, but they were unattractive tenets dramatistically 
conceived as well. In a society that can only celebrate 
the power of the positive, being made to see the 
goodness in the negative becomes a difficult task 
indeed. As Kenneth Burke puts it: "In an advertising 
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world that is so strong on the glorification of the 
20 
positive, how make the negative enticing?" Juhnke 
captures the the problem Mennonites faced in making 
\ 
nonresistance appealing. "Nonresistance and service were 
as related as two sides of one coin--one side negatively 
21 
charged and the other side positively charged." The 
negative is difficult to conceptualize or "make 
enticing" because as Burke continues, it is an idea, not 
22 
an image; it is a principle, not a name for a thing. 
Thus, whereas the tenets of nonresistance and 
nonconformity are understandable enough as negative 
ideas, they also have about their edges the positive 
images of resistance and conformity. Moreover, because 
the negative does not describe a real condition, it is 
more aptly conceived as a function of desire, or 
23 
unfulfilled expectations. Mennonites wanted to live 
in peace separated from worldly concerns. When the war 
erupted, their expectations did not occur. They were not 
separated from the world and they were not in a world at 
peace. Yet there is no such thing as simply not wanting 
to resist and not wanting to conform. Hence, these terms 
are incomplete as principles by themselves. Theologian 
Paul Mininger elaborates on this problem: "The ideal or 
principle of nonconformity to the world is entirely 
negative in its meaning .•. The principle says 'do 
not• but gives no suggestion as to the direction in 
which one ought to go. The Christian life is more than a 
series of negations and refusals .••• The principle by 
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itself is, therefore, incomplete." 
That the negatively-charged associations of 
nonresistance and nonconformity failed to label real 
conditions, or create positive images, prompted a public 
mindset associating such principles with passivity. J. 
s. Hartzler, a leader among the MC Mennonites complained 
that while many efforts were made by newspapers and 
public speakers to define the position of the 
nonresisters, their attempts failed because they equated 
the term with "passive resistance" and even 
25 
"cowardice." In the public's mind, wherein good deeds 
were associated with action, the Mennonite position of a 
meek and quiet presence while "turning the other cheek" 
projected the image of a do-nothing people. Reflecting 
on his experience as a conscientious objector in the 
world war, s. E. Allgyer recalled: "The Mennonites were 
better known for what they did not do then for what they 
26 
did do." Mennonites were sensitive to the disparaging 
perceptions of their "do-nothing" status, and struggled 
with how to present a positive image of who they were 
and remain true to negativistic principles of their 
faith. The tension between enacting the negative 
commands of their faith and acting out the patriotic 
demands of their government was evident in an exchange 
of opinion recorded in Der Herold. "Mennonites ought to 
behave like the Quiet in the Land that we have always 
been," voiced one member of the faith. "We should really 
27 
be do nothing people .••• " Mennonite minister H. D. 
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Penner disagreed: "We have to get more active toward our 
government rather than lambasting it all the time," 
Penner urged. "If we want to improve things we cannot 
28 
remain passive." 
Contributing to the difficulty in upholding 
negatively-charged faith principles was the issue of how 
to present their morally superior position to the 
government and public without appearing self-righteous. 
To say one believes in nonresistance is to say: Thou 
shalt not kill. But the moral overtones of these tenets 
have unfortunate consequences. As Mininger notes, "The 
practice of nonconformity among us has too often 
resulted in a negative type of goodness. We do not go to 
war, we do not steal, we do not get divorces, we do not 
gamble." As a result, Mininger continues, "One of the 
most serious limitations in our practice of 
nonconformity is the tendency toward perfectionism and 
29 
its resulting self-righteousness." Though Mennonites 
projected themselves as moral authorities on the war in 
Europe, condemning the warring nations as "unchristian," 
such a posture was inappropriate once their own nation 
was involved. For to insist on the goodness of 
nonresistance and nonconformity while rejecting service 
in the military was, consciously or not, to position 
oneself as a moral perfectionist. And communicating to 
the public as a moral superior ultimately inhibited 
efforts at identification. Nonresistance and 
nonconformity emphasized differences between Mennonites 
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and other American citizens. Even on a semantic level, 
albeit a latent one, these terms captured an 
antagonistic aspect of the relationship 
(resist/nonresist, conform/nonconform) that existed 
between Mennonites and non-Mennonites. 
Besides the principles of nonconformity and 
nonresistance, a third religious principle that created 
an obstacle for Mennonites in constructing persuasive 
arguments was that the Bible is considered the source of 
all truth. The early Dutch leader of the faith, Menno 
Simons, emphasized the belief in the centrality of the 
Bible as evidence when he wrote: "Christ commanded all 
true messengers and preachers to ••• preach the 
gospel. He does not say, preach the doctrines and 
commands of men, preach councils and customs, preach 
30 
glosses and opinions of the learned." Four centuries 
later, Daniel Kauffman upheld Simon's admonition: 
"Preach the word," Kauffman commanded, "leaving the 
matter of popular lectures on glittering generalities to 
others. The true Gospel minister finds no time for the 
31 
preaching of the things of this world." 
Inherent problems are associated with arguing from 
Scripture. First the Bible has limited relevance for 
addressing a twentieth century political issue. Stated 
simply, the war created a situation in which Mennonites 
were rhetorically irrelevant; they were forced to give 
doctrinal answers to political questions. Second, while 
many passages in the Bible can be used to support one's 
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beliefs, many other passages can be used by opponents to 
refute those beliefs. Finally, just as with the morally 
narrow-minded overtones implicit in the nonresistant and 
nonconformist principles, a Bible-centeredness 
necessarily labels opposing views as un-biblical. As 
Americans sent their sons off to sacrifice their lives 
for their country, Mennonites were arguing from the 
comfortable confines of their homes that the Bible says 
carnal warfare is wrong. By wrapping themselves in the 
Word of God, Mennonites asserted their Christian ways 
and frowned upon the sinful ways of their fellow 
citizens. From an outsider's standpoint, this argument 
was audacious and infuriating. If Mennonites wanted,to 
avoid giving the impression that they were holier than 
others, they could not argue from the biblical 
standpoint that was the basis of their faith. 
A fourth principle that made it difficult for 
Mennonites to address the wider public in a unified 
persuasive manner was their disavowal of charismatic 
leadership. Attempts to call attention to one's 
superiority as a commanding, energetic, and outspoken 
individual had no place in a brotherhood of believers. 
Mennonite historian John Hostetler explains that, for 
Mennonites, a brotherhood means that there is no 
distinction among members. Pastors are looked upon as 
instructors rather than professional leaders. Contrary 
to leadership in most churches, Mennonite leaders were 
not accustomed to playing the role of church spokesmen 
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to outsiders. This was especially true of General 
Conference leaders, as they had far less authority in 
their churches than the bishops of the Mennonite Church. 
When c. E. Krehbiel responded to the charge from Quakers 
that Mennonites did not protest the war more forcefully, 
he lamely replied: "People just don't have gifts toward 
32 
this type of thing." A GC minister, H. D. Penner, also 
told readers of Der Herold that: "I myself am not a man 
33 
who likes to appear in public too prominently." Yet 
even though Mennonite leaders of both conferences 
struggled to adopt more visible and authoritative roles 
in order to explain their beliefs to non-members, they 
found it difficult to convey their beliefs in a 
forceful, public way. Because the Bible itself was 
granted such high authority, pastors did not see fit to 
call attention to themselves when they were delivering a 
message. Rather, they believed that it was important to 
34 
"Make your message plain," as Kauffman put it. 
Mennonite ministers were not, as Kauffman added, "to 
make a display of their wit or oratory, or entertain the 
35 
audience." Since Mennonite leaders were most 
comfortable in an unassuming role, it would prove 
difficult for them to impress the wider American 
citizenry. 
The Mennonites, then, began their defense facing a 
myriad of rhetorical obstacles. They were attempting to 
justify their stance of nonresistance, yet were living 
in a country at war. They were attempting to maintain 
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their status as upright American citizens, yet practiced 
separateness from the world. They were attempting to 
remain faithful to both these principles, yet 
encountered a host of negatively-charged attitudes 
surrounding these terms. They were attempting to address 
a political issue, yet the founders of their faith 
pointed to the Bible as the source of all evidence. 
Finally, they were attempting to make a unified, 
persuasive presentation to outsiders, yet their leaders 
were not accustomed to assuming conventional leadership 
roles. 
With these problems, and those they created for 
themselves prior to U. s. intervention, Mennonites faced 
a formidable, if not impossible, task of gaining a 
favorable response from the public. Thus, it is not 
surprising that they engaged in a practice not atypical 
of movements when they are challenged by outsiders. They 
"rehearsed" their defense among themselves. Rather than 
flooding newspapers with letters explaining their 
position or appearing at public forums to defend their 
integrity, Mennonites retreated to the safe confines of 
their own communities to construct their arguments for 
the outside world. In choosing to print justificatory 
arguments in their own publications they guaranteed that 
their arguments would not be distorted, and they could 
prepare themselves for any potential face-to-face 
confrontation with the public without calling attention 
to themselves any more than they had to. 
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Though Mennonites foresaw the dangers of dealing 
directly with a hostile public, they reserved respect 
for the government. Mennonites were willing to deal 
directly with the government, believing that the Wilson 
Administration would be more inclined to listen to their 
rationale for military exemption and respond in an 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
TAKING A CAUTIOUS OFFENSIVE: 
MENNONITES CONFRONT THE GOVERNMENT 
A Mennonite Lobby 
When Mennonites came under scrutiny by the public 
and the Wilson administration for their refusal to 
participate in any war-related activities, it appeared 
that they had only two choices: defend their "odd" 
practices to an unsympathetic audience, or forfeit the 
essentials of Mennonitism by being coerced into the line 
of duty. Throughout the course of the war Mennonites 
chose to defend themselves, but this was not their only 
recourse. They elected to confront what they considered 
to be a "rational" government and ignore an 
"irrational," hostile public as long as possible. 
Confrontational rhetoric generated by a group of 
quiet, unassuming Christians was bound to violate the 
norms of how discontented groups confront the power 
elite. An unconditional commitment to pacifism prevented 
rhetors of the faith from achieving visibility by 
engaging in radical, disruptive, or threatening forms of 
communication. Yet feeling that the war threatened to 
weaken their faith and that government policy impinged 
upon their religious freedom, Mennonites recognized that 
they must make their grievances known. With no 
rhetorical models for facing government officials, 
Mennonites struggled to establish a new form of 
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confrontational rhetoric suitable to faith principles. 
No consistent form emerged, but three arguments recurred 
with some regularity. First, mild reprimands were issued 
to the government for failing to live up to its historic 
promise of granting Mennonites liberty of conscience. 
Second, ingratiating statements that expressed gratitude 
for past governmental favors and voiced empathy for the 
government's thankless task of pacifying all its 
citizens were offered in exchange for official 
interviews and correspondence. Third, pointed rebuffs 
were shot at the Wilson administration exposing the 
shams of a democratic form of government, though such 
stiff accusations were heard and read only by church 
members. 
In addition to making these persuasive arguments, 
Mennonite communication with government officials served 
a crucial information-gathering function. Mennonites 
needed administration officials to clarify, interpret, 
and apply war-related rulings to the Mennonite 
nonresistant status if they hoped to become 
knowledgeable about what choices, if any, they had in 
responding to war demands. It wasn't long before 
Mennonites realized that lobbies were needed on Capital 
Hill if they hoped to sufficiently instruct apolitical 
members, especially draftees, on what actions under the 
law were in their best interests. 
The decision to approach the government with their 
demands was predicated on key legislative changes the 
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previous year and ongoing debate over the wording of the 
Selective Service Act. With the passage of the National 
Defense Act in 1916, Mennonite exemption status was 
threatened. No longer was the adherence to a 
nonresistant group the decisive criterion for 
determining eligibility for exemption. The religious 
belief of the individual became the acid test. Despite 
Mennonite pleas that exemption from military service was 
a constitutional right, the simple fact was that 
exemption was a legislative concession, and Congress 
could veto exemption without violating the First 
1 
Amendment. This legal decision, while mildly 
disconcerting to Mennonites before United States 
intervention, threatened to undermine their faith once 
the country was at war. This legislative change coupled 
with the debate on Capital Hill over the parameters of 
the Selective Service Act--a debate which commenced in 
late April and was not resolved until mid-May-- thrust 
Mennonites into the role of lobbyist. Mennonites were 
poignantly reminded that there was no permanence to 
their status in the political sphere and accutely aware 
that if they wanted to preserve what legislative 
protection still existed for them their presence should 
be felt in Washington. 
During the debate in Congress on the Selective 
Service Law, Mennonites "beseiged Washington with 
letters and petitions pleading for the legal 
2 
acknowledgment of conscientious objection." Committees 
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were formed hastily. The Citizenship Committee, an MC-
based lobbying group, was headed by J. s. Hartzler and 
Aaron Loucks. The Committee on Information, representing 
both the GC's and the MC's, consisted of s. K. Mosiman, 
P.H. Richert, and Aaron Loucks. The Committee of Seven, 
a GC-based consortium, was led by J. w. Kliewer and H. 
P. Krehbiel. The War Problems Committee, another GC-
affiliated lobby, was spearheaded by Maxwell Kratz, 
Peter Jansen, and P.H. Richert. All of these committees 
constituted official liasons between the Mennonite 
community and government officials. 
GC Mennonites were much more aggressive in 
formulating official statements regarding the Mennonite 
3 
position and war than were MC Mennonites. J. W. 
Kliewer, leader of the GC based Committee of Seven, 
drafted a "Petition to Congress" within two weeks of the 
state of war. An inventive arguer, Kliewer wrote: "Our 
hope that this petition [of exemption from all 
compulsory military training and service] will be 
granted is based on the fact • that in Canada our 
brethren have been assured by the government that the 
4 
exemption which we pray is granted them." By 
contrasting the military service policies of the United 
States and its closest ally, Canada, Kliewer, no doubt, 
hoped to demonstrate to government officials that they 
would not be setting an unusual or undemocratic 
precedent by exempting non-combatant Christians from 
military duty. Furthermore, this line of reasoning 
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informed the government that Mennonites in Canada were 
getting more sympathetic treatment than were u. s. 
Mennonites. 
In addition to Kliewer•s efforts, The General 
Conference sent representatives to Washington almost 
immediately after the declaration of war. Maxwell Kratz, 
a lawyer from Philadelphia, Peter Jansen, a Mennonite 
from Nebraska, and P.H. Richert, a Mennonite from 
Kansas left for Washington to interview senators and 
congressmen with the intent of gaining their support for 
a provision in the law which would safeguard Mennonite 
beliefs. They lobbied strenuously to make their position 
known. Back home, Mennonites remained cautiously 
optimistic that their lobbying efforts would be 
successful. Writing in the April 26th issue of Der 
Herold, c. E. Krehbiel reported that P.H. Richert was 
going to stay in Washington "until this whole thing is 
through in Congress." Adding that "We newspapers think 
5 
that this will happen just any day now, perhaps today." 
Though the Selective Service Law did not pass until 
May 18th, Mennonites were generally relieved to discover 
the clause: 
Nothing in this act contained shall be 
construed to require or compel any person to 
serve in any of the forces herein provided for 
who is found to be a member of any well 
recognized religious sect or organization at 
present organized and existing and whose 
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existing creed or principles forbid its 
members to participate in war in any form, and 
whose religious convictions are against war or 
participation therein in accordance with the 
creed or principles of said religious 
6 
organization. 
But they were concerned by the uncertainty of the clause 
immediately following that read: "But no person so 
exempted shall be exempted from service in any capacity 
7 
that the President shall declare to be non-combatant." 
Mennonites could only wait and hope that Wilson's ruling 
would satisfy their conscientious scruples. In the 
meantime, Mennonites relished a small victory 
concerning the wording in this passage. Through the 
efforts of the lobbying team in Washington, the word 
"military" was struck preceding "service." With this key 
omission, Mennonites assumed that civilian alternatives 
8 
to military service would be found. When in late July 
the President had still not specified what constituted 
noncombatant service, c. E. Krehbiel went so far as to 
predict that "nonresistants will probably not be called 
9 
upon for service until after such declaration." 
While nonresistants waited patiently for ruling on 
noncombatant service, they were faced with immediate 
decisions in regard to registration. On June 5th, all 
men within the ages of eighteen and twenty-five were 
required to register at their respective voting places. 
MC leader J. s. Hartzler reflected that "This was the 
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first real test on the nonresistant principle. A stand 
had to be taken--but where? Some thought that the place 
to take a stand was in the very beginning; that 
nonresistant people should not register at all. Others 
thought that since there was no infringement upon the 
10 
doctrine in so doing, every one should register." With 
so little discussion of the subject before being forced 
to take a stand, it is remarkable that virtually all 
Mennonites complied with the law. But to be sure that 
their youth would be prepared for intense questioning at 
local draft boards on their request for exemption, 
Mennonite newspapers advised: "Read carefully before you 
go to the Registration table. study the questions. 
Prepare the answers in your mind. Questions are set out 
below with detailed information to help you answer 
11 
them." 
What youth and elders alike were not prepared for 
was that those registering as conscientious objectors 
were given an older draft of the Selective Service Law, 
the draft which still included the phrase: "but no 
person so exempted shall be exempted from military 
service in any capacity that the President shall declare 
noncombatant." Fearing that Mennonite boys would be 
forced to render service in the military establishment, 
J. w. Kliewer shot off a letter to the Secretary of War 
explaining the "oversight" at local boards and 
registering his concern. "We are inclined to think that 
this word must have been inserted inadvertenty [sic], 
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but we fear that it may jeopardize our case and we 
therefore beg that the local boards may be given orders 
to cross out the word "military" between the words 
12 
"such" and "service." General Crowder, responding for 
Newton Baker, made it clear that Mennonites had falsely 
assumed that without the word "military," they would be 
allowed to serve in civilian capacities. Consistent with 
Wilson's eventual ruling on noncombatant service, 
Crowder explained: 
The President is not authorized under the Act 
to draft men for service not connected with 
the military establishment, and he is only 
authorized by it to assign certain persons 
entitled to preferential treatment, among whom 
members of your organization seem to be 
included, to service in that portion of the 
military establishment which he shall declare 
to be noncombatant. It is nevertheless service 
within the military establishment. It is 
therefore military, although it is not 
combatant service •••• The noncombatant is 
not obliged to meet the enemy upon the field 
of battle, whereas the person obliged to 
13 
render combatant service must. 
By spelling out the implications of the Selective 
Service Law in such simple terms, Crowder's message was 
painfully clear to Mennonites: they would be serving 
under the military arm of the government. That Crowder 
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interpreted the clause in question as granting 
"preferential treatment," that Mennonites only "seemed 
to be included" under this provision, and that 
noncombatant service was essentially a failure "to meet 
the enemy upon the field of battle," signaled failure 
for Mennonite negotiating efforts and spelled disaster 
for Mennonite draftees. 
Exacerbating the disappointment over the Crowder 
ruling was the fact that the long-awaited Executive 
Order defining noncombatant service did not come until 
March 20, 1918, eight months after the first draftees 
had reported to camp. In the interim, draftees were 
subjected to the idiosyncratic policies of individual 
camp drill sergeants on what they considered 
noncombatant service. 
Despite the covert intentions of the Secretary of 
War to "make good soldiers out of Mennonites" before the 
Executive ruling on noncombatant service went into 
14 
effect, leaders in both conferences doggedly pressured 
government officials to arrive at an equitable ruling, 
and used this time to voice their dissatisfaction. 
Almost as a last ditch effort, Mennonite negotiators 
threatened to leave the country in the face of such an 
uncertain relationship with their government. In a 
personal interview with the Secretary of War, H.P. 
Krehbiel, a leader of the Committee of Seven, was asked 
by Baker: "What would you do if your young men would be 
drafted into military service?" Krehbiel replied: "Many 
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would do what they had done in former years, leave the 
country for religious liberty, as our people have 
already done." To which Baker responded: "That would be 
15 
a sad, sad affair and it shall never happen." 
Krehbiel's response was strategic for several 
reasons. It showed the government just how dissatisfied 
Mennonites were for being held off on their demands for 
specific policy for nonresistants. It was a serious 
threat because Mennonites had often fled a country as a 
result of religious persecution. And although it is 
difficult to determine the sincerity of Baker's 
response, Krehbiel's threat of emigration might have 
been an attempt to evoke sympathy for his people. Would 
the government want to be responsible for families 
leaving their homes because of its failure to uphold 
liberty of conscience? No doubt, Krehbiel hoped that 
this argument would cause Baker to re-examine the 
government's policy toward non-combatant Christians. 
In point of fact, a few Mennonites did emigrate to 
Canada, though neither conference advocated it as an 
official policy option. Accounts of the pilgrimage are 
scarce. Canadian newspapers carried exaggerated claims 
that 35,000 Mennonites had crossed the border. Speakers 
in the Canadian House of Commons stretched the figures 
to 60,000. A more accurate figure is approximately 
16 
500. Those Mennonites who chose to flee rather than 
face an uncertain future in the United States found 
Canada attractive because of its freedom from 
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conscription, close proximity, and because a large 
17 
number of the faith already lived in that country. 
Russian Mennonites constituted the largest emigration 
numbers. Because these Mennonites were rather recent 
newcomers in America, they were less acculturated and 
more anxious to resist it. More telling of their 
decision to leave, however, was their vivid memory of 
the spirit of European militarism. Living in the 
midwest, "the hotbed of spread eagle fanaticism" as one 
historian described this region during the war, only 
reinforced their belief that like European despots, the 
American military complex would coerce them into the 
18 
line of duty or torture them for failing to comply. 
Pulling up roots and stealthily departing in the middle 
of the night was an extremist solution for most 
Mennonites. 
On the whole, Mennonites rejected emigration, 
arguing that it was an impractical action in a world 
almost totally at war, it would seriously handicap 
negotiations with the Wilson Administration, and many 
believed that Wilson's definition of noncombatant 
19 
service might be amicable. Interestingly, President 
Wilson acted almost immediately to approve legislation 
that would require a jail sentence for anyone caught 
leaving the country to escape conscription, while he was 
content to act belatedly in defining noncombatant 
20 
duty. From the perspective of the conscientious 
objector, such action was aggravating and insulting. 
120 
The migration to Canada was not seen positively by 
most members. It was far more common for Mennonites to 
propose alternative ways in which they could help the 
government during the war. With the government still 
deciding what duties fell under the rubric of 
noncombatant, Mennonites sought to provide 
administration officials with a weekly fare of ideas for 
civilian services that they could conscientiously 
perform. P.H. Richert and Aaron Loucks, for example, 
both suggested to President Wilson that "our young men 
could render a greater service to the maintenance of 
national interests and to humanity by being producers of 
21 
food-stuffs •••• " 
J. s. Hartzler had grander plans. He went so far as 
to devise a scheme wherein Mennonites could show- case 
their great skills as cultivators of the soil in 
undeveloped land in Arizona. In the spirit of 
expansionist rhetoric, Hartzler boasted that Mennonites 
could take the tract of land in Arizona given to the 
Pima Indians and develop it into a thriving farming 
community, while teaching the Indians agricultural 
skills. Hartzler inquired: "Would government consider 
letting the Mennonite Church, or a number of responsible 
men have this land, or a part of it with the equipment, 
for the period of the war and as much longer as will be 
necessary to gather the crops then in the ground on the 
conditions that we would take 150 or 200 c. o. boys onto 
the land, clean it up and farm it to the best possible 
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advantage for government?" Hartzler explained his motive 
for wanting to take charge of land granted to the 
Indians with the remark: "The idea was to have the 
Indians develop this into a farming community, but they 
22 
did nothing. It is lying idle." Why an individual who 
cherished a nonconformist lifestyle and resisted outside 
influence himself would propose to intrude upon another 
close-knit community is puzzling. But Hartzler's 
solution to the c. o. problem was indicative of 
Mennonite political naivete, a heartfelt desire to be 
perceived as hard-working, patriotic citizens, and was 
arguably a barometer of their acculturation into a 
society caught up in imperialist, nativist, and Puritan 
ideals. 
Mennonites lobbied vociferously for favorable 
legislation concerning their religious heritage and 
attempted to make up for the lack of initiative on the 
administration's part in regard to noncombatant service 
by proposing, and in some cases acting upon, reactionary 
and idealistic solutions. Their labored, but persistent, 
correspondence efforts failed more often than not. But 
Mennonites were learning quickly how to gain the 
offensive in negotiations. 
Muted Accusations 
Lobbying, petitioning, and interviewing government 
officials did not entirely take the form of a detached 
business engagement for Mennonites. The informational 
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dimension of their transactions was certainly essential 
for both sides in gaining a better working knowledge of 
each other. But as observed in chapter four, Mennonites 
did not easily separate themselves from the issue of 
freedom of conscience. They were the issue. The 
political legitimacy of their core beliefs was being 
debated and voted upon. In their correspondence with the 
government, Mennonites could not simply voice a cerebral 
attachment to their concerns. Yet they also recognized 
that an unbridled emotional appeal or hot indignation 
were inappropriate in making pleas to statesmen in 
Washington. When addressing the government, Mennonites 
adopted the posture of a people who had been wronged and 
they looked for ways to attack the government and force 
the government to account for its actions. 
The reasons that Mennonites began to take the 
offensive were simple. First, this was a "safe" 
strategy. From an argumentative standpoint, it is always 
more comfortable to attack than to defend. Mennonites 
could remove themselves from the center of inquiry and 
focus their criticism on the government--the 
perpetrators of their unpleasant situation. Of course, 
due to ideological constraints, Mennonites could not use 
invective in such a rhetorical posture. Rather, they 
would present historical facts in a restrained, polite 
manner that would imply government inconsistency and 
provide a pretext for subtly blaming the present 
administration. In pointing out the inconsistent actions 
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of the government, Mennonites could re-affirm their 
consistency among themselves. If Mennonites could 
discredit the government's "righteous" and "patriotic" 
attempts to force total commitment to the war, then the 
Mennonites' attempts to remain uninvolved would look all 
the more justifiable to members. Questioning the 
government's policies, which in turn reflected favorably 
on Mennonite practices, was an important strategy in 
maintaining high self-esteem among church members. In 
asking the government to justify its actions, Mennonites 
also could maintain the fantastic hope that the Wilson 
Administration would acknowledge its inconsistent 
behavior and apologize to them. 
One of the three major arguments addressed to the 
government was that Mennonites had suffered persecution 
everywhere throughout the history of the movement and 
had come to America to escape persecution. In addition, 
they argued, not only had Mennonites immigrated to 
America to find religious toleration, but they had been 
invited to come by the government. 
Shortly after war was declared, leaders of the 
Western District churches of the General Conference 
reprinted portions of the minutes of the church meeting 
to send to the War Department. Among other things, the 
letter stated: "[O]ur people, after having for centuries 
suffered persecution in various countries because of 
their adherence to the Christ-taught doctrine of non-
resistance, have at last taken refuge in this our 
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beloved country, which granted liberty of conscience to 
23 
all." Conference leaders hoped that by portraying 
themselves as weary, homeless wanderers who had finally 
discovered a "beloved" country, they would receive 
sympathetic treatment from the government. Yet there was 
also a subtle assigning of guilt in the last line. 
Mennonites reminded the Wilson administration that this 
country had, without exception, honored liberty of 
conscience. 
J. w. Kliewer, in his "Petition to Congress" 
reminded representatives of their historical 
obligations: "The Mennonites of this country are either 
immigrants or the descendants of immigrants from various 
countries in Europe which they left to avoid compulsory 
military service. Assurance was given them by high 
officials of the United States, including President 
Grant in 1873, that they need fear no compulsory 
24 
conscription here." If Wilson overrode this policy, 
Kliewer intimates, he would have demonstrated no respect 
for his predecessor--hardly a Just action. Though a 
Mennonite himself, Kliewer depersonalizes his petition 
by referring to Mennonites in the third person. 
Recognizing the need for formality in addressing 
Congress, Kliewer might have also reasoned that by 
dissociating himself from the group in question, his 
petition would receive more serious attention. 
The Committee on Information wrote to the President 
in early 1918 reminding him of the importance of his 
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yet-to-be-announced decision concerning noncombatant 
service. The committee intimated that if Mennonites 
could not be accommodated under the law, liberty of 
conscience would be a sham in America, Mennonites would 
attract much attention by becoming martyrs, and the u. 
s. government would be weakening a 400 year faith. With 
firm, yet somber, resolve they wrote: 
Having held this position for four hundred 
years, instructing our children from 
generation to generation in this principle, 
which has been a distinctive tenet of our 
creed, we could not consistently yield this 
position in the stress of war, even though 
such a position should bring persecution upon 
us as it has in the past in other countries 
from which our forefathers have fled and taken 
refuge in this our beloved country which 
offers a guarantee of liberty of conscience to 
25 
all. 
That Mennonites had suffered persecution throughout 
their troubled history and had come to America to escape 
persecution was an argument so framed as to accuse the 
government of dishonor and inconsistency. 
The same argument, however, when addressed solely 
to members of the faith was less muted in accusing the 
government of wrong doing. More pointed than the 
official correspondence with the government, Daniel 
Kauffman expressed indignation toward the government to 
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his readers of the Gospel Herald: "We are in America 
because our fathers were invited here and promised 
liberty of conscience, and with the full knowledge and 
understanding that this conscience forbade them taking 
part in any form of carnal strife. This is not a 
26 
question of gratitude but of conscience." Kauffman 
absolved Mennonites of any responsibility to the 
government. As a bishop in the Mennonite Church, 
Kauffman also had the authority to speak with such firm 
resolve and confront the government outright. 
Gerald Dahlke, a General Conference Mennonite, 
prepared a pamphlet for members of the faith that 
corroborates the view that Mennonites used the suffered-
persecution-everywhere argument in varying degrees of 
directness depending on the audience addressed. Dahlke 
began by painting a sympathetic picture of the 
Mennonites: "This very class of people, the Mennonites 
[have] always been in quest of a land, where they could 
exercise without hindrance their religious scruples, 
acting on the dictates of their conscience. [Mennonites] 
came here not alone by their choice but [upon] the 
urgent invitation of the United states and State 
27 
governments • • • • 11 
Taking a view similar to that of Kauffman, Dahlke 
implied that Mennonites need not be overly thankful 
because they were "urgently" asked to come. In effect, 
Dahlke was saying that if any group had to defend 
itself, it was the government. Dahlke strengthened the 
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argument by adding: "So anxious was this government to 
induce the Mennonites to locate in its domains, that it 
even translated the constitution into the German 
language and sent copies of it to them in Russia. Soon 
they were overwhelmed with invitations to come to the 
28 
United States and to Canada." From a somewhat 
exaggerated account of history, Dahlke was attempting to 
remind Mennonites that it was just a century ago that 
the United States actually lured them to America by 
granting them many favors. In light of this treatment, 
Dahlke and others demanded to know, without actually 
addressing the government, just how the Wilson 
administration could deny what had been so faithfully 
promised to the Mennonites by other Presidents. 
The Art of Ingratiation 
Despite their lack of rhetorical training, 
Mennonites understood all too clearly that government 
officials would not be inclined to entertain their 
demands unless they were couched in inoffensive tones 
and unless Mennonites conveyed a sense of understanding 
the government's position regarding military service. 
Adopting the posture of a people wronged was a strategic 
way to diffuse heated accusations toward the government, 
and a diplomatic way to assign guilt without closing 
down lines of communication, but it hardly created 
communicative bonds between each party. Mennonites were 
sensitive to the need to ingratiate public officials 
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before making their requests. 
Identification is an essential strategy in all acts 
of persuasion. Rhetorical theorist Kenneth Burke 
explains that: "A speaker persuades an audience by the 
29 
use of stylistic identifications." He means that a 
speaker draws on the interests of the audience to induce 
cooperation between himself and his audience. One 
strategy designed to create identification is that of 
30 
talking the language of your audience. Mennonites 
attempted to gain the favor of the government by 
speaking the language of government officials. 
When MC leaders convened on August 29, 1917, to 
adopt an official statement to the government on their 
position regarding military service, they expressed 
gratitude for past government favors. In a reserved and 
gracious style, one segment of the Conference record 
reads: "It is with grateful hearts that we recount the 
favors and considerations accorded our people in the 
past •••• We rejoice that freedom of conscience is 
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thus recognized by the laws of our land." When J. W. 
Kliewer registered his concern to General Crowder 
concerning the reinserted word "military" in front of 
service in pamphlets at local draft boards, he appealed 
to Crowder to grant "sympathetic consideration of our 
32 
request." Before unveiling his grand scheme to the war 
department, J. s. Hartzler demurred: "We are indeed 
sorry that our position is causing so much trouble, and 
we greatly appreciate the effort which officials are 
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making to solve the problems connected with the 
33 
c.o.s." 
Mennonites went so far as to place themselves in 
the position of government officials and try to 
understand the military service issue from the 
administration's point of view. With this strategy, 
Mennonites hoped to convince administration personnel, 
including the President himself, that they were 
considerate, respectful, and genuinely understanding 
people, who recognized the magnitude and the political 
fallout of their demands. The Committee on Information 
prefaced their own solution to the c. o. problem by 
first identifying with the goals of the administration 
in the present world crisis ("[W]e agree with the 
government in its desire for universal peace."), and 
then going so far as to imagine how difficult it must be 
for the government to deal with nonresistants like 
themselves ("We further realize the embarrassing 
situation into which the military authorities are put 
regarding discipline by the presence of non-combatants 
34 
in the camps •••• " ) J. s. Hartzler bent over 
backwards in taking sides with the government: 
It is a self evident fact that President 
Wilson and the Congress of the United States 
have been unwisely criticized by some of the 
c. o.•s and their friends (more from the 
political than the religious objectors) 
because Government did not meet their 
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situation better from the standpoint of the 
objector. As representatives of the people 
they were obliged to consider the wishes of 
their constituency; also the conscientious 
objectors constituted such a small per cent of 
the whole that to make them an exception might 
35 
have proven a misfortune. 
Viewing the conscientious objector's stance from 
the government's perspective, and acknowledging that it 
must be "difficult" and "embarrassing" to deal with the 
Mennonites, was an argument that carried a great deal of 
risk. Government officials could have become amused and 
self-righteous knowing that even the Mennonites provided 
the government with justification for treating them as a 
nuisance and for ignoring their demand for complete 
military exemption. 
Yet defending the administration's policy on 
nonresistants, was an argument that not only secured 
smooth relations between Mennonites and the government, 
but reflected favorably on the rhetor; Mennonite 
spokesmen, like Hartzler, understood the political 
realities and the limitations of defending minority 
rights. As an apolitical people thrown into the role of 
political lobbyists, Mennonites were learning-- learning 
to absorb appropriate argumentative strategies, and 
learning to mask their bitter disappointment and 
resentment remarkably well. 
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stiff Challenges to Democracy 
A third, prevalent argument advanced by Mennonites 
in addressing the Wilson administration was that it is 
an essential principle of a democracy to grant freedom 
of conscience unconditionally. Mennonites became deeply 
concerned and resentful when they saw this coveted human 
right challenged by compulsory military service. The 
extreme importance of freedom of conscience to all 
people is expressed well by philosopher Susanne Langer: 
"[I]nterference with acts that have ritual value ••. 
is always felt as the most intolerable injury one man, 
or group of men, can do to another ...• To constrain a 
man against his principles--make a pacifist bear arms. 
-- is to endanger his attitude toward the world, his 
36 
personal strength and single-mindedness." During the 
world war, American philosophers reinforced the 
importance of freedom of conscience especially in a 
democracy. "It is indeed only by a frank recognition of 
the moral autonomy of the individual that we can 
establish any kind of moral order in the world," wrote 
one noted philosopher of the day. Adding that "Even more 
so do the stability and growth of democracy depend upon 
37 
its recognition. 
Mennonites, too, wanted to celebrate this cherished 
democratic principle and challenge the constitutionality 
of forcing individuals to violate their most prized 
personal freedom, but they feared repercussions from the 
government and the public. Questioning the democratic 
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nature of Wilson's policies might be construed as "un-
American,11-- an attempt to undermine the credibility of 
the government, which in times of war is not only 
seditious, but dangerous. For many Americans, war means 
a temporary suspension of some democratic freedoms, and 
such abstract principles as freedom of conscience is 
reconceptualized as a collective conscience of the 
society, a uniformity of conduct no less complete than 
that demanded by an autocracy. In a state of war, 
respecting individual conscience is an irritation, or 
phrased more eloquently by a philosopher of the world 
war Richard Roberts: 
Conscientious objection is chiefly irritating 
because it appears so palpably futile, and 
indeed so vexatiously obstructive of the 
business in hand. Not only does it not work, 
it actually hinders the work in which the 
multitude is engaged. It puts the machine out 
of gear; in a supreme emergency when all hands 
should be at the pumps, the conscientious 
objector puts us to the trouble of putting him 
38 
in irons. 
Defending a pure notion of freedom of conscience was 
extremely unpopular during war time, and exposing the 
hypocrisy of democratic principles might get Mennonites 
jailed. Consequently, while the government comprised 
their ideal audience, they settled upon making this 
argument in their own church newspapers. 
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That freedom of conscience is an unconditional 
democratic principle is an argument found most 
frequently in the MC church newspaper, the Gospel 
Herald. The tone of these articles is serious and the 
style is terse. Kauffman expressed his deep concern for 
the government's violation of his religious scruples by 
writing: "Take away the sacredness of conscience, and 
you strike at the foundation of liberty. Conscience is a 
sacred gift from God that must be held sacred and 
inviolable if we are to remain free." Kauffman used the 
same absolutist language in protesting the Espionage Act 
recently passed on June 15, 1917, which made it a crime 
to "willfully cause ••• refusal of duty." He 
contended: 
If this law did take away our liberty to 
believe the Bible as we understand its 
teaching, and also to tell what we believe, it 
would be unconstitutional; for both nation and 
state Constitutions state expressly that 
Congress (or state legislatures) shall pass no 
laws abridging the freedom of religion or of 
39 
speech. 
Unadorned prose, characteristic of Kauffman's 
rhetoric, created a simple message starkly stated: if 
liberty of conscience were not respected by the 
government, it would commit a serious, irreperable 
offense. With equal resolve, Jacob c Meyers, a GC 
spokesman and drafted man proclaimed: "The right of the 
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individual to stand by his conscience against any power 
on earth--ecclesiastical or political--is the 
40 
cornerstone of liberty." More candid was John Horsch, 
a leading MC spokesman, who remarked: "The government of 
the United States is committed to the principle of 
liberty of conscience. This means liberty not only for 
the Roman Catholic and Lutheran conscience, but also for 
41 
the Mennonite conscience. Horsch reminded the 
government of the real meaning of freedom of conscience 
because he sensed that this had been overlooked. 
Consistency in upholding this right was of utmost 
importance. For as Langer tells us: "No matter how 
fantastic may be the dogmas he holds sacred, how much 
his living rites conflict with the will or convenience 
of society, it is never a light matter to demand their 
42 
violation." 
These arguments for freedom of conscience 
demonstrate two things: it is a crime to force people to 
do that which is abhorrent to their innermost 
convictions, and it is a serious inconsistency to deny 
freedom of conscience in a country which is a symbol of 
such high ideals as religious tolerance. 
Although Mennonites generally argued on 
philosophical grounds for the importance of freedom of 
conscience, they, occasionally, took a practical 
perspective on the issue. In a less serious manner and 
from a more reflective standpoint, Kauffman speculated: 
"[W]ould it not be the part of wisdom to use 
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conscientious people in a way in which their conscience 
would be a help rather than a hindrance to their 
usefulness?" He continued: "Even if it were possible to 
force every nonresistant draftee into noncombatant 
military service and compel every nonresistant man out 
of camp to support war measures ••• it would be a 
waste of effort because it would be forcing abnormal 
conditions, since man is never at his best when 
43 
compelled to live in violation of his own conscience." 
Whether Mennonites treated the freedom of 
conscience argument philosophically or practically, this 
stance adopted within the confines of the Mennonite 
community, proved to be a penetrating way to criticize 
the Wilson administration and make the government in an 
idealized sense feel the necessity to account for its 
action without offending them directly. Yet this line of 
reasoning could have been more sophisticated and, 
ultimately, more persuasive had Mennonites seized the 
opportunity to "turn the tables" and question the 
"American Crusade" mentality. Mennonites might have 
taken Wilson's popular slogan: "This is a war to make 
the world safe for democracy," and asked some very 
disconcerting questions. For example, they could have 
implored: How can we make the world safe for democracy 
by wounding democracy at home? or Do we not mock 
democracy in denying freedom of conscience? and Do we 
know what we are fighting for if we are repudiating 
American traditions by forcing men to violate their 
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principles? Rarely was this attitude expressed. c. E. 
Krehbiel of Der Herold and H. Frank Reist of The 
Christian Monitor provided the fascinating exceptions. 
Vehemently objecting to the way in which the United 
States had conveniently decided to set aside fundamental 
principles like freedom of conscience, the editor of the 
small, unaffiliated church paper, The Christian Monitor, 
rejected democracy as a legitimate form of government: 
After six thousand years, more or less, of 
experimenting man has not yet found a truly 
successful form of government. Democracy has 
not been thoroughly tested. But even now some 
of its weaknesses are evident. It is 
significant that since the begining of the war 
the most democratic nations involved have set 
aside some of its fundamental principles and 
delegated to a few men autocratic powers. Our 
own nation is an example ••• if it is the 
ideal form of government, should it become 
necessary under any circumstances to 
temporarily set aside any of its fundamental 
principles .•• We do not believe that the 
present evil world can ever be made safe for 
democracy, nor that democracy will make the 
44 
world of corruption safe. 
Such a blanket statement protesting a democratic form of 
government was tantamount to treason, if not in 
violation of the Espionage Act. One can only wonder how 
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it escaped scathing criticism from the governmental 
propaganda agencies when Mennonite tracts of much milder 
content were cited for such unlawful activity. One also 
wonders if Mennonites in Illinois, readers of this 
circular, were alarmed by their editors' bold comments, 
especially since the Monitor rarely diverted from its 
monthly fare of strictly church news. This editorial did 
not send shock waves through the community, nor 
stimulate editorial response. Reist went out on a limb 
in exposing government inconsistency in regard to 
freedom of conscience, but his argument is admirable in 
the sense that it is one of the few probing and 
sophisticated critiques of the shortcomings of the 
Wilson administration from a Mennonite. 
Another midwesterner, C. E. Krehbiel of Kansas, 
joined Reist•s undermining of government policy by 
providing German Mennonite readers of Der Herold with 
more than an occasional attack against the government, 
especially in regard to freedom of conscience. Beginning 
in April of 1917, Krehbiel attacked compulsory military 
service as a denial of freedom--possibly a form of 
"involuntary servitude outlawed by the thirteenth 
45 
amendment." In early May, Krehbiel wrote 
sarcastically: "Isn't it noteworthy that our country 
entered this war right after the new president had been 
elected for a second time." And setting up the 
government for further scrutiny by commenting on the 
compulsory service law, Krehbiel made the flippant 
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remark: "[I]t seems to be the fate of mankind since the 
fall of man that hardly one ridiculous idea has passed 
46 
when another one comes up." Then, showing his 
political acumen and rhetorical expertise, Krehbiel 
denounced compulsory military service in a democratic 
form of government by using the words of Daniel Webster. 
Substantiating the Mennonite position of unconditional 
freedom of conscience with the words of a revered 
American statesman gave readers confidence in their 
objections and a history lesson as well. Krehbiel began: 
Daniel Webster gave a talk to Congress over 
100 years ago and it was against conscription. 
That speech is as fresh and as applicable 
today as it was then. At that time our country 
was at war with England and many wanted to put 
in the forced conscription, but they were not 
successful. We would like to put the whole 
speech here in German but I don't know if we 
will find the space for it. It was sent to us 
from the American Union against Militarism. Mr 
Webster says: 'Honorable Chairman, After 
studying the bill that is before you for 
passage, I have come to the conclusion after 
much consideration that in no way is there any 
provision in our constitution for that kind of 
thing. It is right wing by nature and supports 
the military which this session of Congress 
has tried so hard to bring about .••• It is 
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an attempt to repeat the Napoleanic way of 
getting the upper hand, to build up an army of 
free men and force them to participate in war 
under the pretext of 'mere' military 
47 
service.' 
Krehbiel, no doubt, was taken by the courageous stance 
and strong words delivered by a politician to government 
officials. Because it was Webster and not the Mennonites 
calling compulsory military service "Napoleanic," "right 
wing," and "unconstitutional," Krehbiel safeguarded 
this editorial from potential indictment of "willfully 
causing refusal of duty." That it was a German newspaper 
further concealed its contents from public scrutiny, 
though this factor made it more of a target for 
governmental perusal. More politically-minded than most 
of his contemporaries in the journalistic field, 
Krehbiel sometimes used the GC-based church paper to 
espouse his political views. Occasionally, subscribers 
48 
protested, but by and large Krehbiel echoed the 
sentiments of German Mennonites in Kansas. 
Seriously challenging democracy as a viable form of 
government and exposing the hypocrisy of America's 
compulsory military service law was a final and daring 
extension to arguing for unconditional freedom of 
conscience, but it was atypical Mennonite fare. And 
perhaps this was fortunate for such subversive arguments 
threatened to undermine the careful ground work layed by 
other church officials who saw the necessity of a 
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Mennonite lobby and the importance of finding ways to 
identify with government policy. 
Mennonites were in many ways unprepared to present 
a unified rhetorical front against the Wilson 
administration's "sudden" and "drastic" measure of 
compulsory military conscription. Though Mennonites 
recognized the need for committees to lobby, petition, 
and negotiate with Washington officials, there was no 
central organizing body to prevent the propagation of 
disparate proposals. The Wilson Administration received 
both a reactionary plan, a mass exodus to Canada, and an 
idealistic plan, a sanctioned move to Indian 
reservations. How was the government to know what 
Mennonites really wanted? A central agency might have 
also coordinated petitioning efforts more strategically. 
Painful evidence of the often poorly-timed efforts to 
influence governmental policy was a petition against war 
tardily presented to Congress in 1919 after the war was 
over. Impressive though it was, having collected 20,400 
49 
Mennonite signatures from thirty-one states, its 
impact at that late date was inconsequential. 
Yet Mennonites were able to form their own church 
lobbies with remarkable efficiency. Moreover, they 
formulated three major arguments to respond to 
administration policy--arguments that demonstrated 
rhetorical sensitivity. The subtle accusations designed 
to evoke sympathy for themselves and the ingratiating 
arguments found their way into the hands of government 
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officials, while the bold, even subversive, arguments 
against democracy did not circulate outside the confines 
of Mennonite communities. By cautiously opposing the 
government's actions while searching for points of 
agreement, Mennonites maintained open, albeit strained, 
communication with the government and diverted attention 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ON THE DEFENSIVE: 
MENNONITES SEEK REAPPRAISAL OF THEIR IMAGE 
Mennonites took the offensive in questioning the 
government's actions throughout the course of the war. 
But criticism only mounted from the public, and the 
government did not, as Mennonites had hoped, feel 
pressured to account for its actions or to apologize to 
this obscure religious group. The Wilson administration 
had far more pressing war-related concerns to deal with 
than debating the problem of nonresisters. Much to their 
chagrin, Mennonites soon realized that the government 
was not going to sympathize with Mennonite concerns, nor 
could critic½sm from a hostile public be ignored any 
longer. Mennonites grudgingly acknowledged that their 
only hope was to seek to correct the image Americans had 
of them. Mennonites would have to engage in what 
rhetorical critic Walter R. Fisher has termed "a 
1 
rhetoric of purification." 
The Mennonites' decision to address the charges 
against their character confirms the view taken by 
Fisher and Noreen Kruse that people attempt to defend 
their characters rhetorically when their identities are 
2 
in question, and when they believe that failure to do 
so will result in irreparable damage to their 
3 
reputations. Moreover, that the Mennonites' decision to 
defend themselves was reached painfully confirms Maurice 
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Natanson's claim that engaging in personal or "genuine" 
argument is uncomfortable because we do not like to take 
the risks necessary to explore our convictions. 
When individuals feel the need to engage in a 
rhetoric of self-defense, Fisher states, they will 
concentrate upon defining themselves clearly and in 
favorable terms since their ultimate purpose is to seek 
re-evaluation from their accusers. Definitional 
strategies manifest themselves in various ways. 
Individuals can clarify their characters by setting 
others in juxtaposition. They can correct a widely held 
negative image by communicating a sense of the 
unfairness of the charges. They can repair their images 
4 
by identifying with the values of their accusers. 
Mennonites attempted to repair their image 
rhetorically by engaging in the strategies of 
dissociation, denial, and identification. This chapter 
traces the inventive ways in which Mennonites used these 
techniques to construct an apologia of Mennonitism. 
First, they dissociated themselves from the larger class 
of conscientious objectors. Since no distinctions were 
made under the law between the religious and 
nonreligious C. o., Mennonites feared that nonreligious 
c. o.•s were taking advantage of legislation enacted 
expressly to protect an historic peace stance. More 
importantly, they worried that the public would question 
the sincerity of all c. 0. 1 s. Hence, rhetors of the 
faith wished to distance themselves from other objectors 
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by demonstrating that the Mennonite objection to war on 
conscientious grounds was completely different. Second, 
they refuted the charges of insincerity and pro-
Germanism. Mennonite rhetors wanted desperately to 
counter the charge that they had temporarily adopted a 
c. o. status. As a result, their historic position 
against war was paraded in print on countless occasions. 
MC Mennonites denied charges of pro-Germanism by 
renouncing all ties to Germany, while GC Mennonites 
adopted a posture of dignified silence and encouraged 
members to adopt the English language. Finally, they 
identified with the cherished American value of 
patriotism while having little if anything to do with 
the military establishment. Mennonites emphasized their 
benevolent civic activities, their role as farmers, 
their sacrifical efforts, and redefined the meaning of 
patriotism in a way that Mennonites could celebrate it. 
Some Mennonites, primarily of GC origin, rationalized 
that their consciences would allow them to support non-
violent activities connected to the military such as 
Liberty Loan Drives, the Red Cross, and non-combatant 
duties. 
As with other argumentative strategies, however, 
Mennonites rehearsed these lines of argument among 
themselves for use in case they were accosted by angry 
citizens or interrogated for their sincerity by 
government officials. Rarely did they feel it was 
appropriate to repair their image directly to a 
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fervently patriotic public that had already made the 
nonresisters a convenient scapegoat. Thus, it was 
primarily in Mennonite publications that definitional 
strategies were used to correct their negative image. 
Conscience With~ Difference 
One way Mennonites tried to define themselves in 
favorable terms was to dissociate themselves from other 
individuals and groups who claimed status as 
conscientious objectors (c. o.'s). Unfortunately, the 
name "conscientious objector," which had originally been 
used by the War Department to refer to those who 
belonged to a church that embodied nonresistance, was 
now applied to those who, for many reasons, refused to 
5 
take part in the war. Dismayed by the lax use of the 
term, MC leader J .. s .. Hartzler remarked: "This was 
unfortunate. If the two classes had been kept separate 
the first class would have been better understood." 
Hartzler understood that distinction in hierarchical 
terms, with religious objectors faring far superior. 
"The two classes are entirely distinct--legally, 
morally, and practically," Hartzler instructed fellow 
believers, explaining further that Congress gives legal 
status to religious objectors, but "wholly ignores the 
other"; the one obeys God and the traditions of his 
church, while the other "is merely choosing to accept 
the loose and untried speculation of modern theorists 
who avow no respect for religious Scriptures"; the one 
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includes individuals who have registered under 
particular denominations, while the other "would make it 
easier and more of a refuge for an unlimited number of 
6 
slackers." 
Other Mennonites echoed Hartzler•s disappointment 
that Mennonites were being unjustly lumped together with 
undesirables by registering as conscientious objectors. 
Editor s. M. Grubb of The Mennonite was unhappy that 
army officers were not bothering to segregate the 
religious objectors from other objectors as the law 
commanded: 
The spirit of the press, and the public 
fattened upon the stuff the press feeds it, is 
to regard all non-resistance as a species of 
pro-Germanism ••.. [S]ome officials are not 
altogether out of sympathy with this attitude 
[because] religious objectors for whom the law 
provides, have been segregated with I. w. 
w.•s, Socialists and other types of objectors 
for whom no provision is made by law and to 
whom peace is not a matter of religious 
7 
creed. 
Mennonites were understandably concerned that non-
religious c. o.•s were taking advantage of legislation 
enacted expressly to protect an historic peace stance 
and, in so doing, smearing the label of conscientious 
objector. Daniel Kauffman of the Gospel Herald expressed 
his dissatisfaction this way: 
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There should be a distinction made between the 
man who for conscience' sake can not see his 
way clear to comply with the wishes of his 
nation and the self-seeking man who hides 
under a cloak of 'conscience' to keep out of 
disagreeable places; between the man who 
proves himself conscientious in all he does 
and the man who is 'conscientious• only in 
8 
spots. 
Mennonites seemed to think that the solution to 
this unfortunate problem was simple. The Mennonite 
position could be made more palatable by contrasting 
their peace stance with the positions taken by the 
nonreligious and insincere nonresisters. Such optimism 
was evidenced in the following passage from the Gospel 
Herald: "If these distinctions would be clearly made and 
freely recognized by all people it would be but a short 
time until most of the present unpleasantness connected 
with the attitude of nonresistant people would be a 
9 
thing of the past •• II Contrary to what one might 
assume, this article did not appear shortly after war 
was declared, but in a 1918 summer issue, revealing just 
how ineffective Mennonites had been at making their 
position clearly known. Two months later Kauffman tried 
again at encouraging members to make these distinctions: 
"We owe it as a duty to them as well as to ourselves and 
the world in general to make our position clear, so that 
well meaning people may not labor under a wrong 
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impression as to what we are or what we believe and what 
10 
our attitude really is •••• " Finally, Kauffman 
reassured his readers: "Many a well meaning man, being 
misinformed, assumes an entirely different attitude from 
11 
what he would if he knew the facts." When the 
southwestern conference of the Mennonite Church convened 
in August, they echoed their revered bishop's advice. 
"Our ministers are urged to make this position clear to 
all people, using moderation in their utterances, but 
speaking the Word of God with all boldness," stated one 
12 
resolution. For Mennonites, truth was self-evident; it 
only needed to be explained accurately for all 
misunderstandings to be rectified. As Kauffman put it: 
13 
"the facts speak for themselves." 
From the preceding passages a paradox becomes 
evident. Mennonites expressed a desire to dissociate 
themselves from the general class of people placed in 
the conscientious objector category; at the same time 
they did not want to answer the charges directly for 
fear of the retribution that might come from publicly 
engaging in genuine argument. Moreover, Mennonites 
believed that once the truth was made known to 
outsiders, they would be understood and evaluated 
separately from other conscientious objectors, yet there 
was little effort during the war to make these facts 
known to anyone outside Mennonite circles. Mennonites 
were sorely disillusioned for believing that "these 
facts [were] fully established and easily accessible to 
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all who wish to know the truth .•• " The facts 
referred to were so inaccessible that outsiders asked: 
"If the charges are not true why doesn't someone put in 
15 
a rejoinder?" Mennonites deceived themselves into 
thinking that the public would come searching for the 
"rejoinders" buried in Mennonite tracts. 
D. H. Bender, a MC Mennonite from Hesston, Kansas 
provided a notable exception to the general vow of 
shunning public exposure. In a county newspaper that 
served several small towns in Kansas, Bender took it 
upon himself to educate non-Mennonites on the Mennonite 
position. In what came to be a rather lengthy, factual 
article, Bender outlined the biblical basis of 
nonresistance, traced the faith's heritage to Holland in 
the 1500's, described the migration to Russia and the 
United States, and provided an exhaustive list of 
services that the Mennonites were providing in the 
present war, including sums of money contributed to 
16 
various relief headquarters. When Bender prefaced his 
piece with the comment: "We feel confident, however, 
that when our real position is understood and the work 
the Mennonites actually are doing is fully known, there 
will be no ground left for such adverse criticism," he 
at least made efforts to make such an aim realizable. 
More typically the sporadic attempts by individuals at 
explaining the Mennonite position to the wider American 
public were prompted by pointed accusations wherein 
certain individuals, usually ministers, were targeted 
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for abuse. Such was the case in Wayland, Indiana where 
Mennonite minister Simon Gingerich accused of making 
"pro-Germans" and "disloyalists" out of the youth of his 
church was asked to explain his actions and ordered to 
fly the flag at his home. Gingerich agreed to be 
interviewed for an article responding to the charges. In 
that article, he shared how Mennonites had sacrificed 
17 
and served in the world crisis. 
These efforts to go public with a defense of 
Mennonitism were all too infrequent. Mennonite rhetoric 
that sought to repair the faith's image by dissociating 
religious objectors from other conscientious objectors 
went unnoticed by most Americans. Mennonites were 
content to harbor the comforting belief that "these 
facts were fully established and easily accessible to 
all." 
Denials, Rejections, And The Liabilities of 'No' 
Mennonites were painfully aware of the host of 
accusations about them circulating in public places. 
They were insincere, cowards, slackers, yellow, pro-
German, disloyal, traitors, mentally deficient, lazy, 
and parasites. Mennonites took these charges seriously 
because they attempted to correct this negative image by 
vociferously denying each and every disparaging 
description. They were not insincere; they were not pro-
German; and they were not unpatriotic. Readers of 
Mennonite newspapers received plenty of refutational 
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evidence to convince them otherwise. 
Mennonites took different approaches to refuting 
the charge that they were insincere-- that their policy 
of nonresistance had been adopted after the war had been 
declared as a convenient way to avoid participation. 
Kauffman made the charge appear ludicrous. He wrote that 
if the charge is "that we became suddenly conscientious 
when the war began, then we became suddenly 
conscientious at the beginning of every war in history 
since we as a church had existence, for in all previous 
wars we had the same attitude toward war that we have 
18 
now." Elsewhere, Kauffman set the record straight by 
declaring: "Our conference records bear evidence of the 
fact that the two most prominent tenets of Mennonite 
faith with reference to war and Government are: 1) non-
resistance, or abstinence from all carnal strife, and 2) 
19 
loyalty to the Government under which we live." While 
Kauffman may have exaggerated the second point by 
calling it a "prominent" Mennonite tenet, he was 
attempting to reconcile what in the public mind were two 
contradictory positions. Opponents argued that even if 
c. o.•s could prove their sincerity, the c. o. status 
was itself disloyal. 
Interestingly enough, the most comprehensive and 
persuasive defense of the Mennonites on this issue and 
other charges was a paid advertisement by an anonymous 
Mennonite writer in the Elkhart, Indiana, The Elkhart 
Truth, which came one year after the war was over. This 
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lengthy defense was designed to reveal "the real facts 
about the Mennonites." In response to the charge that 
Mennonites temporarily adopted c. o. status, this 
citizen of Elkhart firmly remarked: "Mennonites have 
always upheld the principles of nonresistance and they 
have never asked for anything from any country except 
20 
liberty of conscience." Again, the perplexing question 
arises: if Mennonites were so anxious to prove the 
sincerity of their nonresistant stance, why didn't they 
place articles like this one in public papers during the 
war? Perhaps the Mennonite justification for delay was 
that once Americans had lost their patriotic fervor they 
would be more receptive to arguments that explained the 
position of a nonresistant group, and they would be less 
inclined to inflict verbal and physical abuse. Although 
the war had ended before this discourse was formulated, 
war memories were still fresh for Mennonites and the 
public. This paid advertisement represented a way to 
assuage the bitter feelings and improve the strained 
relationship between the public and the Mennonites, and, 
thus, it warrants notice here. 
s. M. Grubb also was intent on refuting the charge 
of insincerity to his readership. Grubb's position was 
that actions, not words, would be the only way to 
convince the greater American public that Mennonites did 
not become nonresisters for expedient purposes. Thus he 
explained: 
My own personal view of the present exemption 
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law is that it had better have been omitted so 
that those of the so-called peace sects who 
sincerely believe in the doctrine of non-
resistance might have the opportunity of 
proving their absolute confidence in the 
doctrine by paying everything that it might 
have cost, even withholding their lives, were 
21 
such a price demanded. 
Though this course of action would involve extreme 
faith, it was, perhaps, the only realistic way in which 
the Mennonite position would be perceived as sincere. 
Many Americans remained uninformed or refused to 
believe that any c. o., religious or otherwise, 
Mennonite or non-Mennonite, really held steadfast to a 
long-standing creed of unconditional nonresistance. And 
since they would not fight, a more serious charge 
materialized; c. o.•s could only be pro-German. This 
accusation implicated the Mennonites, in particular, 
since many GC Mennonites claimed a German heritage, 
spoke the German language, and publicly supported 
Germany before United states intervention. 
Mennonites were acquainted with many of the 
specific accusations of pro-Germanism hurled at them. As 
an MC Mennonite with no cultural ties to Germany, Daniel 
Kauffman did not find it uncomfortable reiterating those 
charges to readers of the Gospel Herald. "Among other 
things," he wrote: 
we are told that we are pro-Germans, and that 
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if the United states were in a war with 
England our attitude would be quite different 
from what it is now; that we were planted here 
in America about seventy years ago to raise 
seed for the kaiser and to join in the German 
propaganda at the psychological moment; that 
some of our prominent ministers going about to 
visit the camps and looking after the 
spiritual interests of our young brethren are 
22 
in the pay of Germany. 
Kauffman was ready for a one-two counter-punch. "The 
Mennonites believed in and taught nonresistance for 
several centuries before there was an imperial Germany," 
he countered. More intriguing, however, was his second 
line of defense: "Most of the Mennonites now in America 
are descendants from Holland and Switzerland, not from 
23 
Germany." Kauffman, whose ancestry like most MC 
Mennonites was Swiss, was willing to disregard the 
heritage of GC Mennonites in order to confirm his 
American citizenship! This was not a unique argument 
advanced by MC Mennonites. The Elkhart writer, a MC 
member, also refused to acknowledge the heritage of 
General Conference Mennonites. "[Mennonites] have never 
been pro-German in any sense," he wrote, "for their 
ancestors came, nearly all, from Switzerland many years 
ago. Try to imagine a non-resistant people supporting 
the kaiser and his cohorts' military program and you 
24 
will have an incongruity that cannot exist." 
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Mennonites of the Mennonite Church had no 
reservations in responding to the accusation of pro-
Germanism by denying their German heritage. So proud of 
their Swiss heritage, they even treated the charge 
lightheartedly. Kauffman shrugged off the pro-German 
label with the remark: "[The charge is] that we are pro-
Germans," but I say [n]ot any more so than our 
forefathers were pro-British in Revolutionary days, or 
pro-Mexican in the war with Mexico, or pro-Turk in the 
25 
present war." The comparisons were intended to show 
how ridiculous it was to charge Mennonites of being pro-
German, but Kauffman's inaccurate account of history 
weakened its argumentative punch. 
Mennonites of the General Conference were unable to 
treat the charge of pro-Germanism in such a flippant 
manner. For them, the "incongruity" so described by the 
MC Elkhart writer did exist. While GC Mennonites never 
supported the German military program, they had been 
sympathetic to the German people, and even expressed 
pride in the German nation. These Mennonites had to 
wrestle with how they could forsake German ties when 
they had publicly claimed them only a year ago. One has 
to wonder if GC Mennonites felt that their brethren of 
the Mennonite Church had gone too far in trying to re-
establish themselves as upright American citizens when 
they had to dissociate themselves from German-born 
Mennonites of the General Conference in order to do so. 
G. c. Mennonites had an awkward problem to deal 
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with. Editor Grubb of the English newspaper The 
Mennonite handled the situation deftly. Grubb explained 
to his readers that the Government knows "most of us 
speak German and have German names," and that "much of 
the money [we] raised for relief was, by the givers, 
directed to go to the German Red Cross." But more 
damaging yet is that "[i]t has been charged in 
Washington that German Red Cross money was diverted to 
pro-German propaganda just before America entered into 
the war." Grubb's recommendation was to avoid the issue 
with outsiders--a familiar Mennonite strategy. Grubb 
discreetly cautioned Mennonites of the harm that would 
result if they tried to give an honest explanation to 
the public on this issue, or continued to write articles 
that were in sympathy with Germany. His admonishing 
statement began: "[T]here will be some who are not at 
all discreet in the expression of their opinions, when 
they express them the body to which they belong gets the 
full benefit." More directly, Grubb added: "Loose talk 
today not only puts the one who does the talking in 
danger of being roughly handled by his neighbors but 
26 
also exposes him to prosecution by the authorities." 
This was not an accusation that GC Mennonites could deny 
or refute to set the record straight. Rather the charge 
of pro-Germanism was an unpleasant reminder of a fateful 
blunder that must at least be silently acknowledged and 
carefully downplayed. 
Grubb's task must have appeared enviable to c. E. 
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Krehbiel, editor of the German Der Herold. The free-
flowing German patriotism of the years preceding u. S. 
intervention, occured not in The Mennonite, but in the 
GC newspaper for German-speaking Mennonites--members of 
the faith who were more comfortable with the German 
language and who, as the most recent immigrants to 
America, had closer ties to Germany. These Mennonites 
had donated large sums of money to the German Red Cross; 
they had denounced the Allied forces in editorials for 
mistreating Germany, and they had kept up a steady 
stream of correspondence with German Mennonites in their 
Fatherland There was, to put matters simply, no denying 
a pro-German bent to the contents of Der Herold between 
the years 1914 and early 1917. 
Krehbiel elected to repair the damage of, what 
appeared to be by all accounts, a gargantuan faux pas by 
interpreting the charge of pro-Germanism as primarily a 
language problem, and not a problem of national 
loyalties. Krehbiel had a much easier task in responding 
to critics who decried the fact that some Americans 
could not or did not want to speak the English language 
than in explaining away German patriotism. For one 
thing, it was the less emotional component of the 
accusation; for another it was still correctable. 
As an able reporter, Krehbiel kept his German 
readership on top of happenings regarding the restricted 
use of German. As a detached observer, Krehbiel reported 
matter-of-factly whenever he stumbled upon news of 
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German censorship. Readers were regularily updated on 
elementary schools that had banned the German language, 
on colleges that had dropped their German departments, 
and on Mennonite German teachers who had lost their 
27 
jobs. Krehbiel dutifully printed without editorial 
comment official government bulletins, like "The Plan 
for Americanization," that, among other things, 
stipulated: "In all schools where elementary subjects 
are taught, they should be taught in the English 
28 
language only." In his scouting of various language-
related rulings, Krehbiel even anticipated the 
censorship of German in American newspapers, including 
his own. Though a people who, in Krehbiel's own words 
"don't usually cross a bridge until we get there," 
Krehbiel reported in the Aug. 9, 1917, edition of Der 
Herold that he suspected that "we will have to refrain 
from using the German language" and encouraged readers 
29 
to "go on to the English language" without regret. 
So accepting was Krehbiel of the demand to speak 
the English language that when the law forbidding the 
printing of war-related content in foreign languages was 
passed in late 1917, Krehbiel rationalized it to his 
readers, adding that "we are going to abide by the 
30 
regulations that have been given." Many German 
Mennonites, however, were not as eager as their 
newspapers• editor to make the transition to English. 
One member of the faith expressed the sentiment of many 
when he wrote: "I am not convinced that Mennonitism and 
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the English language are compatible." Somewhat 
perturbed, Krehbiel had to remind subscribers repeatedly 
that: "This all has to be written in the English 
language, so please send it in the English language or 
not at all. Before we can print anything in German, we 
have to have a man under oath translate this before we 
put it into the mail by way of the newspaper. So now you 
know we are limited and if we mentioned something that 
you had written perhaps you will recognize it." Then for 
good measure, Krehbiel repeated his editorial policy: 
"But we are not going to publish it if it is in German. 
Send it to us in English if it is at all necessary," 
32 
adding somewhat caustically "and make it short." 
Krehbiel was not insensitive to his readers fears and 
general disinterest in learning the English language. 
But he remained stern in upholding the administrations's 
policy of speaking or writing in the English language 
with regard to the war. Scolding recalcitrants of the 
faith, Krehbiel wrote: 
Now English is our national language and 
everyone has to admit that. And as soon as a 
person wants to become a citizen of this 
country, he has to learn this language. He has 
to make every effort to do so. It is 
absolutely right and just that a person does 
not criticize and scold as soon as he sees a 
German newspaper has some English articles in 
it. It is an unhealthy relationship if a man 
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is a citizen of this country and then fights 
33 
the learning of its language. 
Speaking directly to the concern that the faith might be 
weakened, if another language were adopted, Krehbiel 
exposed its fallacy: "The idea that some of our faith 
will be lost just because we change languages is a most 
narrow-minded idea. If that were the case then we would 
all have to go back to Aramaic or the Hebrew language 
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and never change from that." Resistance to change on 
that point was simply lame reasoning, Krehbiel believed. 
Throughout the course of the war, Krehbiel used his 
influential paper to cajole members of the faith into 
wholesale acceptance of the English language. His 
rhetorical burdens were lifted slightly by making the 
language issue germane to the charge of pro-Germanism 
while refusing to engage in a debate surrounding 
national loyalties in the present war. Mennonites could 
not clear themselves of the charge of being German 
sympathizers, despite the fact that German patriotism 
had come to a screeching halt at the outset of the war. 
Nobody was more keenly aware of that then Krehbiel. But 
Krehbiel reasoned that if German Mennonites began to 
speak the English language, they might come to be 
regarded as having American loyalties in the public's 
eye. "The citizens of German extraction should be 
especially conscious of the fact that it is important 
that they learn the English language," Krehbiel 




Americans remained suspicious of the Mennonites 
though. Despite attempts by their Swiss brethren to 
disavow the German roots of Mennonitism, Mennonites of 
Swiss and German extraction, GC's and MC's alike, became 
the targets of violent retributive acts by angry mobs 
under the pretext of pro-Germanism. Whether they denied 
or skirted the attacks of pro-Germanism, this charge 
remained a difficult one for Mennonites to refute, and 
served as a painful lesson to Mennonites of German 
descent of the perils of participating in the political 
world. 
Mennonites dissociated themselves from the larger 
category of conscientious objectors and denied that they 
were insincere or pro-German. But these strategies 
designed to clear their image were controlled by the 
nature of the accusations; their statements of self-
defense were built around and restricted by the 
unfortunate charges forced upon them by the wider 
citizenry. Hence, outsiders became "master of the 
36 
controversy" even in Mennonite circles. The posture of 
defensiveness, a necessary consequence of adopting such 
strategies to the exclusion of others, is not healthy 
for a church, sect, or any group, attempting to carve a 
niche of legitimacy for themselves. When a defensive 
posture is evident, a group faces negativistic, 
splintering tendencies because the ingredient of 
37 
reJection 1s uppermost in their minds. Mennonites 
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understood this at least in an intuitive sense. Not only 
did the practice of denying each and every disparaging 
charge enslave them to unpleasant subjects, but their 
principles of nonresistance and nonconformity had 
negative meanings to outsiders. As observed in chapter 
four, Mennonitism prompted a public mindset of 
associating the negativistic principles of the faith 
with passivity. Mennonites were known for what they 
would not do. To repair their "do-nothing" status and to 
avoid the pitfalls of being driven into a corner saying 
"no" to accusations, Mennonites searched for more 
constructive ways to defend themselves. 
Loyalty With Severed Ties To The Military 
Mennonites wanted desperately to be identified with 
their countrymen as patriotic American citizens. To 
build what they hoped would be a convincing line of 
defense, at least as it was rehearsed in Mennonite 
communications, Mennonites devised several strategies to 
highlight the similarities between themselves and the 
wider citizenry. Mennonites of both Conferences 
attempted to gain the favor of the wider public by 
drawing upon the venerated traits of loyal citizenship. 
The end result of such efforts was to see a more 
positive reflection of themselves in the social mirror. 
38 
Mennonites went to great lengths to re-affirm 
characteristics of loyal citizenship not associated with 
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the military. They pointed to a host of benevolent 
activities that they dutifully performed, capitalized 
upon their visible roles as farmers, emphasized that 
they, too, were sacrificing in this time of crisis, and 
expanded the meaning of patriotism to embrace an altered 
version of civil religion. 
For a group traditionally satisfied with being 
called "The Quiet In The Land," Mennonites' attempts to 
accentuate active, noticeable dimensions of their 
loyalty was an exercise in image-reversal. Members of 
the faith who before the war heartily agreed with c. E. 
Krehbiel that: "[Ours] is not the kind of loyalty that 
has a lot of hoopla that we have to let everybody know 
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about it," were following a very different example in 
the wake of u. s. intervention--an example that even c. 
E. Krehbiel was setting. "It is important that a person 
ask himself very directly: what can I do for my country 
to show that I am loyal to it," Krehbiel advised, 
stressing further that each individual "has to be ready 
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to do something and in some way to serve." Krehbiel 
used strong words in warning members of the consequences 
of a passive witness: "The government then has no 
obligation toward us if we haven't been active 
41 
citizens," he warned. 
As part of their effort to help call attention to 
visible aspects of loyal citizenship, Mennonites 
expressed interest in giving generously to those in 
need. When The Mennonite first addressed the war issue, 
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the search for ways in which Mennonites could make non-
military contributions to their communities was given 
high priority. s. M. Grubb stated: 
We have always insisted that testimony against 
war does not make us any the worst (sic] 
citizens. In times of war it remains for us to 
show that we are good citizens •• Binding 
up wounds, carrying helpless ones out of 
danger, helping innocent sufferers, are 
Christ-like duties which should appeal to 
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every able-bodied man among us. 
The Christian Monitor was more austere in reminding 
Mennonites of their civil and Christian obligations. 
Editor H. Frank Reist wrote: 
[O]ur religious convictions .•. [do] not 
excuse us from bearing our share of the burden 
to relieve suffering. If we refuse to take up 
arms the world has a right to expect that we 
exemplify the spirit of the Master by giving 
liberally of our means and service for the 
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succor of those in need. 
MC Mennonites acted upon the advice of Reist and others 
to relieve suffering and give liberally of their 
services by creating The Relief Commission For War 
Sufferers in December of 1917. Understanding that "Our 
militant countrymen have had a right to challenge the 
sincerity of our faith," an MC member, J. R. Allyger, 
suggested that official Mennonite relief and 
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reconstruction organizations would turn "a protest or 
mere passivity" into "positive alternatives" and 
"construct[ive] ideals [that] transcend the mere 
44 
objections." J.C. Meyer, coordinator of Mennonite 
reconstruction efforts, concurred: "We as Mennonites owe 
it to our generation to carry out our ideals in the 
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social order." Cognizant of the efforts by their MC 
brethren, Der Herold encouraged GC Mennoni~es to follow 
their lead: "The Old Mennonites [MC's] have already 
collected $100,000 to be used for rehabilitation in the 
war areas. Wouldn't it be in place for the other 
46 
branches of Mennonites to also go in this direction?" 
The GC equivalent turned out to be The Emergency Relief 
Commission, an agency that collected in excess of 
$40,000 and periodically printed lists of contributors 
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in both The Mennonite and Der Herold. 
Daniel Kauffman of the Gospel Herald was less 
concerned with specific ways in which Mennonites could 
help in the crisis than he was in reminding members of 
the desirable traits of loyal citizenship that they 
already possessed. Noting that, "nonresistant people 
• are peaceable and law-abiding and the governmental 
expenses on their account are practically nothing; that 
they are sober, conscientious, and industrious," he drew 
the conclusion that they "contribute to the nation's 
stability and wealth ••• and hence are a positive 
contributing force to the cause of righteousness [which] 
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makes the nations desire them as citizens •••• " 
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Not only did Mennonites look for immediate ways to 
relieve suffering and paint a respectable character 
sketch of themselves, they also highlighted their role 
as farmers. Since one of the major occupations of 
Mennonites was farming, and harvesting food became as 
essential as manufacturing munitions, an argument for 
Mennonite loyalty based upon the fact that they were 
hard-working farmers was difficult to refute. Mennonites 
did not need to convince the public that the farmer was 
of great value to the country during the war. Generals 
in the throes of battle and the President in a national 
address had publicly praised their efforts. John 
Pershing, the commander-in-chief of the Allied forces, 
expressed heartfelt gratitude to the American farmer 
through the Secretary of Agriculture: 
"Will you please convey to farmers of America 
our profound appreciation of their patriotic 
services to the country and to the allied 
armies in the field ••• Food is of vital 
military necessity for us and for our Allies, 
and from the day of our entry into the war 
America's armies of food producers have 
rendered invaluable service to the Allied 
cause by supporting the soldiers at the front 
through their devoted and splendidly 
successful work in the fields and furrows at 
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home." 
President Wilson echoed that appreciation in a national 
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address to the people. In praise of the farmer, Wilson 
predicted at one point that: "The toil, the 
intelligence, the energy, the foresight, the self-
sacrifice, and devotion of the farmers of America will, 
I believe, bring to a triumphant conclusion this great 
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last war." After hearing Wilson's appeal to the 
farmers to join the crusade by providing food, C. E. 
Krehbiel reprinted part of the address in Der Herold and 
voiced his approval by responding: "Certainly no good 
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citizen will have scruples on this point." Aaron 
Loucks, writing in the Gospel Herald concurred. Farming 
during wartime "cannot be wrong when by so doing we are 
supplying the necessities of life for ourselves and our 
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fellowmen." 
While Loucks wanted to ease members' consciences on 
the righteousness of providing for a country at war, he, 
like many Mennonites, was aware of the tremendous moral 
pressure on Mennonite farmers to feed the hungry in the 
face of skyrocketing prices on farm commodities. 
Tobacco, the crop raised by Mennonites in the East, 
nearly trippled in price from 1914-1918, and wheat, the 
primary crop produced by Mennonites in the great plains 
states, doubled in price in the same time period. 
Mennonites did not want to be recognized for their 
fattened pocketbooks alongside their military 
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exemptions. To circumvent that association, Loucks 
urged Mennonites to "produce the necessaries of life, 
not only for ourselves, but for others who will have 
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need and cannot be producers." For as he warned: "unless 
food becomes more plentiful prices will continue to 
advance until they will be beyond the reach of the 
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common population." 
The need for food in winning the war on all fronts 
gave rural Mennonites a wonderful opportunity to boast 
that their occupations provided ample proof of loyalty 
to country. Since Der Herold's readership was almost 
exclusively rural, the paper frequently sprinkled 
official government advertisements urging farmers to 
"Cultivate the Soil," "Keep it Coming," "Send the wheat, 
meat, fats, and sugar--the fuel for fighters," as 
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"Victory is a question of Stamina." The paper even 
broke editorial policy in the April 18, 1918, issue by 
printing an illustration that depicted the farmer of 
America as an integral role in America's wars. The 
mightily-built farmer in the foreground (who could have 
easily been taken as Mennonite) with jutted jaw and 
sleeves rolled up is hard at work sewing wheat. A small 
sketch in the background shows a determined farmer of 
the colonial era (presumably during the Revolutionary 
war) pulling a plow. Both images are set in a background 
of the stars and stripes, and the caption below reads: 
"PATRIOTS." The message is crystal clear: Farming has 
always played a major role in the country's welfare in 
times of war. The farmer is as much the patriot as the 
man on the firing line. The editor added: "It is the 
duty of every Christian at this time to help with 
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raising food. Half the world is going hungry and it 
could be that much of it is going to waste. But that 
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does not excuse us from wasting one kernel." 
Mennonites relished the ability to proudly proclaim 
that "our farmer is as important as anybody in the 
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trenches." Occasionally, however, Mennonites 
exaggerated the importance of their role as the nation's 
food producers. Daniel Kauffman could not suppress an 
air of superiority. "War is not the only thing that 
keeps up a nation," he remarked confidently. "Even now 
it is proclaimed by the war authorities that this war 
will be won, not by the armies but by the tillers of the 
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soil." Not only did Mennonites see themselves as 
essential and loyal citizens, but they harbored an 
exaggerated belief that they, not those on the firing 
line, would be the real persons responsible for bringing 
the war to an end. Kauffman's statement was a prime 
example of a rhetorical problem that Mennonites faced. 
In the very process of establishing themselves as loyal 
citizens, it was easy to praise themselves for doing the 
"right" things, which, of course, implied that the rest 
of the nation was doing the wrong things. 
A closely related, but more pronounced, attempt to 
re-affirm their loyal citizenship in a non-military way 
was to to demonstrate that they could make larger 
sacrifices, since they would not participate in the war. 
The concept of sacrifice is rich with symbolic import 
and supreme irony in that the very best argument one can 
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make in support of a good is one's willingness to 
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sacrifice himself for it. Mennonites wanted to make 
larger sacrifices in order to give what they hoped would 
be sterling testimony to the fact that they were like 
their fellow citizens in many respects and unlike the 
irreligious nonresister. 
As previously discussed, Mennonites denied charges 
of insincerity in the hope that they would be judged 
apart from the general class of conscientious objectors. 
But Mennonites also felt that it was necessary to 
respond positively to these charges. By showing the 
public that they were willing "to go the extra mile" to 
relieve suffering, Mennonites believed that this would 
be ample proof to demonstrate that they were indeed a 
different kind of c. o. and ones whom their fellow 
citizens should be proud of. Mennonite leaders strongly 
urged their members to do more for those in need than 
most citizens were doing. s. M. Grubb envisioned that 
Mennonites would remain outcasts if they did not make 
such large sacrifices. He frankly remarked: "Should our 
people not respond, even with greater energy and in 
greater numbers than those who believe in war, they 
would deservingly bring upon themselves the contempt of 
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being slackers." H. Frank Reist, writing in The 
Christian Monitor, echoed Grubb's sentiments: "If we 
want to give indisputable evidence that we are seeking 
exemption from military service on scriptural grounds 
and not because of cowardice or in order to escape 
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making sacrifice, we must do so by making a larger 
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sacrifice." Similarly, Aaron Loucks realized that 
Mennonites needed to seize as many opportunities as they 
could in order to prove their sincerity as conscientious 
objectors. He told members: 
We should always be willing to contribute to 
causes which we can support in amounts greater 
than those asked of us for the support of the 
war. We should not shrink from hardships or 
sacrifices, but show that it is wholly a 
matter of conscience with us. Let us prove our 
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sincerity. 
Daniel Kauffman challenged members to take action 
immediately. "This is your time," he began, "to prove 
that your failure to support war measures is in no sense 
due to a desire to take it easy or to shirk 
responsibilities." He pressed the issue by asking: "How 
does your contribution toward the relief of war 
sufferers compare with the contribution of the average 
person who has no scruples against war?" Admonishing 
members who had failed to perform their Christian duty, 
he asked: "Can you point to your record and prove that 
you have . contributed liberally to the support of 
the needy, even beyond the suggestion of the Government 
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or the demands of reasonable people?" Mennonite 
Church member J.E. Hartzler was even more demanding of 
his fellow members. He was determined to make Mennonites 
appear to the public as courageous, patriotic, and even 
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heroic for performing so many good works. He exclaimed: 
Every member of the church should do more than 
the soldier on the firing line. We should do 
more than buy Liberty Bonds. We must do more 
than simply contribute to the Red Cross fund. 
We must go the 'second mile,' and as a church 
we must do more toward relief and 
reconstruction than can possibly be done 
through military avenues •••• If the church 
will start something soon • the world will 
have no occasion to point the finger at us and 
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say ' slacker. ' 
As all of these writers indicate, it was of utmost 
importance for Mennonites to "bend over backwards" to 
demonstrate that they, too, were loyal American 
citizens. Yet in wishing to make larger sacrifices 
through non-militaristic avenues, Mennonites were giving 
these acts of loyalty higher status than military 
sacrifices. Mennonites trod a fine line between 
identifying with their fellow citizens and appearing 
morally superior. The writer who raised the status of 
the Mennonite farmer above that of his fellow citizens 
overstepped that line. So, too, did Hartzler in his 
great enthusiasm to show the public that Mennonites were 
the most industrious, loyal citizens. In one self-
righteous passage, Hartzler exhorted: 
Every man and woman in the Mennonite Church 
can render a greater and more noble service to 
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God and to the human family than can the man 
who enlists in military service and dies on 
the firing line. It is not a difficult thing 
to die for a country; but it takes a great 
faith and courage to live for God and our 
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country. 
This statement only served to distance Mennonites from 
the wider public and it further exemplified the 
rhetorical problem. Attempts to identify themselves as 
patriotic Americans resulted in arguing for the 
rightness of the Mennonite position because Mennonites 
also identified themselves as disciples of Christ. 
Mennonites went to great lengths to prove that 
loyalty to one's country could be demonstrated by doing 
good deeds, giving of financial resources, growing food 
for others, and sacrificing for the good of the country. 
Yet allegiance to the state was the acid test of 
patriotism in war time. Unwavering support of the 
government in war or peace times was the mark of the 
true patriot. 
The Mennonite faith strictly forbade unquestioning 
obedience to government where it conflicted with 
allegiance to Christ's principle of nonresistance. The 
flag and the cross could not be worshiped together. 
Civil religion was heresy. It would have appeared that 
Mennonites had no recourse but to be silent about this 
aspect of patriotism. Before the war, Mennonites had 
frowned on Fourth of July celebrations, referring to the 
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holiday as "a celebration in which prayer, patriotism, 
fire-crackers, and foolishness formed a prominent part," 
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and "nothing for Christian people to have a part in." 
During the war, one might have assumed that they simply 
refrained from commenting on that part of the American 
psyche they could never understand for fear of 
retributions. The July 4, 1918 issue of Der Herold told 
another story, however. Two articles, one a Fourth of 
July message from the government and another from a 
Mennonite minister, essentially overrode the Mennonite 
stance of nonresistance because each identified the 
government with God. On the front page, readers were 
greeted by a patriotic message from the government 
printed in English reminding its citizens that "Now is 
the hour for unquestioning loyalty to constituted 
authority, doing what it orders, obeying what it 
requests, sacrificing when it asks, suffering, if need 
be, with the full hope and assurance that thus we are 
opening up the way to victory ..•• To authority in 
these days, as unto God, the inquiry, the only inquiry 
of the right-thinking American should be, Lord, what 
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wilt thou have me to do?" In another time or place, 
Mennonites would have been shocked and horrified to 
discover such a blatant endorsement of civil religion in 
their church paper. Even in 1918, amidst the crisis of 
citizenship Mennonites were experiencing, it seemed 
strangely inappropriate material and an extremist effort 
at identification. 
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Yet the peculiarity of this issue of Der Herold 
becomes greater in light of the fact that a Fourth of 
July sermon delivered by H. o. Penner a General 
Conference minister and reprinted in German surrounded 
the official Fourth of July address and echoed its 
themes! Penner preached to members of the faith that 
"Every true citizen should be thankful to God for our 
country and we ought to express it. It ought to be 
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expressed in a prominent manner; don't keep it quiet." 
Elsewhere, Penner attempted to reconcile loyalties to 
God and country by pronouncing: "God created us wanting 
us to be happy and for this purpose he gave us the 
ingredients of happiness--the family, the state, and the 
church. None of these elements can be ignored or even 
scorned and neglected. The state shouldn't be neglected 
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anymore than the other two--family and church." 
Rarely, did Mennonites venerate the state in the same 
breath as the church, treating them as equal in all 
respects. According to the dictates of their faith, 
Penner's sermon could have been tagged heretical. 
Explanations for the sudden outburst of patriotism that 
necessarily involved a forfeiture of Mennonite 
principles are scarce. One can surmise that because 
Mennonite tracts printed in German were under 
surveillance by the government for subversive activities 
that editors, like c. E. Krehbiel, wanted to play it 
safe and give the pretense of patriotism. But such an 
interpretation belies the fact that Mennonites 
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formulated their self-defense in their own periodicals 
precisely because they circulated in the safe confines 
of their own communities. Additionally, if Mennonites 
were threatened by government surveillance, they would 
not have challenged the administration's policy or 
questioned the legitimacy of democracy as they did in 
other issues of the paper. Perhaps in their zeal to 
identify with their patriotic neighbors, they 
temporarily lost sight of their religious 
distinctiveness. Perhaps this issue of Der Herold was 
more of an extraordinary exception than the rule. 
Such a rationalization, while plausible in many 
respects, fails to account for the policy of printing 
the emblem of the United States flag at the top of the 
editorial section of every issue of Der Herold between 
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the years 1917-1918. Whether the editorial for that 
week covered the war, or church activities, a picture of 
a waving American flag identified the first column on 
the second or fourth page as the editorial section. 
While a picture of a flag does not call for 
unquestioning allegiance to the state or equate loyalty 
to God with loyalty to country, as the Fourth of July 
messages tended to do, it was, nonetheless, an oddity in 
a Mennonite newspaper. Why a flag, Mennonites might have 
asked, and not a cross? The unbridled American 
patriotism evidenced in Der Herold during the war, like 
the unabashed support of Germany before the war, 
projected the image of a people clumsily struggling with 
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how to address political issues through Mennonite 
spectacles. 
For what ever the reason, Der Herold's flair for 
patriotism, as it was defined by the state, was not 
standard fare in other Mennonite tracts of either the 
General Conference or the Mennonite Church. Since 
Mennonites very much wanted to appear patriotic, though 
they could not carry a gun or pledge unwavering 
allegience to the state, the meaning of patriotism was 
often altered to encompass what they could do for their 
country. The Mennonite recognized the importance of this 
and devoted much of one issue to addressing the 
question, "What Is Patriotism?" R. F. Landis, the 
author, cited common definitions of patriotism before 
giving his own, which "more accurately" reflected the 
meaning of the term. Landis contended that patriotism is 
not a brave, fearless spirit for a barren or cultivated 
piece of land or a country. "It is rather a brave 
fearless spirit in the individual for the principles on 
which our country is established." Landis further 
contended: "Patriotism is a backward look with a forward 
step, looking backward and forging ahead." To illustrate 
this point, Landis proclaimed: 
Let us be patriotic, let us look back to 
Abraham Lincoln and the boys of 1 61 and 1 65. 
These men aided to make men of different color 
free, from the bonds of slavery. Translating 
anew the words of Paul that with Christ there 
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is neither Greek nor Barbarian, neither bond 
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nor free, but all one in Christ. 
Landis's initial comments appear to reinforce the 
conventional meaning of patriotism, but as he applied 
this definition, it became apparent that fighting for 
one's country was not a patriotic gesture. Landis 
argued: 
What we need is a patriotism that will 
illuminate our hearts so that we can look 
back, not only over sixty some years to the 
Civil war, nor simply one hundred forty-one 
years to America's Independence, but rather 
over the nineteen centuries which have passed. 
In the distance see Him who delivered the City 
•.• who taught that prayer and love for 
personal enemies was the all-conquering weapon 
of the kingdom of heaven ••.• The patriot of 
God, every one clad in the whole armor of God, 
has the only true and ultimate weapon of 
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peace. 
The fearless spirit and the war terminology remain, but 
intimations of aggression, war, destruction, or killing 
are absent. The symbol of patriotism is not the flag, 
but the cross. The true patriot does not raise the sword 
of combat but offers the branch of peace. 
This constructive form of patriotism was also 
evident in the Gospel Herald. Kauffman stated: "It 
should also be made plain that there is a difference 
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between constructive patriotism which seeks the best 
interests of home and country and the destructive spirit 
of the mob which in the name of ~patriotism' inflicts 
violence upon the in-offending man who tries to obey the 
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Word of God as he understands it." Kauffman 
disapproved of the "misguided" patriotic intentions of 
mobs to set the Mennonites straight, but he also echoed 
the sentiments of Landis in rejecting the meaning of 
patriotism as fighting for what one thinks is a 
righteous, democratic cause. 
Mennonites like Landis recast patriotism in the 
constructive terms of Christian love, peace, and 
compassion. Yet, oddly enough, they were also attracted 
by the wartime terminology that marked the spirit of 
American patriotism. Landis spoke of "the ultimate 
weapon" of peace and of the true patriot being "clad in 
the whole armor" of God. Similarly, The Christian 
Monitor advocated Christ-like gestures of patriotism, 
but adopted militaristic metaphors. Reist stated: "[W]e 
are ready and willing to cheerfully make a possible 
sacrifice for Him, and .•• we are willing and anxious 
to have our boys and girls enlist in the service of the 
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Master." The GC leader, P.H. Richert, expressed the 
same wish for young Mennonites. Writing to Kauffman, 
Richert said: "May our boys in gratitude so much more 
willingly follow the Lord's draft into his service when 
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peace comes again." 
Wartime terminology, while decidedly inappropriate 
185 
taken literally, renewed the biblical stance of 
nonresistance with its timely meaning, figuratively 
applied. More broadly conceived, Mennonites' words for 
God and their faith principles, by definition, had to be 
used analogically. The supernatural is the realm of the 
ineffable, and language by definition is not well suited 
to the expression of the ineffable. Hence, our words for 
God are necessarily borrowed from our words for the sort 
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of things that we can talk about literally. Mennonites 
could make the world of the supernatural understandable 
and even enticing by referring to the Almighty as a 
"patriot" and Christ's teachings as "the ultimate 
weapon." 
Mennonites altered the meaning of patriotism 
considerably to accomodate their Christian identity. Yet 
they did not completely reject the basis of American 
patriotism. Mennonites made a concerted effort to 
identify with the democratic goals of the nation, even 
though they could not support the democratic means. 
Grubb explained most eloquently that Mennonites were not 
so different from other Americans in this regard, and in 
the process skillfully demonstrated how parallel 
structure creates rhythm, enhances the precision of 
language, and creates an impression that the rhetor 
77 
thinks in a very orderly fashion. 
Though we are a people of peace we no more 
want the things that our enemies would impose 
upon the world than do the rest of our 
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countrymen. Indeed, we might say we have the 
same goal in view as they. We want the world 
to be safe for democracy; we want the rights 
of smaller nations respected; we want the word 
of a people to be sacredly and honorably kept; 
we want the hand of the assassin to be stayed; 
we want the virtues of women to be respected; 
we want the aged and helpless to be protected, 
not butchered . we want these things as 
much as those who are fighting for them. 
but we want to go about it in a different 
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way. 
General Conference leader J. G. Ewerts whole-heartily 
agreed with Grubb. "We long to help this great Republic, 
dedicated to liberty and democracy, to realize its 
noblest aims. These aims we approve of, even where we 
cannot approve of the means by which they are to be 
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attained .•• " 
Although Mennonites supported the "noble aims" of 
their fellow Americans, the question arises as to 
whether Mennonites had an alternative means of achieving 
these desired goals. In fact, Mennonites did offer a 
"third way" of Christian relevance. Ewert suggested 
that: 
When two sides are grappling in a deadly 
conflict, it is not true that there is no 
other way out but for one or the other side to 
'win• by knocking the other opponent down ... 
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• there is a third way, the Christian way of 
reconciliation and understanding, of 
forebearance and forgiveness, of patience and 
love, that reaches the divine height of loving 
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one's enemies. 
The Mennonite solution to the world crisis was totally 
consistent with their peace stance. It was not, however, 
a realistic alternative. Mennonites failed to articulate 
exactly how they would implement the "third way" of 
Christian reconciliation on a world-wide basis. 
Moreover, the third way of loving one's enemies had no 
political relevance. For political persons, there were 
only two sides to this war. The Christian way was 
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decidedly inappropriate in a polarized world. 
Mennonites did not expect Americans to agree with 
their solution to the crisis. It is less clear, however, 
whether Mennonites actually believed that they could 
appear as patriotic Americans in the public's eye after 
changing the meaning of patriotism. Writing with 
militaristic metaphors, a bold, courageous tone, and 
supporting the democratic ends of their countrymen might 
lead one to conclude that they hoped their efforts would 
be well received by the wider citizenry. Yet these 
strategies were so riddled with flaws that this 
conclusion seems unlikely. 
As had been the problem with other Mennonite 
efforts to reconcile their American and Christian 
identities, this strategy left an impression of 
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Mennonite self-aggrandizement. Altering the meaning of 
patriotism not only gave Mennonites a chance to see 
themselves as patriots, but it emphasized that their 
"constructive" form of patriotism was good, and the 
"destructive" patriotism of the vast majority was bad. 
Rather than demonstrate their patriotic ties with the 
larger community, Mennonites highlighted their 
patriotism at the expense of their fellow citizens. 
A more basic flaw with this strategy is that it was 
not realistic to think that such a powerful, emotive 
word as "patriotism" could be given a new meaning. 
Rhetorical critic Richard Weaver writes that words such 
as "democracy," American," and "patriotism" are "God-
terms"--"expressions about which all other expressions 
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are ranked as subordinate." As God-terms, it is 
difficult to change their meanings. To begin with, they 
defy definition in the usual manner because people fear 
their potency will be taken away. They are also 
publicly-agreed upon attitudes grounded in a particular 
way of viewing the world. Perhaps most importantly, they 
serve the psychological function of upholding national 
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egotism. When Mennonites defined patriotism as peace 
through prayer, they weakened its impact, they 
challenged the American world-view that, at times, peace 
can only be achieved through war, and they bruised the 
American ego by claiming that to be a soldier, to carry 
a gun, or to die for one's country was not true 
patriotism. 
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From a Mennonite perspective, however, these 
efforts served the important psychological purpose of 
reducing the discomfort of holding fast to two seemingly 
contradictory identities. Claiming to be an American 
citizen in the midst of war involved an expression of 
patriotism. Since Mennonites could not support the war 
militarily, they were forced to change the meaning of 
the term. In this way, they could, at least in their own 
minds, affirm their loyalty to the country without being 
disloyal to their faith. 
Loyalty With Minimal Ties To The Military 
Could the doctrine of nonresistance be stretched to 
allow for additional patriotic acts--acts marginally 
associated with the military? Mennonites asked 
themselves this searching question as they looked for 
additional ways to repair their image. Some Mennonites 
rationalized that their consciences would allow them to 
support non-violent activities such as Liberty Loan 
Drives, the Red Cross, and non-combatant duty, even 
though these were a part of the war machine. 
One important test of loyalty associated with the 
military arm of the government was contributing to the 
war bond drives. Much of the support generated for these 
drives came from government agencies, state officials, 
and the President himself. on more than one occasion, 
Wilson told Americans: "To subscribe to the Liberty Loan 
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is to perform a service of patriotism." Kansas 
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Mennonites heard Governor Capper exhort: "I appeal to 
every citizen of Kansas to meet this call of the Nation 
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generously and promptly." Official solicitations for 
"patriotic" support were boosted by a well-orchestrated 
drive conducted by the Treasury Department. An Honor 
Flag would be awarded to each community that subscribed 
the sales quota set for it by the Federal Reserve 
District Liberty Loan Committee. A blue star to be sewn 
to the flag would be awarded to communities each time 
they increased their quotas by 100 percent. An Honor 
Role bearing the words: "These are the people of our 
town who are helping to win the war" would be displayed 
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prominently in each community. 
It was difficult for some Mennonites to resist this 
patriotic non-violent act of goodwill. H.P. Krehbiel 
rationalized that "a war bond is a kind of tax, and 
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Jesus told us to pay taxes." Not entirely, sure, 
however, what the Mennonite stance should be on this 
issue, c. E. Krehbiel initially discussed liberty bond 
drives cautiously. Der Herold was, for much of 1917, an 
informational source for readers on what bond drives 
entailed. Everything from how much loans cost, when they 
were due, how much interest they accrued, to how one 
made out an application could be found within its 
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pages. Of course, the very fact that these 
"information pieces" existed at all, and that they could 
be found in the editorial section, was evidence of at 
least indirect support for this war-related act of 
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goodwill. 
Krehbiel, too, became more opinionated as the war 
progressed. An early April 1918, issue of the paper, for 
example bore little resemblance to a Mennonite 
newspaper. One page alone carried fourteen 
advertisements and official bulletins encouraging 
support for liberty loan drives. The choice was simple: 
"Your choice: Bonds or Bondage?" "Go On? or Go Under?" 
"Will you lend your money and be free or hoard it now 
and pay it out in Tribute when Liberty is lost?" Even a 
vicious anti-German ad designed to whip up financial 
support for the war passed editorial scrutiny: "Carry 
the war to the kaiser," the ad demanded, "by lending 
your Cash to Uncle Sam. Every Liberty Bond you buy hits 
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the Hun a blow." While these hard sell advertisements 
in support of the war appeared out of place in a 
Mennonite newspaper, the aggressive, anti-German ad most 
certainly was a glaring contradiction in a German-
Mennonite paper. 
Mennonites were not unaffected by the onslaught of 
campaigning for war bonds. In some localities Mennonites 
justified giving money to the drives because they were 
promised that their contribution would be used to 
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purchase food, not ammunition. All too frequently, 
however, Mennonites who purchased war bonds did so as a 
result of the extreme pressure put on them by their 
fellow citizens. Like the abrasive posters, flyers, and 
advertisements that demanded the purchase of bonds, 
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fellow citizens angrily inquired of Mennonites: "Where 
have you classified yourself in this great drive for 
Liberty? There are but two classes--you fall with the 
one or the other. You are either placing yourself with 
the patriot or the slacker, with honor crowned or with 
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the yellow streak." In the face of such threats by 
Americans who took it upon themselves to enforce 
loyalty to the country, some Mennonites were willing to 
bend the principle of nonresistance. 
Most Mennonites, however, did not buy war bonds 
because these were voluntary contributions that, in 
effect, represented one's direct support of the war. 
Rather, they attempted to devise bond plans that would 
allow them to contribute financially in ways 
disconnected from the military. The MC leader, Aaron 
Loucks, was especially instrumental in proposing 
alternative loan plans to satisfy conscientious 
scruples. Both the Lancaster and Franconia conferences 
of the Mennonite Church adopted his plan to deposit 
money in local banks for local purposes only, and agreed 
that Louck's proposition would serve in lieu of 
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purchasing Liberty Bonds. So important was it to find 
an acceptable alternative to signing up for liberty 
loans and to hit upon an alternative that would get 
official sanction from the Treasury Department, that 
Loucks published hundreds of copies of a tract outlining 
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a proposed loan system entitled: "Meeting The Issue." 
Unfortunately, the Treasury department could not endorse 
193 
the Mennonite loan plans since it was not compulsory to 
purchase liberty bonds, though it did give assent to the 
arrangement being a private contract between the 
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depositor and his local bank. After their encounters 
with liberty bond collectors, Mennonites might have also 
asked themselves: Could not the government bend its 
position to allow for alternative patriotic acts? 
Another test of loyalty associated with the military 
branch of the government was contributing to or 
participating in the Red Cross. The President was 
actively involved in whipping up support for a war-
related activity. Wilson vigorously promoted the Red 
Cross as a worthy Christian cause in stating: "This 
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cross •.. is an emblem of Christianity itself." This 
was yet another patriotic, non-violent cause that 
Mennonites found difficult to resist. As a whole, 
Mennonites of the General Conference rationalized that 
they could support the Red Cross. But an official 
endorsement of this organization, however, was not 
without expressed reservation by key GC leaders. In the 
General Conference statement from the Western District 
to the Secretary of War, delegates offered reluctant 
support for the Red cross. The uneasiness with which 
delegates arrived at a position was captured in the 
line:"The Conference cannot attempt to dissuade those 
who can do so freely and feel called to do voluntary 
medical service in the army under the Red Cross in times 
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of war. " That the resolution was so negatively 
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stated reflected the ambivalence that Mennonites had 
toward a constructive program tied to a destructive 
organization. The Red Cross aided the destitute and 
wounded, it represented Christian aims, after all its 
symbol was the cross, but how closely was it supervised 
by the War Department and to what extent did it 
represent only the Allied forces? Mennonites wondered. 
Though Mennonites did not arrive at a satisfactory 
answer to this question, delegates of the Western 
District grudgingly elected to overlook its ties to the 
military establishment and focus upon its assistance in 
bringing the war to an end. 
Other Mennonite leaders voiced little hesitation in 
championing the Red Cross. Here was a way to prove our 
sincerity as devoted Christians and as loyal citizens, 
they reasoned. s. M. Grubb, for instance, rationalized 
supporting the Red Cross by arguing that not to do so 
was to take a pious, insensitive stance: 
I certainly cannot fold my hands and say: 'I 
am a pacifist,' when millions are ••• in 
misery craving for the drink of cold water 
given in the disciples' name. Hospital work 
Red Cross, YMCA, reconstruction and sanitary 
work offer opportunities for the service of 
our people to an extent that could use all 
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their strength. 
Krehbiel, too, saw no incongruity in supporting the 
Red Cross and opposing the war. When the campaign to 
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raise one million dollars for the Red Cross was 
publicized, Krehbiel responded without hesitation: "The 
Herold is glad to take a part in this," explaining that: 
"The Red Cross is the only organization that does 
not draw the line between friend and enemy. It respects 
both •••• The Red Cross should be supported because 
of this by those who do not take up arms." Aware that 
contributing'Mennonite resources to this organization 
was a point of dispute, and perhaps in anticipation of 
resistance to his position among the Herold readership, 
Krehbiel added: "Even though this might be against the 
conscience of some people because they don't take the 
sword, [failing to support the Red Cross] is not 
carrying out the point correctly. It is told to us by 
Christ himself that healing should be promoted by the 
Christian. Remember the Samaritan did this. The Master, 
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himself, was always ready to show compassion." With 
members clear on this issue, Krehbiel must have 
reasoned, the repeated advice in Der Herold for readers 
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to give their last dollars to the Red Cross would not 
be interpreted as an insensitive command that violated 
conscience but as helpful advice that eased conscience. 
Mennonites who were not convinced that the Red 
Cross was a compassionate, Christian organization, read 
full-page advertisements in their church newspapers 
sponsored by Mennonite businesses to solidify this image 
and convince them otherwise. One advertisement in Der 
Herold highlighted both the humanistic and Christian 
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aspects of the Red Cross, by personifying the 
organization as a good samaritan and a compassionate 
mother. As "the Greatest Mother in the World," the Red 
Cross was "showing mercy in a healthy, human way," 
"eager to comfort," "rebuilding," "reaching out," 
"warming hearts," and "healing wounds." Its 
constructive, humanizing dimensions absorbed, readers 
also learned of its Christian message of peace and 
reconciliation. The Red Cross did not stand in judgment, 
but like the good samaritan "stretch[ed] forth her hands 
to all in need; to Jew or Gentile, black or white; 
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knowing no favorite, yet favoring all." Ads like this 
one raised anew the pressing question: How could a 
peace-loving, God-fearing people fail to support such a 
constructive effort by Christian people to bring peace 
on earth? 
Although supporting the Red Cross represented an 
important way for Mennonites to affirm their loyalties 
to God and country, this identification strategy was not 
very effective because the GC's position was not widely 
adopted by other Mennonites. The Mennonite Church 
believed that the whole military--from the army down to 
the Red Cross--was directly or indirectly out to destroy 
the enemy. MC Mennonites might have corrected Krehbiel's 
observation that "the Red Cross is the only organization 
that does not draw the line between friend and enemy" by 
pointing to the fine print in the ad that appeared in 
his paper. The Red Cross was hardly the good samaritan 
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"knowing no favorite" because it only brought relief to 
"every War torn allied country," it was only there "to 
help your soldier boy," and it was "enthusiastically 
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endorsed by your Army, your Navy and your Allies." 
The MC's rationale for standing in opposition to the Red 
Cross was clearly stated in the Southwestern 
Pennsylvania conference minutes early in 1917. 
We also believe that the Red Cross, when 
serving in a civilian capacity, is a worthy 
cause; but when, as in existing circumstances, 
the Red Cross is taken under the military arm 
of the Government and becomes an adjunct of 
the War Department nonresistant people can not 
consistently render aid under such 
circumstances but should contribute their 
money to other causes and do their deeds of 
102 
charity through other channels. 
Taking a "purist" stance, MC Mennonites would not bend 
the principle of nonresistance and support the Red Cross 
in order to identify with the wider American public. For 
these Mennonites support for the Red Cross infringed on 
an integral principle of Mennonitism that any 
participation in carnal warfare was evil. Supporting the 
Red Cross was too high a price to pay for demonstrating 
one's loyalty. 
It was unfortunate that this issue was a major 
point of dispute for the two conferences because in 
showing a lack of consistency to outsiders, Mennonites 
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created grounds for charges of insincerity. Furthermore, 
support for the Red Cross suggested that Mennonites 
might eventually join the war effort, since they 
appeared to differ about the meaning of their doctrines. 
More seriously, however, was the fact that it threatened 
to weaken the faith, as members issued reprimanding 
words and showed their disapproval of each other's 
position. 
Another source of conflict between the two 
Conferences involved a third test of loyalty associated 
with the war, that of performing non-combatant duty. 
Mennonite men drafted by the Selective Service Law had 
more pressing decisions concerning the extent of their 
loyalty than their brethren back home. Almost all 
Mennonites affected by the service law accepted the 
order to report to training camps in the fall of 1917, 
since th~ law provided that "no person shall be exempted 
from service in any capacity that the President shall 
declare non-combatant" and violators faced charges of 
desertion. While in camp, Mennonites took advantage of 
the law which temporarily granted them the right to 
reject wearing the uniform and participating in drills. 
But when the long-awaited order defining non-combatant 
service was finally issued, it was a disappointment, 
because it failed to make provision for service outside 
the military organization. Wilson officially defined 
non-combatant service as 1) service in the medical 
corps, 2) service in the quartermaster corps, and 3) 
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service in the engineering corps. This was an 
unsatisfactory ruling for Mennonites of both 
Conferences. While Mennonites would not have to carry a 
gun, they would be directly connected with the military 
and with the purpose of taking human lives. J. S. 
Hartzler complained that such work "would suggest 
service back from the line of danger [and] that 
Mennonites accepted it [only] because they were afraid 
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of danger, and that was not true." 
Few of the MC draftees accepted any form of non-
combatant duty, while GC draftees were more disposed to 
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accept non-combatant duty. Those who refused to obey 
the President's order were sent to Ft. Leavenworth, 
Kansas where they were given a hearing before a 
government-appointed tribunal to judge the sincerity of 
their religious convictions. If found sincere, they were 
recommended to be furloughed for agriculture. If not 
found sincere, they would suffer the penalty of 
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disciplinary imprisonment. 
Mennonites were divided on whether or not they 
could bend the doctrine of nonresistance to support 
Liberty Loan Drives, the Red Cross, and non-combatant 
duty in order to prove their loyalty and Christian 
goodness. Because these activities were a part of the 
American war machine, many Mennonites feared that going 
along with their fellow citizens in support of these 
activities would forfeit the essentials of Mennonitism. 
Because Mennonites did not present a unified front in 
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support of these activities, the attempts made by some 
members to prove their loyalty to outsiders went without 
notice. 
Showcasing in print their constructive efforts of 
volunteering for relief work, sewing wheat, purchasing 
war bonds, and serving in the Red Cross was evidence 
that Mennonite rhetoric of self-defense was marked by 
great diversity and, upon occasion, contradiction. The 
breadth of the arguments designed to re-define their 
image bore testimony to the fact that Mennonites had 
become acculturated into the American way of life and 
wanted desperately to maintain their status as loyal 
American citizens in their own eyes and in the public's 
eye. The more arguments Mennonites constructed, the 
better chance they had of proving their loyalty and of 
explaining an easily misunderstood religious position to 
outsiders. The contradictoriness of the arguments could 
only be expected from a people who had ignored the 
inevitable crisis for so long that they were unprepared 
to address the war issue with a clear purpose. It is 
little wonder that some arguments were not convincing, 
occasionally contradictory, and had the potential to 
backfire. Yet, given the fact that Mennonites 
constructed positions with little or no time to discuss 
them with the wider fellowship, one has to admire the 
range of opinions that reached publication and the 
steady optimism that Mennonites displayed in facing such 
a formidable, rhetorical challenge. 
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Perspective~ Incongruity 
Church newspapers and Conference statements 
provided the prime forums for the range of arguments 
designed to purify the Mennonite image. Members of the 
faith received position statements in piece-meal fashion 
from their ministers, editors, and official 
representatives. It was incumbent upon individuals to 
fit the various apologetic statements into a coherent 
whole. 
The notable exception to this rhetorical procedure 
was provided by a little-known General Conference Kansas 
farmer by the name of Gerald Dahlke. In a sixteen page 
pocket-size pamphlet entitled: "A Defense of the 
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Mennonites Against Recent Attacks Made Upon Them," 
Dahlke constructed an apologia, complete with story 
line, vivid language, and a host of inter-related 
arguments designed to refute the "cruel attacks" against 
them and bolster the Mennonites image as upright 
American citizens. Though printed in English, Dahlke 
advertised his definitive defense of the Mennonites in 
German-Mennonite newspapers, perhaps under the 
assumption that Mennonites of recent German descent 
faced the most formidable obstacles in repairing a 
tarnished image among the wider public. For only a small 
fee members of the faith could purchase a "pre-packaged" 
apologia. 
Dahlke's defense of the Mennonites resembled, in 
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some respects, the rhetorical efforts of others to 
purify the church's tainted image. He implicated the 
government for failing to make good on President Grant's 
promise of military exemption. Mennonites had suffered 
persecution everywhere, Dahlke noted, and so came to 
"the United States which had from the very beginning 
been the home of religious liberty and freedom." Like so 
many other Mennonite rhetors, Dahlke recognized that 
blaming the government for their unpleasant situation 
temporarily removed them from the spotlight and, in his 
own mind, forced the government to account for its 
inconsistent, dishonorable, actions. 
Dahlke also perpetuated the mistaken assumption 
that Mennonites did not need to publicize their defense 
outside Mennonite circles; truth was self-evident for 
those wishing to seek it out. Ostensibly, the target 
audience for the tract was the outside public. In his 
opening paragraph, Dahlke asserted: "This article is 
written with no other object in view than to put the 
Mennonites in the proper light and justify their stand 
on recent events against the undeserved attacks made 
upon them." More directly, he claimed that "After having 
gained a full knowledge about the history of the 
Mennonites, especially learning the lofty motives that 
prompted their actions in taking the stand they take, 
this class of people will be appreciated and loved." By 
every indication, the discourse was formulated with non-
Mennonites in mind. Yet Dahlke made no effort to expose 
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the tract to the wider public and non-Mennonites were 
not going to come searching for an apologia among 
Mennonite publications. Following the lead of other 
rhetors, Dahlke was content to "justify their stand" 
against "the undeserved attacks" by rehearsing the 
defense for the faithful. 
In repairing the damaged image of the Mennonites 
Dahlke employed many of the same strategies utilized by 
other Mennonite rhetors. He denied that the Mennonite 
stance was insincere. Military exemption (never referred 
to as nonresistance) was not the stance "of a tramp," 
but the stance taken by "their ancestors on account of 
their religious principles and scruples"--a principle 
for which they became "martyrs during the middle ages 
from 1524 to 1614." He redefined loyalty to one's 
country. The Mennonites "are as desirable citizens, 
judged from the viewpoint of their worth and integrity 
as any other class of people in this the best country in 
this world of ours •••• They have always done their 
duty." Dahlke provided examples of their benevolent 
disposition when called to the aid of their neighbors in 
distress. Loyalty was clearly associated with good 
deeds, not carrying a gun. He portrayed Mennonites as 
sacrificing in extraordinary ways, "alleviat[ing] 
suffering and preserv[ing] life" wherever "they could 
lend a helping hand." Dahlke also identified with the 
democratic goals of the country. "The whole world longs 
for a general world peace. In the midst of war, the 
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heart of the soldier even on the European battlefields 
longs for peace, the peace that has been preached by the 
Mennonites for many years, that has been advocated by 
President Wilson and supported by Governor Capper of 
Kansas"" Mennonites had similar hopes as the government 
and the men in the battlefields. The point of dispute 
was not over the goals of peace, but the methods of 
accomplishing that peace. As Dahlke explained: "The 
Mennonites believe this world peace can be attained by 
international law based on the Bible," whereas "Nations 
want to attain this world peace by the sword." 
As observed previously, the strategies Mennonites 
used to identify with other Americans had their 
shortcomings, and Dahlke's efforts at identification 
contained liabilities too. For example, the alternative 
means Dahlke proposed for ending the war were neither 
realistic nor relevant. "International law based on the 
Bible" had little hope of actual implementation and had 
no political relevance in a world plunged deeply into 
war. To outsiders, such solutions demonstrated political 
naivete, if not, outright incompetence. Moreover, by 
arguing that Mennonites were loyal citizens because they 
made larger sacrifices than their fellow man, Dahlke 
opened himself up to the charge of claiming moral 
superiority on the Mennonites' behalf. In "bending over 
backwards" to demonstrate their charitable activities, 
Dahlke ran the risk of having this attempt at 
identification backfire; Mennonites were not only 
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"desirous citizens," but better citizens, if, as Dahlke 
contended, they should be perceived as "model citizens." 
Finally, in tracing the noble cultural heritage of the 
Mennonites, as a way to "place them in their proper 
light," Dahlke was guilty of excluding MC Mennonites. 
The MC Mennonites of Swiss origin who arrived in America 
long before the German-Russian Mennonites, would have 
found little in Dahlke's tract to remind them of their 
cultural heritage, or, for that matter, to construct a 
convincing defense of themselves. Early Mennonite 
1mmm1grants to the United States are conveniently 
omitted in order to highlight the history of GC 
Mennonites living in the central plains states. Like the 
MC writers, such as Daniel Kauffman and the anonymous 
Elkhart source, who failed to acknowledge GC Mennonites 
in their defense of the Mennonites, Dahlke, too, was 
guilty of a parochial defense. 
While Dahlke's defense of the Mennonites is similar 
in some respects to other Mennonite apologetic 
statements, it is fascinating rhetorically, and warrants 
separate analysis here, because in many respects it is 
astonishingly distinctive. Rather than reinforce the 
traditional image of Mennonites as a Christian 
conservative people, who went about their duty in a 
quiet, unassuming way, or support the ideological 
dimension of Mennonitism by explaining the principles of 
nonresistance and nonconformity, Dahlke created "a 
perspective by incongruity"--a method for gauging 
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situations by verbal 'atom cracking.'" That is wrenching 
loose words belonging by custom to a certain category 
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and making hitherto unlinked categories. 
Specifically, the defense of Mennonites through Dahlke's 
perspective by incongruity can be seen in three image 
reversals. 
First, Mennonites were a people who lived for the 
sacred, world and remained suspicious of the secular 
world, a people determined to "be in the world yet not 
of it." Yet Dahlke's defense of them is essentially 
grounded in secular Justifications and clearly "of the 
world." While not a minister, Dahlke's defense of his 
people on secular grounds was still considered highly 
unusual. For all members of the faith, the Bible was the 
source of all truth, and Mennonites based their 
arguments on biblical passages and Mennonite doctrine. 
Oddly though, not once does Dahlke mention 
nonresistance, nonconformity, the Dordrecht Confession 
of Faith, or quote biblical passages. At two places in a 
sixteen page defense, he refers to "religious beliefs 
[which] give courage to endure," and world peace which 
"can be attained by international law based on the 
Bible." The apologia in all essentials aims to bolster 
Mennonite loyalty to their country. Reasoning perhaps 
that their loyalty to God was intact, Dahlke elected to 
shore up the Mennonites' national loyalties to the 
exclusion of church loyalties. Nowhere is that choice 
more clear than when Dahlke recounted a heart-warming 
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story of Mennonites doing their patriotic duty: 
Hardly had these Mennonites settled on their 
farms, even before the pioneer days had 
passed, when an appeal came to them for help. 
The crops west of Ellinwood county had failed 
and urgent help was needed, and when the call 
came, they responded heartily and gave freely. 
They gave not as church members to 
church members, but as loyal citizens to 
citizens. 
From the careful and deliberate phrasing of the last 
line, it is apparent that Dahlke wanted to emphasize the 
patriotic, not the religious side of the Mennonites. 
These members gave to those in need not so much because 
it was what the Christian would do as it was what the 
loyal citizen would do. 
That loyalty to country could take precedence over 
loyalty to God among Mennonites was one image reversal 
that constituted an incongruous perspective. Another 
attempt at "verbal atom cracking" was Dahlke's 
interpretation of the principles of nonconformity and 
nonresistance. Dahlke argued that Mennonites did not 
court obscurity, but had close ties with their larger 
communities, and that Mennonites were not a peculiar 
people who embraced an unpopular stance on military 
service, but shared a desire for military exemption with 
many other people. When Russian Mennonites immigrated to 
this country they were greeted with open arms by 
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American citizens, according to Dahlke's recollection. 
So congenial was each to the other that "Bonds of 
friendship were established between the two 
nationalities--which have endured for forty years." 
Contrary to the idea that Mennonites preferred to keep 
to themselves and dwell in isolated communities, Dahlke 
depicted Mennonites as friendly and congenial; people 
who had developed close ties with the larger community. 
This image diffused the charge that Mennonites appeared 
morally superior to non-members for their asocial, 
nonconformist practices. 
Neither were Mennonites peculiar or nonconformist 
in their stance on military exemption. Dahlke took great 
care to establish the fact that other Americans besides 
the Mennonites affirmed an exemption status. "Besides 
the Mennonites," Dahlke informed his readers, "there are 
the Quakers, Dunkards, and River Brethren, who hold the 
same views on the questions of military service." 
Elsewhere, that list of proponents broadened 
considerably: 
[T]he Mennonite church is not the only church 
that opposes the 'Military-Draft-System'. 
There are thousands upon thousands of 
individual citizens, who follow this principle 
in their life. Thousands of people came from 
Germany and Switzerland, who do not believe in 
militarism although they are not Mennonites. 
They left their homes in Europe to escape the 
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military draft system. Not only that, but we 
have a large number of people of English 
descent, men and women of noble character and 
lofty ideals who have worked whole-heartedly 
for world peace and we honor them for their 
devotion to this noble principle and ideal. 
By showing that military exemption had diffuse support, 
Dahlke removed the dubious distinction that Mennonites 
held for being singled out as convenient scapegoats for 
abuse. At the same time he gave their own doctrine of 
nonresistance more credibility. 
In keeping with his strategy to downplay the 
uniqueness of the Mennonite position in regard to war, 
the Mennonite term for military exemption, 
"nonresistance," was never used. Nonresistance was the 
historic principle of Mennonitism, a word closely 
associated with the Mennonite people and a word that 
reflected the biblical basis for requesting military 
exemption. The "thousands of individual citizens" that 
Dahlke described did not all subscribe to the doctrine 
of nonresistance, but, for a variety of reasons, refused 
to support the military. While Dahlke did not go so far 
as to claim mainstream support for the rejection of 
military service, he did bring the Mennonite position 
closer to being accepted as a viable stance. Mennonites 
were not, as the tenets of the faith proscribed, "sheep 
among wolves," or prone to live a lifetime of suffering 
in the name of Christ, for their "radical," 
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"separatist," views. On the contrary, they reflected the 
views of a healthy minority, who very much wanted not 
only to be understood, but "appreciated and loved." 
That the Mennonite position could conceivably 
become "appreciated and loved" by patriotic Americans was 
just one of many examples of a third image-reversal that 
comprised the most notable and distinctive aspect of 
Dahlke's apologia. Dahlke questioned the image of 
Mennonites as humble, unassuming folk, who preferred to 
be called "the Quiet in the Land." With a penchant for 
hyperbole, Dahlke magnified both the virtues of 
Mennonites and the dastardly charges levied against 
them. Dahlke overstated his case from the very 
beginning: "After having gained a full knowledge about 
the history of the Mennonites •.•. this class of 
people will be appreciated and loved." Seemingly 
oblivious to the great sacrifices that Americans were 
taking to uphold democratic values, the patriotic fervor 
that gripped the country, and the conviction expressed 
by most Americans that the war was a moral and just 
cause, Dahlke clung to the fantastic belief that his 
fellow American citizens would be approachable, even 
amicable, to the Mennonite stance. Ignoring the advice 
of Mennonite leaders that it would not be in the 
Mennonites' best interest to publicize their objections 
to the war or "to get into peace arguments just now when 
their fellow citizens were smarting under the deeds of a 
devilish foe," Dahlke, albeit not actively seeking a 
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wider audience, stepped out on a limb by advancing such 
a preposterous idea. 
Likewise, when Dahlke portrayed the Mennonites as 
loyal, upright, American citizens, he did not go about 
it in the modest Mennonite way. Rather, he boasted of 
their accomplishments, overstated their good qualities, 
and made exaggerated claims to clear them of any 
wrongdoing. The easiest way for Dahlke to boast of 
Mennonite loyalty was to exploit their capabilities as 
farmers, for as everyone knew the American farmer was an 
integral part in winning the war. Dahlke's sentimental 
account of the European Mennonites' nomadic existence is 
the backdrop for raising the Mennonite farmer to heroic 
stature. When Holland passed a military draft law and 
Mennonites were forced to leave that country for Russia, 
Dahlke sadly observed: "Of course Holland did herself 
harm by passing that military draft law, because for 
that very reason she lost her best farmers." 
Fortunately, the Czarina Catherine of Russia gave 
permission for Mennonites to settle in her country. 
She knew that Mennonites would be "model farmers" and 
"had the reputation of being progressive and 
industrious" and believed that "[w]herever the 
Mennonites settle, the desert becomes a blooming garden 
spot." In little time, Mennonite colonies in Russia came 
to be called "the Granary of Russia" and "whatever 
surplus in crops Russia then had came from the immigrant 
Mennonite colonies." At last, government officials in 
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Russia recognized that despite their refusal of military 
service, Mennonite farmers provided the country with its 
"strongest support." Dahlke's depiction of Mennonites as 
a precious resource and not a source of trouble or 
embarrassment for government officials explained 
Dahlke's version of the enthusiasm expressed by United 
States officials at having Russian Mennonites cultivate 
their soil. When Mennonites considered immigrating to 
the United States, "they were overwhelmed with 
invitations to come" and President Grant was so 
impressed with them that "he granted them a personal 
interview." 
In addition to marveling at the successes that 
Mennonites had farming, Dahlke showed how industrious 
they were in bettering social and educational services, 
and praised their natural abilities as leaders. In 
Russia, the Czarina believed that Mennonites "should 
become an ideal in morals and conduct to her people, 
knowing that her people had sunk to a low degree in 
morals and culture." Her plan, Dahlke further detailed, 
was that "the churches, schools and model farms of the 
Mennonite farmers through their attractive aspects would 
be an incentive to her subjects to do likewise." Wanting 
to convey just how capable Mennonites were, Dahlke 
recalled that they were "asked to plant and cultivate 
forests and even were given the supervision of other 
men." Mennonites living in America were of the same 
stock in Dahlke's continuing saga. "The Mennonites 
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believe and work for progress in the highest sense," he 
pontificated. Adding that "Should anyone desire to know 
what the Mennonites have done for [their] country, some 
very interesting figures could be produced by the 
Mennnonites, showing large sums of money ••.• " Dahlke 
did not hesitate to parade their accomplishments. 
They now own an [sic] support six colleges; 
fifteen academies; four hospitals, one of 
which costs $75,000.00; three sanitariums, for 
[sic) consumptives; three homes for the aged; 
and six assylums [sic] for lepers. They have 
done missionary work among the Red Men of 
America for the last thirty-three years. In 
fact they have sent missionaries to all parts 
of the world, namely to India, China, Africa, 
Japan and the different islands and everywhere 
they have met with very encouraging success. 
Dahlke, no doubt, hoped that flaunting such an 
impressive list of civic accomplishments would prove 
that Mennonites were progressive, intelligent, desirous 
citizens and not as the widely circulated accusations 
suggested backward, unintelligent slackers. 
The same strategy of creating a complete re-
evaluation of the Mennonites' accusers was accomplished 
when Dahlke exaggerated the nature of the accusations 
against them. Dahlke overstated the case in his attempt 
to convey the message that the accusations against the 
Mennonites were grossly inappropriate, yet he refrained 
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from identifying from whence the accusations stemmed. 
Mennonites had been "cruelly attacked placing them in 
the darkest light." "Certain men," Dahlke indicated have 
so "falsely accused the Mennonites" that they want "to 
place the same in the front ranks to have them cruelly 
shot." In astonishment and indignation, Dahlke at one 
point expressed: "These attacks are so fierce and 
unbecoming a gentleman from the standard of the present 
civilization that one would be inclined to compare them 
with the utterances of the dark Middle Ages, such as 
could be made only in the years 1524 till 1624, when 
Christians were butchered by the thousands." So unfair 
were these charges that Dahlke surmised that they were 
"probably the greatest sin committed .• "Yet such 
accusations, for all their punch, went unattributed. 
They were, according to Dahlke's testimony generated by 
shadowy figures, "certain men in their public speeches 
in the East." 
In an attempt to elicit sympathy for a people 
wrongly accused and to preserve any hope of identifying 
with his fellow Americans, Dahlke amplified the severity 
of the charges without taking the political risks of 
indicting specific individuals. Even where the political 
risks were minimized, as in the well-known accusation 
made by Teddy Roosevelt that if c. o.•s would not serve 
107 
their country, they should be put on mine sweepers, 
Dahlke refused to link directly the accusation and the 
accuser. His objection to Roosevelt's extremist 
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accusation was made enthymematically. "At the time when 
Mr. Roosevelt was president the Mennonites honored and 
respected him and even helped to elect him to that high 
office," Dahlke recalled. To which he followed with the 
rhetorical question: "Does their confidence merit 
unkindness?" Dahlke's attempts to magnify the 
seriousness of the accusations against the Mennonites 
revealed both its benefits and its liabilities in 
describing the dispute that Mennonites had with the 
wider American public. 
Dahlke's Juxtaposition of incongruous images in its 
varied dimensions created a view of Mennonites that was 
at once startling, enlightening, and wildly 
108 
imaginative. More directly, in wrenching words from 
their "constitutional setting," a perspective by 
incongruity is especially designed to "remoralize" a 
109 
situation that has been demoralized by inaccuracy. 
Dahlke's defense of the Mennonites through its 
perspective by incongruity was essentially a drastic 
attempt to remoralize or rejuvenate a badly damaged 
image promulgated by "undeserved," "cruel," and "false 
accusations." It was an effort to tip the scales of 
public perception in the opposite direction. And while 
fellow members might have raised an eyebrow at its 
pretentiousness, and non-Mennonites most certainly would 
have written it off as an absurdity, or worse, Dahlke 
had, in effect, created grounds for synthesis--a 
remoralization of the Mennonite image. 
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Dahlke's defense distinguishes itself for more than 
its high-profile of the Mennonites. It also clearly 
exemplifies several of the rhetorical problems that 
plagued Mennonite rhetors. Mennonites had always been a 
people grounded both ideologically and rhetorically in 
the Bible. While Dahlke's secular defense might have 
been motivated by the realization that his militaristic-
minded neighbors did not want to hear biblical 
justifications for their stance, the simple truth was 
that without the Bible, Mennonite rhetors floundered. 
Dahlke was no exception. His inexperience at defending 
his fellow believers in secular terms was expressed in 
the opening line: "Most likely the readers of this 
pamphlet will be surprised to read an article of this 
nature from my pen." Dahlke was severely constrained in 
drawing a favorable composite of the Mennonites with 
only secular material to draw upon. If one could not 
defend them for their qualities of Christ-like 
discipleship, or explain the tenets of their faith, or 
explain their rich, troubled religious heritage, what, 
in good faith, was one left to piece together? Dahlke's 
only choice in attempting to exonerate Mennonites of all 
charges and to "put them in the proper light" was to be 
wildly imaginative and magnify their secular traits by 
embellishing their life story--a choice no other 
Mennonite apologist was willing to make. 
Dahlke was also constrained in formulating a 
convincing defense to outsiders because despite his 
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depiction of the openness of the Mennonite community, it 
was relatively isolated. The liabilities of a 
nonconformist lifestyle to efforts of establishing 
communicative ties with non-Mennonites was evident in 
Dahlke's address. As a citizen removed from the 
mainstream of political thought, Dahlke was utterly 
incapable of understanding the "cruel attacks" made upon 
him and his fellow believers. The incredulous tone of 
the apologia was sustained throughout. "Why should these 
bitter attacks be made upon them at all?" Dahlke asked 
beseechingly. "Would somebody call this work the deed of 
a "tramp'?" he added. Mennonites, like Dahlke, could not 
convey familiarity with their opponents• position 
because they were not exposed to them. The insular 
Mennonite life, the "worldly" naivete, of which Dahlke 
was a product, explained his ability to express with all 
seriousness his goal to give "a full knowledge about the 
history of the Mennonites" in order that "this class of 
people will be appreciated and loved." 
A final rhetorical obstacle that Dahlke, like many 
Mennonite rhetors, encountered was a lack of rhetorical 
training. Dahlke was unskilled at presenting an 
articulate, polished position statement to outsiders. 
The occasional awkward phrase, and grammatical and 
syntactical errors contributed to the general 
observation that Dahlke was less than comfortable in the 
role of rhetor. German may have been his first language 
which would explain, in part, the clumsy phraseology. 
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More critically, as explained in chapter four 
Mennonites were not accustomed to playing the role of 
church spokesmen to outsiders. They had never seen the 
need to be gifted rhetorically when the Bible was the 
source of all truth. Daniel Kauffman's advice to 
Mennonite speakers "not to make a display of their wit 
or oratory" summed up the problem well. Dahlke's attempt 
to defend his faith by assuming the role of church 
spokesman and then failing to maintain that posture was 
proof of his rhetorical inexperience. Dahlke began the 
apologia by narrating in the third person. By speaking 
of "the Mennonites," "this class of people," their 
faith," Dahlke could assume an authority role. The 
third person narrative serves as a distancing device and 
as a way to make a defense appear more objective. But 
Dahlke failed to maintain the third person narrative. He 
began with a personal reference ("Most likely the 
readers of this pamphlet will be surprised to read an 
article of this nature from my pen."), and interrupted 
the third person narrative throughout the defense with 
references to himself. At one point Dahlke lapsed into a 
story about his ancestors."My grandfather left his home 
in Holland on account of the military draft," Dahlke 
recalled fondly. Elsewhere, as if cognizant of the 
inappropriateness of shifting tense, Dahlke interjected: 
"The readers will pardon a personal reference." At other 
times, Dahlke simply dropped the reference to "the 
Mennonites" in favor of "we" before completing a 
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sentence. Assuming the role of church spokesman to 
outsiders was difficult for many Mennonites, especially 
a Kansas farmer with little training in the art of 
persuasion. 
In the final analysis, Dahlke's "defense of the 
Mennonites against recent attacks made upon them" did 
not diffuse those attacks, nor convince outsiders of the 
Mennonite position, nor equip members with cogent 
secular arguments for use outside Mennonite circles. 
Rather, it served a useful purpose in terms of 
maintaining the faith. As ill-formulated and ineffective 
as some of Dahlke's strategies were from an outsiders 
standpoint, the apologia was an ego-boost for the 
Mennonite image. Dahlke's genuflections on their proud 
heritage was therapeutic. Mennonites took center stage 
in Dahlke's satisfying tale. They were actors, doers, 
movers, innovators, industrious, progressive, 
resourceful, and, above all, model citizens. The 
narrative structure was an ideal way to magnify their 
desirable traits. A good story has clearly identifiable 
good characters (model Mennonite citizens) and bad 
characters (certain men from the east). A good story 
gives coherence to experience (Mennonites have been 
unjustly attacked because outsiders are oblivious to 
their sterling civic record and their glorious cultural 
heritage). A good story gives its readers a lesson to 
live by (Mennonites are strong, resilient people, who 
like their ancestors "will not walk on flowery paths of 
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ease through this world"). Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly in this case, a good story demonstrates 
fidelity to the truth, if it is used for rhetorical 
purposes. Dahlke's perspective by incongruity would have 
been judged an improbable story to outsiders, but as 
quite probable to fellow believers, though they, too, 
might have conceded to Dahlke's stretching of the truth. 
For this reason, Dahlke's defense of the Mennonites did 
more to reaffirm their image among themselves than to 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
KEEPING THE FAITH: 
MENNONITES RE-AFFIRM THEIR IMAGE 
Mennonites cautiously took the offensive in 
reminding the government of its obligations to respect 
freedom of conscience. They also defended their image to 
the government and the wider American public by adopting 
strategies of dissociation, refutation, and 
identification. But not all Mennonite rhetoric during 
the war was a defense of Mennon1tism to outsiders nor a 
questioning of government policy. Much of the rhetoric 
served the essential function of maintenance: keeping 
the faithful strong in the face of adversity. Mennonites 
may have feared engaging in genuine argument with an 
unsympathetic public, but they were more fearful that 
the world crisis would undermine the very existence of 
their church. Apprehensively, Mennonites observed that 
"The world has become a neighborhood and we are 'in the 
1 
world' as we have never been before." More pointedly, 
H. P. Krehbiel imparted soberly: "The Mennonites will 
now be purified by fire. What will become of us in the 
2 
heat?" Such reluctant acknowledgements of worldly 
encroachment expressed a common concern among Mennonites 
as to what the future would hold for the church. 
Mennonites were keenly aware that, if their faith were 
to be preserved and the membership remain strong, it 
would be essential for members re-affirm the 
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righteousness of Mennonitism to themselves and to each 
other. 
Rhetorical transactions with the self, as outlined 
in Chapter one, can serve a reflexive task of 
psychologically refurbishing oneself. The very practice 
3 
of verbalizing one's beliefs reconstitutes the self. To 
a significant degree, Mennonite rhetoric fulfilled a 
consumatory function for its members. Through the 
inventional process itself, Mennonites could reaffirm 
who they were. Articulating their beliefs, fears, 
suggestions, and admonishments in print carried 
intrinsic worth. Among other things, it aided in 
reducing the uncertainty of espousing an unpopular 
position with its share of penalties. 
While one's self may be the primary audience, 
others of the group may identify with the rhetoric 
4 
insofar as they share similar concerns. The Mennonites' 
practice of defending their religious convictions to 
each other corresponds to what Walter R. Fisher calls "a 
rhetoric of reaffirmation" whereby a person "attempts to 
revitalize a faith already held by his audience." Fisher 
contends that reaffirmative rhetoric is characterized by 
"Christian life renewal themes." Strategies such as 
tying the past, present, and future together and 
emphasizing that out of suffering comes everlasting life 
can be found in rhetoric designed to reinforce 
5 
commitment to a faith. 
Mennonites utilized Christian life renewal themes 
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in a variety of ways to reinforce a commitment to their 
religious heritage. First, refamiliarizing members with 
the biblical and historical basis of nonresistance 
became an important way to ground Mennonitism in a 
relevant epistemological framework and instill 
confidence in the faith's legitimacy. The retelling of 
Mennonite history lessons often took the form of 
venerating martyrd ancestors of the church. Second, re-
emphasizing the importance of membership in a select 
body of believers became an important way to maintain 
membership loyalty. Fearing perhaps that the demands of 
war would wittle away at church attendance and 
ultimately erode church affiliation, rhetors saw the 
necessity of praising members for remaining true to such 
high Christian standards and distancing themselves from 
other wayward nonresistant bodies. Third, drawing sharp 
distinctions between Mennonitism and militarism became 
an important way to prevent compromise or half-way 
stances that could lead to wholesale adoption of the 
Crusade mentality. Cultivating an "us versus them" 
mentality polarized rhetorical and behavioral choices 
thus encouraging members to stake out recalcitrant 
positions on war issues. Fourth, redefining the war to 
emphasize its positive connotations became an important 
way to help members survive as devoted Christians in a 
world at war and to emerge from the experience with 
minimal psychological battle scars. War fears were 
repeatedly transformed as challenging and welcomed tests 
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of faith-- tests not unlike those experienced by Jesus 
and other key biblical figures. War evils were also 
transformed by diminishing their importance. The war was 
merely a passing event, insignificant in the totality of 
God's plan for his followers. Fifth, resolving the 
uneasy relationship that existed between an individual's 
conscience and church polity became an important way to 
convince members that for all the advice given, their 
leaders were mindful of church creed which granted the 
superiority of individual conscience over a collective 
conscience. Mennonite rhetors deftly handled the fact 
that church doctrine did not require a rigid adherence 
to the official church position by candidly 
acknowledging that the faith honored and respected 
individual conscience, and yet at the same time gently 
suggesting that individual and church conscience be 
merged. 
The church press was largely responsible for 
propogating the five themes that characterized Mennonite 
reaffirmative rhetoric. Mennonite publishing houses had 
always seen their mission as one of preserving the 
foundations of the faith, maintaining cohesive ties 
among Mennonite groups, and giving counsel as to how 
Mennonites should respond to worldly issues. That 
mission, as highlighted in chapter two, became all the 
more important during the course of the war. Daniel 
Kauffman gave testimony to the ambitious, yet vital, 
function of the church newspaper as a forum of 
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reaffirmative rhetoric when he wrote: "The object of a 
church paper ought to be not only to defend and to 
promulgate the principles and doctrines for which the 
Church stands but also to strengthen every individual, 
every congregation, every institution, and every 
6 
conference in the church." The war presented editors, 
publishers, and contributors with an unparalleled 
responsibility in making Kauffman's claim realizable. 
An Entrenched Stance Against War 
One of the prominent Christian life renewal themes 
that surfaced in a number of Mennonite publications was 
confirming the biblical and historical basis of 
nonresistance. Justifying nonresistance on these grounds 
was essential for Mennonites to reinforce the commitment 
entailed in their faith. Proving that Mennonites were 
dutiful Christians involved using the Bible to support 
nonresistance. Mennonite leaders encouraged members to 
be well-versed in relevant New Testament passages that 
addressed the evilness of war. As it was, Mennonite 
leaders feared that some members had become unfamiliar 
with what the Scriptures said on the subject of war. 
When General Conference leaders convened in April of 
1917 to discuss the war, they expressed their concern: 
The long period of rest and the supposed 
security have been detrimental for some. Many 
many [sic] did not know on what scripture 
passages our confession of nonresistance was 
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founded, especially among the young people .• 
• . [So] the Committee decided to publish two 
collections of scripture passages in order to 
7 
still remedy this deficiency to some extent. 
Der Herold and The Mennonite followed these GC 
proceedings with interest, by informing readers of the 
key resolution that "the scriptural foundation on the 
doctrine of nonresistance [would] be printed by the 
Herald printing company and sent out under the auspices 
8 
of H.P. Krehbiel," and by printing Krehbiel's 
admonishing words on what Christ and the Apostles taught 
Christians to do: 
Christ's teachings prohibit retaliation, 
hatred, envy, bitterness, malice, evil 
designs, revenge, strife and physical 
violence. Christ's teachings enjoin love, 
goodwill, kindness, and helpfulness to enemies 
as well as to friends .••• In view of these 
truths a sincere and faithful follower of 
Christ cannot consistently participate in war 
9 
in any form. 
Printing biblical passages that supported nonresistance 
was a way in which Mennonite leaders could help members 
see that their position was founded on the essentials of 
Christianity. Furthermore, because the Bible was primary 
evidence for justifying nonresistance, Mennonite leaders 
were also able to help members make a relevant defense 
of their faith to outsiders, without having to rely on 
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other forms of Mennonite doctrine, which could be 
interpreted by outsiders as obscure and irrelevant. In 
fact, not only did Mennonites encourage their fellow 
members to re-acquaint themselves with Bible verses that 
addressed the Christian's duty in war, they urged 
members, if at all possible, to go "to the trouble of 
memorizing all of these scripture passages, which is 
10 
best of all." 
Daniel Kauffman, the ideologue and authoritative 
bishop among MC Mennonites, made it his crusade 
throughout the course of the war to encourage members to 
stand firm on God's word in times of crisis. In one of 
many passages in the Gospel Herald where the editor 
urged readers to get back to the Bible, he wrote: "[T]he 
testimony of Christ and the apostles with reference to 
carnal warfare is so clear (Matt. 5:38-45; 26:51, 52; 
John 18:36; Rom. 12: 17-21; II Cor. 10:4; etc., etc., 
etc., etc.,) and emphatic that we can not for one moment 
11 
think of surrendering the nonresistant faith." The 
centrality of the Bible as evidence for the nonresistant 
stance was also clearly expressed in the Mennonite 
Church Statement on Military Service that Kauffman and 
other MC leaders prepared: 
As followers of the Lord Jesus Christ, the 
Prince of Peace, we interpret His command, 
'Resist not evil,' by His other teachings on 
this subject; viz., 'Love your enemies.• 'Do 
good to them that hate you.• 'My kingdom is 
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not of this world: if my kingdom were of this 
world, then would my servants fight.• 'All 
they that take the sword shall perish with the 
sword.' The Bible also teaches us not to 
avenge ourselves (Rom. 12:17-21), that "the 
weapons of our warfare are not carnal" (II 
Cor. 10:4), and that "the servant of the Lord 
12 
must not strive" (II Tim. 2:24). 
Through a strategy of enumeration--a list of examples 
which give overwhelming support for an argument, MC 
Mennonites hoped to instill confidence among members as 
to the legitimacy of Mennonitism in the present crisis. 
Establishing the biblical foundation for nonresistance 
was so critical to the re-affirmation of their faith 
principles in these tumultuous times that Aaron Loucks, 
president of the Mennonite Publishing Company, decided 
that funds should be appropriated to print a handy 
pocket-size tract that, among other things, served as a 
13 
concordance of relevant passages on nonresistance. 
Loucks tract, no doubt, eased efforts at memorization 
considerably. 
Both conferences re-affirmed the fact that 
Mennonitism was based on God's Word. Yet they did not 
ignore what had become a point of tension for some 
members. Outsiders were quick to point out that in the 
Old Testament Christians fought just and righteous wars 
under God's command. How, then, could Mennonites offer a 
biblical rationale for nonresistance when the Bible 
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could be used to support either position? One writer for 
The Mennonite was prepared for this argument. Posing the 
question as it might have been formulated by non-
Mennonites, she began: "Question: If war is wrong for 
the Christian, why did God Himself in the Old Testament 
lead Israel into battle and into victory against their 
enemies?" The appropriate Mennonite response came 
quickly: "Answer: The Jews were then living in the age 
of law and judgment, whilst we dwell in the dispensation 
14 
of grace and mercy." Acting as a biblical authority, 
this member of the faith followed the question-answer 
series with a lengthy exposition of the great difference 
between the Old and New Testaments, between Israel and 
the church of Christ. This writer, as did others, wanted 
to demonstrate unequivocably that the biblical stance of 
nonresistance was not vulnerable to this all too 
frequent challenge. 
Mennonites quoted Scripture to show that they were 
dutitul Christians in maintaining nonresistance during 
war. Yet to further demonstrate that their doctrine was 
and always had been scripturally based, leaders 
frequently reprinted the central tenet of Mennonitism: 
the Dordrecht Confession of Faith adopted at Dordrecht, 
Holland, in 1632. This document relied heavily upon 
Scripture in explaining the Mennonite aversion to war. 
Its initial passage reads: 
Regarding revenge, whereby we resist our 
enemies by the sword, we believe and confess 
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that the Lord Jesus has forbidden His 
disciples and followers all revenge and 
resistance, and has thereby commanded them not 
to 'return evil for evil, nor railing for 
railing'; but to 'put up the sword into the 
sheath,' or as the prophets foretold, 'beat 
them into plowshares.• Matt. 5:39, 44; Rom. 
15 
12: 14; I Pet. 3:9; Micah 4:3. 
The Dordrecht Confession of Faith was ample proof that 
Mennonitism was biblically based. Yet its repeated 
appearance in Mennonite tracts served another purpose; 
that of proving to themselves, if not to outsiders, that 
Mennonites were sincere conscientious objectors; they 
had not temporarily adopted nonresistance as a 
convenient way to escape the present world conflict. 
The frequent appearance of a central doctrine from 
the post-Reformation era was just one indication that 
members felt the need to document carefully both the 
biblical and historical basis of nonresistance. Other 
century year old Mennonite documents and official church 
statements with much less recognition were also 
ressurected from obscurity as further proof of an 
historical, not an expedient, stance against war. The 
Mennonite Yearbook and Almanac for 1918, for example, 
reprinted an official statement that MC Mennonites had 
drawn up in 1775 that registered the church's position 
16 
against war. Many church leaders believed that in 
emphasizing the church's historical stance against war 
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members would be less inclined to question whether they 
could still be members in good standing if nonresistance 
were dropped. In a concerted attempt to discourage that 
misguided thought, John Horsch penned a lengthy article 
for the Gospel Herald entitled: "When was the Principle 
of Nonresistance Made a Part of the Creed of the 
Mennonite Church," wherein he emphatically denied the 
possibility of there ever being a time when Mennonites 
17 
did not embrace nonresistance. 
In addition to pointing out the long-standing 
doctrines of the faith that opposed war, Mennonite 
rhetors encouraged members to remember why their 
ancestors had become martyrs and preached the importance 
of gaining strength from them. A notable example of that 
practice was evident in the MC statement on military 
service. Featured prominently in the position paper was 
a passage that called attention to the stoic posture of 
the early Mennonites. MC bishops and deacons in 
collaboration wrote: "[Nonresistance] has been uniformly 
held by our forefathers from Reformation times and their 
loyalty and devotion to their faith is attested by their 
suffering, even to the extent of martyrdom and 
banishment by those governments enjoining military 
18 
service upon their citizens." Reminding members of the 
Anabaptists' exemplary devotion to the principle of 
nonresistance gave them a high standard to emulate. s. 
M. Grubb made a point of reminding his readers that 
their ancestors held fast to the principles of 
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nonresistance at any price: 
As Mennonites we cling to our historic 
principle of testing against war. Four 
centuries, some of them marked with bloody 
persecution, are behind us perpetuating the 
glory of our fathers who were so far in 
advance of their times as to dream of a time 
19 
when wars should cease to curse the earth. 
Regarding the early Mennonites with high esteem, Grubb 
hoped that present day Mennonites would want to keep the 
heroic tradition alive. A similar attitude was expressed 
by Gerald Dahlke. "Our ancestors did not walk on flowery 
paths of ease through this world," he wrote, "nor did 
their persecutors escape the hand of the Almighty and it 
is this unwavering trust in their Heavenly Father that 
makes them [present day Mennonites] hold to their 
20 
principles without wavering or faltering." Dahlke was 
optimistic that members would never doubt the logic of 
the nonresistant stance, especially given their 
knowledge of the tumultuous history and enormous 
sacrifices of their forefathers. 
Others took a more authoritative approach by 
commanding that members not forsake what the early 
Mennonites died for. Loucks confronted members with the 
disconcerting question: "Remember our forefathers 
suffered persecution and death for the sake of 
maintaining these principles. Shall we be less loyal and 
21 
faithful?" Jacob c. Meyers echoed Loucks probing 
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question when he asked pointedly: "Are we worthy to be 
22 
classed as their descendants." Kauffman told members 
to "remember the thousands who died a martyr's death 
rather than give up their faith in Bible 
23 
nsnresistance." All of these rhetors urged members not 
to forsake the essential tenet of Mennonitism by 
rekindling pride in their past, emphasizing that they 
played a vital link in carrying the torch of an 
undiluted faith into the future, and essentially arguing 
a fortiori that if their ancestors withstood the horror 
and anguish of torture surely present day Mennonites 
could withstand penalties that paled in comparison. 
Calling attention to the martyred ancestors of the 
faith in an attempt to generate renewed enthusiasm for 
the principle of nonresistance was effective from a 
philosophical perspective as well. The concept of 
martyrdom is a highly emotive and powerful term in a 
religious context. Kenneth Burke writes that 
"[S]acrifice is the essence of religion" and of all the 
modes of sacrifice "none is more eloquent than 
24 
martyrdom." A totally voluntary self-sacrifice enacted 
in a grave cause symbolizes the ultimate heroic act and 
the great worthiness of a cause. Furthermore, the notion 
of becoming a martyr is appealing because it is a way to 
identify with the most sacred martyr--Jesus Christ. 
Finally, because martyrdom is a defenseless way to 
suffer at the hands of some outside force, it is often a 
powerful way to suggest that one's persecutors are 
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cruel, unjust, and evil. 
The government was not unaware of the power of 
martyrdom. In a report compiled by the Military 
Intelligence Division (MID) on military surveillance of 
nonresisters during the war, there is evidence that 
government officials refused to prosecute Loucks for 
violating the Espionage Act because they did not want to 
give him "either the notoriety desired or the 
25 
opportunity of playing the role of the martyr." 
Mennonite leaders, too, were well aware of the 
power of martyrdom as a testament to the burning vision 
of the faith. When the military exemption law was 
interpreted by outsiders as "protection" and "privilege" 
to protect slackers, Grubb remarked impatiently that he 
wanted "to have the opportunity of proving ..• 
absolute confidence in the doctrine [of nonresistance] 
by paying everything that it might have cost, not even 
26 
witholding [their] lives, were such a price demanded." 
On more than one occasion, Kauffman stated: "[T]he blood 
27 
of the martyr is the seed of the church." Martyrdom, 
as these Mennonite leaders recognized, was the ultimate 
testimony of a strong faith and a convincing way to 
prove the sincerity of their stance to outsiders. The 
war, of course, did not demand nor even allow Mennonites 
to make the extreme sacrifice for their nonresistant 
stance. Mennonites could only speculate as to whether or 
not, as members steeped in the American way of life and 
growing up in an untroubled generation, they would have 
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shown the same ruggedness, fortitude, and courage of 
their 16th century ancestors. At least one member of the 
faith had the disappointing answer: "I wish the 
Mennonites and the Quakers in our day had had the 
convictions and the courage of our leaders of earlier 
28 
days." 
Only The Strong In Heart Need Apply 
Perhaps the Mennonites of twentieth-century America 
would have been hard-pressed to emulate the stoic 
postures of European Anabaptists, but they were, 
nonetheless, still a hearty breed of devoted Christians 
and members of a church that demanded very high 
standards of its followers. To encourage members to 
remain faithful to their church throughout the war, 
Mennonite rhetors re-emphasized the importance of their 
membership in a select body of believers. Giving members 
a sense of pride in their religious affiliation served 
an essential re-affirmative purpose. Church leaders 
pointed out that Mennonitism stood for something 
distinctive, and that many people could not meet the 
requirements of the church because it demanded too much 
of a Christian sacrifice. In short, the overriding 
message of this strategy to renew commitment to the 
faith can be summarized thus: a Mennonite is someone who 
is special; someone who has a more perfect desire to 
follow Christ; someone who should feel honored to be a 
part of a dedicated few. 
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A pertinent aspect of getting members to feel pride 
in their association with the Mennonite Church was to 
stress the fact that Mennonites stood apart from other 
protestant denominations. In the Mennonite Church 
statement on military service, the distinctiveness of 
the church is evident in a prominent passage entitled: 
"Our Standard." Delegates affirmed: "that in all places 
[our people] may be known by the Scriptural 
designation--'A peculiar people, zealous of good 
29 
works. '" Grubb also emphasized the special character 
of the Mennonite faith by stating flatly: "It stands for 
30 
something distinctive." 
Of course, Mennonites were not satisfied with being 
distinctive, or peculiar, or separated from other 
Christians just for the sake of being different. 
Mennonite rhetors closely associated distinctiveness 
with specialness. Mennonites were different from other 
religious groups because the church required commitment 
to a higher set of standards. The MC statement on 
military service succinctly captured that high standard: 
"[Our people stand for] the surrendered life, a 
consistent separation from the world, and an attitude of 
31 
peace toward all men." Kauffman's book The 
Conservative Viewpoint elaborated upon the special 
standards of the church. Unlike other Christians, 
Kauffman intimated, Mennonites attempted to be examples 
of God's paradoxical dictum: Be ye in the world, but not 
of it. This involved, according to Kauffman, that 
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Mennonites be "models of holiness and purity," "God's 
representatives on earth," and "lights to the world," 
and perhaps most difficult of all to be both "pilgrims," 
because "we are in the world to do all the good we can," 
and "strangers," because "we should not live for this 
32 
world, but for the world to come." 
Standards like these were not for the weak at 
heart. And Mennonites understood that their strength 
would not come from a large following. In its smallness, 
Mennonites contended, their church was distinctive, not 
weak and obscure, but strong and special. Providing 
counter-arguments to the common assumption that the 
power and strength of a group is determined by its size 
was important for several reasons. First, it was easy to 
assume that since Mennonites were one of the smaller 
bodies of Christians, their demands for complete 
exemption need not be taken seriously, and, second, 
because the church could not show a large following, 
they were often categorized as an obscure religious 
group. These charges were detrimental to keeping the 
faith strong in a crisis situation. H. Frank Reist 
attempted to remedy the potential damage of such charges 
by comparing stringent requirements for joining the 
Mennonite church with the lax requirements for joining 
other churches. Readers of the Christian Monitor, no 
doubt, whole-heartily confirmed Reist•s efforts at 
distinguishing the Mennonites as a superior religious 
group. He wrote: 
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We believe that it would be desirable to have 
and maintain some high standard for 
applicants, one that .•• will require of all 
applicants certain evidences of fitness for 
church membership. The tendency has been to 
lower the standard. It is a very easy matter 
to 'join church' • • The result is that 
churches today are loaded down with 
unconverted members who hinder her in her 
spiritual progress and service for the 
33 
Master. 
That the Mennonite church should entertain the idea of 
an application process wherein prospective members would 
be required to demonstrate some degree of "fitness" to 
Mennonite principles reinforced for members the select 
company of which they were a part. 
In a similar vein, Grubb emphasized the special 
character of the faith by emphatically denying the idea 
that smallness meant weakness: "If our church is not 
large in numbers, there are a number of reasons why we 
prize it all the more for its being our church," he 
countered, adding "[T]he Mennonite church aims not at 
increasing its size, being satisfied rather to increase 
the respect for its principles which insist that there 
must be a separation from the world." Grubb, like Reist, 
went so far as to claim that many people could never 
become Mennonites because the church required levels of 
"fitness" or Christian sacrifice that were too high. 
250 
"[T]hose who are outside of it," he wrote, "are 
frequently out because they could not come in if they 
wanted to unless they changed both their way of living 
34 
and believing." Other writers also argued that 
remaining a faithful Mennonite in tumultuous times 
required great courage that most did not have. One guest 
contributor of The Mennonite recalled that from the 
movement's inception, membership had been small because 
of the total commitment required. He explained the small 
following of Anabaptists by noting "many would have 
become Mennonites had the times called for less 
35 
heroism." 
In calling attention to the rigorous membership 
qualifications of their church--degrees of fitness that 
required a total commitment to Christ's principles, even 
courage and heroism in the face of religious 
persecution--members could explain away their small 
numbers and reverse the popular perception that strength 
is equated with bigness and weakness equated with 
smallness. 
With the high expectations of members, Mennonites 
had difficulty attracting outsiders in peace times. When 
the world was engulfed in war, the church had to prepare 
itself for losing members that it had attracted and yet 
somehow find ways to perservere. Mennonite leaders 
braced themselves for watching fellow members leave the 
flock in the face of extreme pressures from outside. 
After several readers of The Mennonite voiced their 
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concern to the editor about the fact that some 
Mennonites in their community had slipped away to other 
churches during the present crisis, Grubb responded 
rather callously: "Such losses came about because our 
aims and ideals were too high for the shallow-minded to 
approve and our very losses along this line have been 
our gain, because we have remained what we set out to be 
instead of permitting our standard to be lowered for no 
36 
other reasons than to acquire mere bigness." To be 
sure, Grubb's line of reasoning appealed to those who 
elected to endure the trials of war and stand firm in 
the faith as the real Christians, but it failed to 
reflect an element of compassion or forgiveness, or a 
recognition of human foibles--important traits for a 
group of believers who called themselves Christ's 
disciples. 
In point of fact, Mennonite congregations did not 
deal with wayward members so severely. Bishops of the 
Springdale Church in Waynesboro, Virginia decided that 
"since instances of disloyalty are so varied--some the 
result of weakness or extreme pressure, others as 
evidence of disloyalty or indifference to the doctrine 
of nonresistance--we recommend that the disposition of 
individual cases be left to the local officials." On a 
personal note the bishops added: "We believe due 
sympathy should be accorded to right meaning brethren 
who in case of severe pressure yielded a point of 
37 
doctrine .• II The bishops of Lancaster County who 
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met in Pennsylvania to discuss, among other things, the 
issue of sagging membership granted much leniency to 
those who in a weak moment had compromised their faith 
principles. They agreed that "the brethren who have 
taken active service in the army, and those who 
enlisted, may be reinstated to membership on making a 
full confession of transgression." For the brethren who 
accepted noncombatant service, the repentence consisted 
38 
of an apology. 
Although the idea of a faith comprised of those who 
had never yielded to temptation might have appealed to 
church leaders in theory, put into practice the policy 
would have seriously eroded the faith. Being in the 
world, the church would not be unblemished. Mennonites 
would have their share of prodigal sons and daughters. 
Under certain circumstances some members would sacrifice 
principle for expediency. That Mennonites by and large 
invited back into the fold those who had once walked 
away was evidence of a church that cared deeply about 
its losses and wanted desperately to avoid religious 
obscurity. 
While Mennonite rhetors understood that the problem 
of dwindling church membership in their own faith needed 
to be addressed forthrightly, they were much more 
comfortable and willing to discuss the faltering 
membership of other nonresistant bodies. Self-
examination for the purpose of exposing weaknesses is 
never gratifying. By exposing the weaknesses of others, 
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members could divert attention from their own troubles, 
take some comfort in knowing that their church was not 
in the serious trouble that others were, and, 
ultimately, provide further incentive to remain firm in 
the faith. 
Mennonites followed with great interest and alarm 
the militant actions of their brethren in Europe. When 
the stunning news was delivered to members that 
Mennonites in Germany and Austria were "in sympathy with 
the efforts of their countries to take everything in the 
world that does not belong to them and destroy 
everything that opposes them," Grubb could think of no 
other reasonable explanation than to say that the war 
39 
"had bewitched Mennonites there." In later issues of 
The Mennonite, still in disbelief, Grubb questioned how 
any one could "by any method of reasoning, justify an 
allegiance with the unspeakable Turk •••• " Dismayed, 
he concluded: "I have yet to hear of a Mennonite martyr 
40 
in Germany or anywhere else." Kauffman was quick to 
inform American Mennonites that their European brethren 
seriously jeopardized the future of the church. 
Disgruntled over the weak faith they had exhibited~ 
Kauffman remarked with some perturbation: 
We hear a great deal these days about what 
'Mennonites' are doing. In this connection it 
is well to bear in mind that there are some 
who have left the Mennonite faith but forgot 
to drop the name. As already stated, in Europe 
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there are Mennonites engaged in the work of 
41 
killing and being killed •• 
Reports of the failing of Mennonitism on the European 
continent elicited fear for the longevity of the faith 
on the other side of the Atlantic. If a majority of the 
Mennonites in Germany and Austria had sacrificed their 
identity to embrace a militant nationalism, what would 
become of the church's integrity in America, members 
asked. If nothing else, Mennonite leaders reasoned, the 
unbiblical actions of German Mennonites might prompt 
fellow members to stand up for the principles of the 
faith. 
Other nonresistant bodies closer to home did not 
escape scrutiny in Mennonite correspondence for failing 
to uphold rigorous standards of membership. The 
practices of both the Church of the Brethren and the 
Quakers were frowned upon by Mennonite rhetors as 
encouraging a lax faith commitment. One MC member hoped 
his fellow believers would learn a lesson from the 
serious mistakes committed by the Church of the 
Brethren. "We have seen what compromise has done to the 
Church of the Brethren," he began gravely. "They have 
accepted army reconstruction and other non-combatant 
service and as a result their name is scarcely mentioned 
in connection with non-resistance." His bleak 
pronouncement included the observation that "they have 
manifestly lost their identity on this principle. The 
public has not stamped them as c. o.•s and probably they 
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are not deserving of this high privilege." Less 
condemnatory, but no less dissatisfied with their 
actions, the Gospel Herald made the Quakers the subject 
of a lesson for their own faith. "Among those who 
protest against connecting pacifism with disloyalty are 
the Society of Friends or Quakers. They are manifesting 
their loyalty by mobilizing their young men for service. 
While holding aloof from actual fighting they mean to 
serve their country in the way of hospital service, 
relief work etc.,--an attitude which is at least 
43 
questionable for nonresistant people." 
The Society of Friends, the Church of the Brethren, 
even Mennonites in Germany compromised faith principles 
in some way, and hence ran the risk of dilluting, if not 
washing out entirely, an historic nonresistant stance. 
Reporting the questionable and unfaithful actions of 
other groups gave Mennonites further impetus to re-
affirm their own faith. This strategy, as with their 
efforts to emphasize the church's distinctiveness and 
high standards, reverse the perception that strength 
lies in numbers, and cope with membership losses, became 
of vital importance to lessen the unpleasantness of 
being rejected by the larger American public. Re-
emphasizing the significance of their membership was a 
way to keep members from foresaking their Mennonite ties 
to join mainstream America's support of the righteous 
crusade to make the world safe for democracy. 
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A Battle Between Competing Scenes 
Nonresistance was the biblical stance. Mennonites 
had embraced this Christian tenet from the beginning. 
Mennonites had to be zealously committed to becoming 
"God's representatives on Earth" in order to meet the 
demanding membership requirements. These words were 
essential for members to hear again and again. In the 
face of public pressure to join the crusade mentality 
and rout the horrible Hun in order to preserve life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, members wanted to 
hear that facing this difficult test was worth the 
sacrifices involved. They wanted to hear that their 
position was the righteous one. Distinguishing 
themselves from other wayward nonresistant bodies was 
one way in which Mennonites could clarify their own 
identity and preserve an aura of superiority. Distancing 
themselves from the crusade mentality became a more 
important way to protect their distinctiveness. 
Rhetors of the faith were able to draw the lines 
between Mennonitism and militarism by calling attention 
to the dangers of compromise. With its repeated use in 
Mennonite tracts in negative contexts, the word 
"compromise" became a baneful concept. Compromise meant 
weakness, selling-out one's principles, giving in to 
sin, and placing the church in jeopardy. Kauffman's 
favorite sermon topic was to warn members against the 
perils of compromise. Using his editorial discretion, 
Kauffman devoted a good deal of space in the MC's church 
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paper to spell out the dangerous long-term ramifications 
of a compromising stance both to the individual and the 
church. With so much consternation expressed over the 
consequences of giving in to external pressures, 
Mennonite rhetors, like Kauffman, hoped to intensify the 
importance of clinging to the essentials of their faith. 
"History has proven that compromise in one generation 
means surrender in the next," Kauffman flatly told 
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readers of the Gospel Herald. To Mennonites of the 
Indiana-Michigan conference, he preached: "To draw the 
line on all war measures is the only satisfactory 
platform to stand upon. Let us be consistent. If we 
thought that war was right we should go into it with all 
our might. If it is not right then draw the line on all 
war measures. We are in a testing time. Compromise means 
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trouble." Similarly, H.P. Krehbiel tested readers of 
Der Herold with the pointed question: "Can you actually 
love your enemy and pray for him while you are rushing 
at him to kill him?" Krehbiel provided the emphatic 
reply: "No! No! So it is plain that there is no room for 
love and goodwill in the conflicts on the 
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battlefield." 
Upon their repeated efforts to caution believers on 
the dangers of compromise, members began to absorb this 
concern and openly testify that they, too, understood 
the need to draw the line on all war-related activities. 
One MC Mennonite wrote Loucks that he now understood the 
need to distance himself from worldly influences if he 
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were ever to emerge from the crisis with his Mennonite 
identity intact. "Contrary to what I formerly thought," 
his revelation began, "I am not ashamed to be called a 
stand-pat, uncompromising conscientious objector. I can 
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see no honorable position in a half-way stand." 
Mennonites recognized that the distinctions between 
right and wrong, good and evil, morality and immorality, 
etc. must always be presented clearly, simply, and in 
polar extremes to prevent "half-way stances." In order 
to preserve Mennonite identity, members were forced to 
choose between Mennonitism or militarism. Straddling the 
fence, or compromise, was not an alternative. This 
strategy confirms an important dimension of 
reaffirmative rhetoric that has been adopted by many 
groups intent upon reconstituting their identity in the 
face of external pressures. In order to enhance one's 
identity as an out-group, there is often a need 
expressed among group members to distance oneself from 
one's adversaries; the very process of identifying a 
self involves identifying against others. By identifying 
against a war mentality, Mennonite rhetors could thereby 
delineate their own position--locate themselves by 
contrast. Such a strategy necessarily becomes self-
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persuasive and confirmatory. 
In charting the progression of social movements, 
Burke corroborates the cohesive function of an us versus 
them mentality. He observes that the essential 
ingredient of every social movement is a marked devil 
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figure. "Men who can unite on nothing else," he writes, 
"can unite on the basis of a foe shared by all." More 
pointedly, he notes that adversaries need to belong to 
one category only. If members perceive that there are 
various enemies, it will lead to incipient doubts as to 
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their own cause. Mennonite rhetoric confirms these 
theories with a notable twist. The polarization between 
Mennonitism and militarism, insofar as it was a battle 
between the secular and sacred world, kingdom of God 
versus the kingdom of man, was actually a battle between 
competing scenes. The "enemy" was an entire way of life. 
Belief systems were in conflict, not persons. To 
describe the conflict in these terms is to depersonalize 
the confrontation. By identifying the antagonism as 
between competing scenes, Mennonites could issue 
apologetic statements in an effort to identify with 
patriotic Americans while at the same time issue 
reaffirmative statements in an effort to identify 
against militarism. 
When Mennonites decided to rehearse their rhetoric 
of self-defense among themselves, they perpetuated a 
drive to separate themselves from a competing way of 
life. When German Mennonites expressed reservation at 
learning the English language, they feared that an 
insiduous aspect of Americanism had impinged on their 
world. When Aaron Loucks published and circulated the 
popular pocket-size tract on nonresistance, he 
contributed to the efforts of polarizing the two world 
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views. 
Loucks tract deserves special attention, not only 
because it found its way into a great many Mennonite 
homes, but because its form and content accentuated the 
great distinctions between good and evil and reduced the 
complexities of war to simple, clear-cut issues. on both 
sides of the credit card size tract were the two sides, 
militarism and Mennonitism, in dramatic juxtaposition. 
Readers received in capsulized form testimony of "The 
Warrior" versus "The Christian" and the foundations of 
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"Nonresistance" and "War." Loucks made the evils of 
war and the goodness of peace strikingly clear by using 
reluctant testimony, a strategy by which the source adds 
credibility to the message precisely because he has 
nothing to gain by stating it and everything to lose. By 
quoting "noted warriors," Loucks enhanced the 
credibility of his devastating depiction of war. 
Moreover, Loucks believed that he could escape 
recrimination for printing "seditious" messages because 
they did not originate with him or any Mennonite, but 
from officers of the government. Without editorial 
comment, Loucks simply listed their descriptions of war 
one right after the other. "War is hell," General 
Sherman had once pronounced. Napoleon topped him, 
describing it as "the business of barbarians." 
Montiesquieu had once made the disillusioned observation 
that "If Europe will ever be ruined it will be by its 
warriors." Hooker offered the treasonous revelation that 
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"The truth is, good men can not be good men and fighting 
men. They must have the devil in them. To kill one 
another, they must have their blood up, and then they 
are just like devils." Mennonites could not have devised 
a more ugly picture of war themselves. That "good men 
cannot be fighting men" because soldiers are transformed 
into devils was a poignant reminder of the perils of 
compromise. 
Below the warriors' testimony lay "The Christian's 
Duty, 11 --a series of bible verses that served as a code 
by which all good men lived. Strategically, the Bible 
passages chosen for the Christian's honor code reflected 
the Mennonite position exactly. such duties as "To obey 
God even though the powers that be may command us to do 
otherwise--Act 5:29" and "To live a quiet and peaceable 
life, a life of holiness consistent with our 
profession--I Tim. 2: 2; Eph. 4:1" described this 
nonresistant body, not Christians who supported the war 
efforts. Both sides of the tract were sprinkled 
liberally with Scripture to re-emphasize the biblical 
basis of the Mennonite position. In fact, so important 
was it to associate Mennonitism with Biblicism that 
excluding the Mennonite Publishing House stamp, the word 
Mennonite never appeared in the tract. 
Loucks' tract would have probably escaped the 
scrutiny of the government for seditious activity had it 
not included a section entitled: "Some Facts Concerning 
War." Contrary to the earlier practice of using military 
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men to denounce war, Loucks elected to make the "facts" 
speak for themselves. Where such "facts" (and not 
opinions) came from only Loucks knew. One of the first 
"facts" about war was that: "Might, not justice, decides 
its issues." The seditious implication, of course, was 
that all wars were motivated by greed and conquest, not 
moral and just principles. Another "fact" about war was 
that "moral degradation and lawlessness invariably 
follow in the wake of war." A reconstruction period, 
then, was woefully misnamed. Perhaps the most 
challenging, if not audacious, "fact" listed was that 
"the annals of history contain no records of nations 
that long retained commanding power after an era of 
conquest." Loucks assumed that any nation that went to 
war had visions of take-over. The closest this tract 
came to identifying against individuals, not ideologies, 
was the ill-advised remark: "The men who are responsible 
for war seldom get within range of the enemy's bullets." 
The attack on the integrity of heads of state read loud 
and clear. The duplicitous men who declared war and 
asked their fellow citizens to sacrifice their lives if 
necessary for the country, were not the same men who 
carry out those orders. 
Loucks "facts concerning war" helped maintain the 
gulf between competing scenes. The lines were clearly 
drawn between war and peace, good and evil. Loucks 
adopted an absolutist stance in order to polarize the 
world of the Christian and the world of the warrior. 
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"All war is evil" the tract asserted. No gradations 
between just and unjust wars, good and bad soldiers 
existed. Such universal claims also gave the tract a 
distinct ahistorical flavor. It was not just applicable 
for Mennonites in the crisis of the Great War; rather, 
it was relevant for all times and all places. Its 
ahistorical character, however, also gave the impression 
that Mennonites were an apolitical people who owed no 
loyalties to any country. To be sure, Mennonites wanted 
to convey the message that Christ's Rule superseded 
government's everchanging laws. But, as analyzed in 
chapter six, Mennonites did affirm certain aspects of an 
American identity. In this respect, the tract overstated 
its case. As far as the government was concerned, it 
overstepped the law in its disrespectful attitude toward 
government too. As a result, its publisher would be held 
accountable. 
Taking Control of The Crisis 
It was one thing for Mennonites to find rhetorical 
means by which to re-confirm the righteousness of their 
church identity, it was quite another for them to 
actually go about their daily routine without events of 
the war controlling them. The war loomed larger than 
life for many Americans. As a relatively small, obscure, 
religious group, it would have been very easy for 
members to become overwhelmed, if not paralized, by its 
insatiable demands for sacrifice and its rude intrusion 
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on community tranquility. Mennonite writers, who before 
United States intervention had grimly stated that: "It 
is idle to dream of a war-less world," and "Our faith in 
the sanity of the world has fallen to a point where it 
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disappears," were quick to recognize that such 
comments were patently inappropriate for helping members 
remain faithful in a crisis situation. By the time 
America had entered the fray, such expressions of 
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hopelessness and despair had tapered considerably. The 
task before Mennonite leaders now was to alter the 
impression of the war as a "violent storm" that pinned 
their church to either a defensive or a defenseless 
posture. Mennonite rhetoric designed to convince members 
that the war need not control their actions was 
characterized by two seemingly contradictory strategies: 
to celebrate the war as a "day of opportunity" that 
would test their faith and to dwarf the significance of 
the war by transcending their present situation. 
Mennonite rhetors, like C. E. Krehbiel, reasoned 
that if Mennonites could be convinced that the war was 
less a grim situation than an opportunity to test the 
extent of their faith, then remaining loyal to the 
church would carry with it a positive challenge. The 
editor attempted to accomplish that among his German 
readership in each editorial. Beginning with the April 
5, 1917 issue of Der Herold and continuing through the 
Dec. 7, 1917 issue, Krehbiel prefaced each editorial 
topic with the phrase: "The best time to establish peace 
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is today." The constant reminder that Mennonites should 
demonstrate an optimistic attitude amidst the pressures 
of war was an important way to buoy their faith and 
diffuse an all is lost attitude. 
But as the war wore on, it became increasingly 
difficult for members to maintain an optimistic outlook. 
Sensitive to that problem, Krehbiel started a new policy 
on Dec. 7, 1917, to head each editorial section with two 
Bible verses, one from Ephesians 4:26: "Be Ye angry and 
sin not. Let not the sun go down upon your wrath," and 
the other from James I:20: "For the wrath of Man worketh 
not the righteousness of God. 11 In light of the 
increasing pressures on Mennonites to conform to the 
war, from the verbal and physical abuse for their 
nonresistant stand to the prohibition of the German 
language in published materials that discussed the war, 
Krehbiel's change of policy was a candid acknowledgement 
that Mennonites were only human; it was easy to get 
discouraged and angry at the incessant badgering and the 
many restrictions on their activities. Yet the new 
slogan, like the old, served to boost the morale of 
church members and give them guidance to cope with 
frustrating and intimidating skirmishes with outsiders. 
Other contributors to Der Herold also gave readers 
reason to believe that some good would come out of this 
unpleasant experience. Minister H. D. Penner, using the 
poignancy and inspirational value of figurative 
language, told GC Mennonites that he was convinced that 
266 
"we are facing the rising sun and have everything to 
live for," and that "[i]f ye have faith the size of a 
mustard seed" through this crisis "you can move 
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mountains." 
Krehbiel was not the only Mennonite editor to use 
his influential post to reverse members' perception of 
the war. In several issues of the Gospel Herald, Daniel 
Kauffman explained to his readership that war was not 
all bad. "In the midst of trials," he confidently 
announced "is our brightest opportunity to shine for the 
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Master." Kauffman often espoused the position that the 
war did not present an unfortunate or hopeless 
situation. He was still claiming in the waning months of 
the war that "We have opportunities today that we have 
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not had before in this generation." Not only did he 
want members to see the brighter side of the war, but he 
wanted them to see the war as a precious opportunity to 
demonstrate their faithfulness. Kauffman once explained 
to MC members that the war could be compared to a series 
of difficult tests that, if passed, would create a most 
satisfying and rewarding feeling. "In war times we may 
expect any kind of test," he warned. "In some place~ it 
is not a test of national or state law but of mob law. 
In other places it is not a test of law or lawlessness 
but a test of endurance in the face of public sentiment, 
or cunningly devised arguments against the nonresistant 
faith, of tempting offers of place and preferment, of 
other tests which try our faith, courage, and quickness 
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of perception." Kauffman followed this long list of 
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tests with the challenge: "Will we stand the test?" 
Likewise the small conference affiliated papers, 
the Christian Evangel and the Christian Monitor viewed 
the war as a great opportunity for Mennonites to show 
their true Christian discipleship. A. Augspurger, 
writing in the Christian Evangel proclaimed: "This is a 
day of testing for those societies who make the claim of 
being Christian, and their character brought under the 
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full light of the gospel." Augspurger did not claim 
that this would be an easy test, but, nonetheless, it 
was a test that Mennonites should enthusiastically 
endorse. H. Frank Reist, editor of the Christian 
Monitor, also voiced enthusiasm for interpreting the 
present situation as an opportune time for members to 
show the world that they were devout Christians. "We as 
a Church are today face to face with an opportunity to 
give a practical testimony for Christ such as has seldom 
or ever confronted her," he exclaimed. Reist further 
speculated: "May it be that God is giving the Church her 
last great opportunity for the accomplishment of the 
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task given her by the Master upon His departure?" 
Rather than silently affirm the rightness of Mennonitism 
in order to avoid unwanted publicity from an 
unsympathetic public, Reist believed that Mennonites 
should call attention to the Christian principle of 
nonresistance. In this way, Mennonites could show their 
unwavering devotion to Christ's peace principles. 
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GC Mennonites who subscribed to The Mennonite 
received plenty of advice encouraging them to respond to 
the crisis as if it were an essential test of faith. H. 
G. Allebach, a guest contributor, realized the 
importance of this opportunity when he wrote: "The 
present war is an unequaled opportunity for us to 
demonstrate, if we can, the immense superiority of the 
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gospel of peace and non-resistance." Similarly s. M. 
Grubb envisioned that if Mennonites could see the war as 
an opportunity to express their devotion to Christ then 
"after the smoke of battle is cleared away we will be a 
stronger and more influential people. The thousands or 
more young men who are now in the detention camps. 
will set a new standard of non-resistance." Grubb even 
went so far as to believe that the wider American public 
would eventually see the wisdom of the Mennonite 
position. "Already has their example set folks to 
thinking," he remarked in reference to the Mennonite 
draftees in camp. Grubb concluded with the optimistic 
assessment that "When once the world gets sane again men 
and women will see the sense there is in doing exactly 
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as Jesus would have them do." 
On more than one occasion, it was members of the 
faith, not its leaders, who encouraged their fellow 
members to see the war as a test of courage and devotion 
to faith principles. One particularly persuasive 
argument came from a draftee whose entire letter was 
given prominence in the Gospel Herald. Speaking for the 
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Mennonite contingent in camp, draftee J. Heishman 
stated: 
We •.• feel that the rise or fall of the 
Church hangs on our shoulders, for if it goes 
down now, it will never be recognized anymore 
as a non-resistant body. And we believe that 
it is our duty to stand and even give our 
lives if necessary to uphold for future 
generations the principles which our 
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forefathers died to preserve for us. 
Intimations of heroism and even patriotism are evident 
in this draftee's statement. Mennonite leaders hoped 
that such dedication to the faith would be the rule and 
not the exception, that members would see the importance 
of using this test to show their faithfulness to 
Mennonitism and to God's Word. 
Reversing the perception of the war from an 
unfortunate to a fortunate experience enhanced the 
Mennonites' desire to remain part of the church. But if 
the war presented a grand opportunity to demonstrate 
their Mennonite identity, how, exactly, were they to go 
about meeting the challenge in their home communities? 
Kauffman was prepared for this question. He suggested 
that members "should show by our quiet, peaceable, meek, 
pure, submissive, Spirit-guided life that our profession 
of nonresistance is not mere slavery to church creed but 
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the expression of a living conviction .••• " In 
enacting the lifestyle of a dutiful Christian, 
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Mennonites could prove the sincerity of their 
convictions in the face of hostility. 
A more concerted effort to give members direction 
on how to survive the test was for Mennonite rhetors to 
compare themselves to biblical characters. Since 
Mennonites were a people of the Bible, biblical images 
were critical to their self-understanding. Jesus was a 
central figure that Mennonite ministers and other church 
leaders urged their fellow members to pattern their 
lives after. As Krehbiel stated simply to his readers: 
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"[T]he life of Christ is our example." Kauffman 
outlined what that example entailed for his readers. 
"[Jesus] meekly submitted to his persecutors," he 
explained, "and though He might have called to His 
assistance more than twelve legions of angels from 
heaven to rescue Him from the cross, He used none of 
these powers in His own defense and died an ignominious 
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death." THe argument might have continued thus: If 
Christ practiced nonresistance even in the face of 
death, can we as Christ's disciples abandon 
nonresistance in the face of public hostility? 
Another key biblical figure in Mennonite rhetoric 
was the Apostle Paul. This disciple of Christ who 
remained an outcast much of his life and endured so much 
suffering in the hands of his enemies proved to be an 
excellent source of inspiration. Der Herold instructed 
its readers who were smarting under verbal abuse from 
the wider citizenry to take solace in his words. "Paul 
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warns the Christian that he is not supposed to get 
angry, he is not supposed to hate the wrong that has 
been done in over-powering him, he is rather to accept 
the evil and forgive him." Readers were reminded of 
Paul's last words of advice: "Be not overcome with evil, 
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overcome evil with good." The Gospel Herald also found 
it helpful to compare the perils that Mennonites had 
experienced in facing a hostile public with those that 
Paul had endured. One such article that members might 
have read with keen interest made that analogy 
particularly clear. It stated: 
[T]hese oft-repeated statements, published as 
facts and seldom refuted in public print, 
leave an erroneous impression upon the minds 
of many people and encourages a feeling of 
resentment against nonresistant people--a 
feeling similar to that which impelled the mob 
to cry out against Paul. 'Away with such a 
fellow from the earth; for it is not fit that 
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he should live.' 
With this analogy, Mennonites could interpret the 
bitterness they endured from the wider citizenry as less 
painful, in fact, their run-ins with patriotic Americans 
could be seen as heroic when placed in relation to the 
trials of a great disciple of Christ. 
The biblical figure that Mennonites most frequently 
compared themselves to was the proverbial Good 
Samaritan. This was an ideal comparison in light of the 
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fact that Mennonites wanted to remain faithful 
Christians and uphold nonresistance, yet also wanted to 
prove their loyalty by serving in a charitable capacity, 
such as relieving suffering. As one writer for the 
Christian Evangel remarked: "Personally we prefer to 
class the dutiful Christians with those whom Christ 
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represented in the Good Samaritan." Playing the role 
of the Good Samaritan entailed supporting the Red Cross 
for S. M. Grubb. He claimed: "If I cannot be a soldier, 
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I can and ought at least to be a good Samaritan." This 
was a meritorious argument in support of serving in the 
Red Cross, even though Mennonites were completely 
against supporting war-related activities. As the 
parable of the Good Samaritan goes, it was a Samaritan 
(whose people traditionally despised the Jews and vice 
versa) who helped the ailing Jew lying along the 
roadside. As the Samaritan look at the suffering man, he 
did not see a Jew but a fellow human being who deserved 
his help. Likewise, Grubb rationalized that persons who 
were killing were in great need. Mennonites needed to be 
dutiful Christians--Good Samaritans--and help their 
fallen brethren, not because they were militaristic 
Americans, but because they were part of the human 
family. 
MC leaders also used the Good Samaritan comparison, 
but in this case it was used to justify the importance 
of Mennonites finding charitable works that were 
dissociated from the military arm of the government. J. 
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E. Hartzler instructed: 
Let us not content ourselves in walking with 
the 'be good' fellows who passed by the man 
who fell among thieves. Let us join hearts and 
hands with the 'do good' man who came with oil 
and wine and carried the half dead man to the 
hotel and paid all his doctor bills. The good 
Samaritan was non-resistant but he did a 
service which the world shall never forget. No 
people on earth are in better position just 
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now than are the Mennonites. 
Acting the role of the Good Samaritan gave Mennonites a 
way to reconcile their loyalties to God and country. 
Mennonites could maintain their nonresistant stance and 
their image as hard-working Christians, yet help those 
in need and be seen as loyal Americans because Jesus 
taught his followers to be good neighbors to all 
persons. 
If Mennonites could, in Kauffman's words, see that 
the war presented them with a bright opportunity to 
shine for the Master, an opportunity to become 
twentieth-century versions of exemplary biblical 
characters, and an opportunity to show outsiders the 
wisdom of the Mennonite position, then in Grubbs' words, 
they would emerge from the smoke of battle a stronger 
and more influential people. Transforming the war from a 
frightening enemy to a test of spiritual strength was an 
inventive way to take control of the crisis. 
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Another inventive strategy Mennonites used to avoid 
letting the events of the war dominate their lives was 
to downplay its significance, a strategy which would 
appear to contradict attempts to celebrate the war as a 
day of opportunity. The war could not be significant and 
insignificant at the same time, or could it? For a 
people set on being in the world, but not of it, the 
decision to make both arguments in an effort to maintain 
control of events made perfect sense. As "pilgrims" in 
the world, Mennonites were instructed to be "God's 
representatives on Earth," not just in peace times but 
in war times too. True disciples of Christ would view 
the war as an opportunity to shine for the Master. As 
"strangers" in the world, Mennonites were instructed to 
live "not for this world but for the world to come." 
Loyal followers of the Gospel would view the war as a 
necessary evil of the world that should be kept in 
perspective lest they became too absorbed in the affairs 
of this life. 
But even with the knowledge that Mennonites wanted 
to enact a biblical paradox, one can question whether or 
not refusing to grant the war great import was a harmful 
avoidance strategy. Failing to discuss war issues had 
the potential to inflict damage on the church's 
longevity. If Mennonites did not remain informed on war 
news, how could they make an appropriate defense of 
their faith when confronted with a myriad of damaging 
charges from outsiders? Mennonites might have countered, 
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however, that failing to highlight war issues served a 
beneficial purpose. There were, from a Mennonite 
perspective, more critical matters for the church to 
address. More importantly, in terms of keeping the faith 
strong, the practice of giving minimal attention to war 
news, distracted members from dwelling on an 
uncomfortable subject, preserved the Mennonite principle 
of non-conformity, and, ultimately, dwarfed the threat 
of the war. 
In keeping with Christ's teaching to be strangers 
in the world, Daniel Kauffman urged members not to let 
the war control their lives because "It is not the most 
important thing before us." He continued: 
We are apt, in the time of noise and turmoil 
and clamor of war, to lose sight of things 
less noisy but of far more importance •. 
Let us apply ourselves to the great work of 
strengthening the Church, seeking the lost, 
building up Christian homes, magnify [sic] 
Jesus Christ in all we do, seek [sic] and 
follow [sic] the guidance of the Holy Spirit. 
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Kauffman transcended the immediate concerns generated by 
the war to focus upon matters "of far more importance" 
to the devout Christian. Passages like this served to 
distract members from contemplating the anxieties of war 
pressures, and helped to preserve a semblance of 
tranquility and separation from the world. The Gospel 
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Herald was not the only forum in which Kauffman avoided 
a discussion of war issues. The Conservative Viewpoint, 
Kauffman's extremely popular and influential book, was 
published at the height of the war, and yet there is no 
mention of war anywhere between its covers. Despite the 
fact that Kauffman saw so many "problems" facing the 
Mennonite church, as evidenced by a table of contents 
which identifies everything from dress problems to 
publication problems, the influence of the war is 
71 
neither a cause or consequence of them. 
Kauffman's belief that there were more important 
matters than the war for members to attend to was shared 
by the editors of the other Mennonite newspapers. During 
the course of the war, the layouts of the five major 
Mennonite periodicals regularly intermixed the numerous 
church-related subJects with only a few articles that 
addressed the war. In all five newspapers between the 
years 1917-1919, there was never an entire issue devoted 
to war concerns; in fact, with the exception of Der 
Herold, rarely was there an entire page devoted to war 
concerns. Der Herold provided the notable exception 
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primarily due to its advertising policy. The war-
related articles that did make it into print focussed 
exclusively on how Mennonites were affected. Information 
on legislation, such as compulsory military service, 
noncombatant specifications, Farm Furlough regulations, 
the sedition act, and Mennonite negotiation efforts 
with the government were appropriate. So, too, were 
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updates on the status of Mennonite draftees in camp and 
Red Cross and Liberty Loans contributions. Conspicuously 
absent were reports on the progress of the war on 
various battle fronts. Unlike American periodicals, 
which featured war-torn cities or patriotic G. I.'s and 
acquainted readers with names of battles, generals and 
casualties in order to make the war real for Americans 
back home, Mennonite newspapers closed their columns to 
war reports in order to keep the outside world from 
infringing on their lives; the less Mennonites had to 
know about the war, the less they were reminded that 
they held a nonresistant position in a resisting world. 
A prime example of editors' discomfort in bringing the 
war up for consideration was a remark that Kauffman made 
one year into the war. "We almost feel like apologizing 
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for mentioning the war question so often," he wrote. 
Despite the minimal number of articles published 
concerning the war, Kauffman voiced reluctance to 
subjecting members to a disturbing issue. 
The editors of Mennonite papers felt much more 
comfortable giving coverage to such subjects as mission 
work, Bible study, Mennonite history, births, deaths, 
marriages, and other community news. It is of particular 
interest to look at the front-page of the Gospel Herald 
and The Mennonite in the issue after war had been 
declared. The Gospel Herald gave the news of America's 
entrance into the war one column on the first page. Yet 
getting equal coverage on the first page was an article 
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discussing whether or not there was such a thing as 
degrees of sinfulness. America's entrance into the war 
did not even rate front-page coverage in The Mennonite. 
Rather, Grubb decided to print an article of two columns 
on page four, alongside a three-column article that 
\ 
argued that "ministers of the gospel of today would 
preach better sermons if they would get more physical 
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exercise." From an outsider's journalistic 
perspective, juxtaposing a subject that warranted 
screaming headlines with a subject so trivial that it 
barely warranted a blurb in a humor column was the 
epitome of a gross error on the editor's part. But from 
a Mennonite perspective, it would not have been 
appropriate to emphasize a worldly concern at the 
expense of a church concern. 
In Mennonite publications, war news had to compete 
with church news. By refusing to consider the war the 
most pressing news of the century, Mennonite rhetors 
could distract their fellow members from dwelling on an 
unpleasant subject and remain faithful to their 
Scriptural paradox. When editors refused to give war 
news any larger headlines than they gave to community 
news, they were giving the impression of "business as 
usual." Mennonites were a people of the Bible bent on 
doing constructive church work, and although the war 
intruded upon their lifestyle, Mennonites refused to 
give it their undivided attention. In deflecting 
attention from the war to dwell on Christian concerns, 
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the war became a less real threat to the church. 
Mennonite rhetoric that aimed to downplay the 
significance of the war was also characterized by a 
tendency to dwell in the past or future, but not in the 
present. Specifically, this took the form of focussing 
on the glorious past and future of the church. This is 
an important strategy for group cohesion, according to 
Eric Hoffer. He observes that "[T]here is no more potent 
dwarfing of the present than by viewing it as a mere 
link between a glorious past and a glorious future. 
[for] a vivid awareness of past and future robs the 
75 
present of its reality." 
As discussed earlier, highlighting the glorious 
past of their martyred ancestors was a way to re-affirm 
the historical basis of nonresistance, but it was also a 
way to dwarf the present. When Mennonite writers 
reminded members of the barbaric torture that the early 
Mennonites endured for their peace stance, they were 
also reminded that their ordeal involved much milder 
forms of verbal and physical abuse that could not 
compare with the hardships suffered by their heroic 
forebears. The world war appeared much less threatening 
to the church when it was compared to the trials 
suffered by the early Mennonites. 
The influence of the war on Mennonite thought and 
action was also lessened when it was put in the 
perspective of a perennial problem that Mennonites had 
always faced. The war only confirmed the history of the 
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Mennonites as transient people in quest of a land. 
Delegates of the Western District conference who 
convened in the summer of 1917 to discuss the war tried 
to downplay its significance by recounting their 
temporary stay in all countries. The minutes read: 
[A] long stay has never been their [the 
Mennonites'] lot in any country. Finally they 
came to America, in the hope of having at last 
found a country in which they would be able to 
serve God undisturbed, in their own way. After 
years of peaceful labor, the same problem is 
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again arising before us. 
Mennonites always learned to weather the storms of war 
before, as this passage implied. The present situation 
should not be any more difficult to endure than were 
crisis situations in times past. 
Reliving a glorious, and sometimes troubled, past 
was one way to rob the present of its reality, another 
way was to hope for a better future. Hoffer notes: 
"There can be no genuine deprecation of the present 
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without the assured hope of a better future." 
Mennonite leaders frequently stressed the great rewards 
that would be forthcoming for the true Christian who 
remained a staunch believer in Christ's peace principles 
during this time of turmoil. One passage in the Gospel 
Herald portrayed a time in the near future when the 
world would be at peace again and Mennonites would be in 
good standing with the wider American citizenry. 
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Our prayers shall continue to ascend that the 
day may speedily come when the present 
differences and misunderstandings will have 
been wiped away, when our religious 
convictions may be fully recognized as 
guaranteed by national and state 
Constitutions, and when we may be able to 
serve in a capacity in which we can do so with 
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a free conscience. 
Such encouraging words helped members to place the war 
in its proper perspective. The war would not endure 
forever, as it so often seemed. This war, like all wars, 
was but a temporary suspension of life at peace. This 
was important for members to remember in the face of 
public pressure to support the war. 
While Mennonites deprecated the war oy Iocu-si--i1-g on 
a time in the not too distant future when the world 
would return to normal, they more frequently dwarfed the 
present crisis by focusing on a glorious life in heaven. 
As biblical people, Mennonites used the Bible to justify 
the fact that a better life was awaiting the devout 
Christian, just as they had done to justify the 
rightness of nonresistance in war times. Two scriptural 
passages frequently found in Mennonite periodicals that 
transcended the world crisis included: John 18:36: "My 
Kingdom is not of this world," and Col. 3:1, 2: "Set 
your affections on things above, not on things of the 
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earth." As the Christian Evanqel saw it, the lesson 
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from these passages was clear: "From these words of our 
Savior we can easily see that His great concern was with 
reference to His kingdom, and which also should be the 
great concern of everyone who claims the nonresistant 
80 
faith." Mennonites may not have been able to ignore 
all of the demands of the war, but, as Scripture 
commanded, they would not consider the war their most 
pressing concern. 
Kauffman hoped to convince members to remain strong 
in the faith by reminding them that "there is a brighter 
day coming." To help fellow believers resist the 
pressures of war demands, he urged them to remember that 
"if we trust in God and keep our conscience bright 
before God and man there is a golden Crown awaiting us 
at the end." If members would "never lose sight of the 
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cross" they could withstand the test of war. 
Elsewhere, Kauffman frankly stated: "Life here is a 
little thing compared with life over yonder ••• Let us 
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look at life from this standpoint only." Since devout 
Christians were in the hands of God, it did not matter 
if they had to endure persecution here on earth. They 
would be justly rewarded by God in the future. 
If Mennonites could dwell on a glorious life after 
death, they could effectively deflect attention from the 
war. Mennonite rhetors also recognized that they could 
downplay the signficance of the war by wondering if it 
were not a sign of the Second Coming. Since much of the 
world was engulfed in battle, some Mennonites presumed 
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that Christ's return was imminent. One guest contributor 
of The Mennonite insisted that "the present crisis 
points towards the close of the Times of the Gentiles," 
and that "the revelation of our Lord may be expected any 
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moment." Concerning oneself with the Second Coming was 
a way to transcend specific war problems. Kauffman also 
found it important to discuss Christ's return to earth: 
"We do not know what will be the nature of the end of 
the present conflict, but we do know that 'when Christ, 
who is our life, shall appear, then shall we (the 
84 
righteous) also appear with him in glory.'" Devoting 
one's thoughts to Christ's Coming served to distract 
members from dealing with "mundane" war problems. By 
rejecting the present to center their interests on the 
future, Mennonites could be consoled by the statement 
made by General Conference leaders that "although round 
about us it is dark, above us there is nevertheless 
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light." 
Mennonites discovered a number of ways to rob the 
present world crisis of its immediate threat to the 
church's longevity. They made war news compete with 
church news in Mennonite newspapers which showed that 
spokespersons of the faith were determined to keep the 
war from becoming their main priority. They compared the 
trials that Mennonites were currently enduring with the 
trials experienced by their martyred ancestors in order 
to show that the war was not the worst testing of their 
faith. They viewed the war as just one of many problems 
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that Mennonites have always had to contend with in order 
to eschew the war's grave significance. Finally, in 
order to dwarf the influence of the war, they set their 
sights on the return to peace and on their just reward 
in heaven. 
Freedom of Conscience Versus Church Polity 
From explaining the biblical and historical bases 
of nonresistance to celebrating their high standards of 
membership, from identifying against the war mentality 
to taking control of the crisis situation, members of 
the faith were provided with a veritable blueprint of a 
rhetorical foundation to help them reaffirm Mennonite 
identity. Mennonite rhetors presumed that if Mennonites 
were presented with a variety of ways to re-affirm the 
faith, members would be able to stand firmly united in 
facing the test. If Mennonites could support each other, 
the test would be less difficult. The old axiom: "united 
we stand, divided we fall," had a particular relevance 
in maintaining the church. Critic Eric Hoffer explains 
why it is necessary for members of a group to stand 
firmly together during a crisis: 
The capacity to resist coercion stems partly 
from the individual's identification with a 
group. When individuals face a crisis or 
confrontation it is highly difficult to rely 
on the resources of his own individuality. His 
primary source of strength is not himself but 
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rather being part of something mighty, 
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glorious, and indestructible. 
Mennonite leaders understood that members would be less 
inclined to be coerced into the line of duty if they 
could see themselves as part of a strong and mighty 
church. But in order for this goal to be realized, 
Mennonites needed to stress cooperation among various 
Mennonite groups. To some extent this was accomplished. 
General Conference leaders acknowledged the importance 
of working together. In the Western District's Committee 
Report, delegates expressed the desire to work with other 
Conferences. The minutes read: "[W]hen it comes to the 
test [the present world crisis], then we feel that we 
really all belong together. It has been the privilege of 
the Committee to deliberate jointly with similar 
committees of other conferences of our Mennonite people 
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a number of times." Moreover, when Mennonites made 
trips to Washington or sent letters to government 
officials, they made a point of including delegates from 
several Conferences. 
But despite the expectations of many, Mennonites 
did not present a unified Mennonite front to outsiders 
on all issues. There was no Central Committee of 
Mennonites to make denominational policy. Therefore, 
Mennonites were not organized to speak with one voice on 
key war issues. While both MC and GC Mennonites 
recognized the extreme importance of cooperating with 
one another during the present crisis, members were not 
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willing to concede on issues that violated their 
conscience. Freedom of conscience meant something 
slightly different to each Mennonite, and this was the 
crux of the problem in establishing a unified front. 
Freedom of conscience was a cherished right for 
Mennonites. In their church constitution of 1860, GC 
Mennonites had consciously emphasized that the moral 
code of the individual superseded the moral code of the 
church. With a clear purpose and a strong vision, the 
constitution read: 
Each believer stands before God Himself in 
faith as a free individual, uncoerced by other 
believers. Each individual soul, created in 
the image of God, is competent and responsible 
to deal directly with God through Christ, 
without intervention of parent, priest, 
sacrament, church, or state. This personal 
responsibility to God is the basis for freedom 
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of conscience. 
Fifty-seven years later, in the midst of a world war 
that threatened to snuff out the existence of their 
faith, GC Mennonites tried to re-affirm the policy 
outlined in their constitution to grant individual 
conscience priority over a collective conscience. The 
report of the GC Committee on Military Exemptions in 
1917, prefaced its guidelines on what drafted members of 
the faith should do in the absence of a ruling on 
noncombatant service from the President with the remark: 
287 
"The Committee does not find it easy to give a definite 
answer covering all cases coming up for consideration. 
In the first place, neither Committee nor Conference can 
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formulate a man's conscience." Church papers, for all 
their drafting of "official" Mennonite positions, 
reminded readers that in the final analysis each 
individual, not church polity, would formulate a stance 
on the war. Der Herold frequently stated: "It is 
important that a person ask himself very directly, what 
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can I do without injuring my conscience." On the issue 
of the Red Cross, for example, the paper suggested that 
"each one search his own conscience and see whether they 
are taking part in the war or taking part in helping 
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others." 
MC Mennonites also revered freedom of conscience, 
though their constitution did not stipulate its 
precedence over the authority of church bishops. And 
yet, a guest contributor to the Gospel Herald, J. c. 
Meyer, was every bit as careful to recognize the extreme 
importance of spiritual autonomy, and even more 
philosophical about its preservation, than GC 
Mennonites. In an impassioned plea for its recognition, 
Meyer wrote: 
[I]t does not help the cause to say that the 
Mennonite Church has decided that it is 
morally wrong to kill a fellow man. The 
question is: What do you think? What do you 
believe? What are you willing to do to 
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exemplify your faith in nonresistance?. 
This is a question between God and the 
individual ••••• This may sound like 
dangerous individualism, but it is the natural 
consequence of the idea of conscientious 
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objection. 
Mennonites might have questioned Meyer's light dismissal 
of freedom of conscience never becoming "dangerous 
individualism." Mennonites in Germany had used Meyer's 
philosophy to justify their military support, and, 
consequently, forfeited Mennonite principles. "In order 
to satisfy his own conscience and the demands of the 
authorities," German ministers wrote, "we leave to the 
judgment of each of them as to our old Mennonite stance 
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of nonresistance." The advice American Mennonites 
gave to their boys in camp was hauntingly reminiscent of 
the words of their German brethren. Writing to Aaron 
Loucks, minister J. A. Ressler acknowledged that: "[I]t 
will be of little account for us to advise the boys as 
to what to do. • But we may be very free in telling 
them just what the law is and then telling [sic] it is 
for them to decide. The final decision will have to rest 
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with the boys." The Mennonite position appeared all 
the more fragile if Mennonite draftees were not getting 
firm guidance on faith matters in the company of 
tempters. 
The real problem with espousing a totalistic notion 
of freedom of conscience is that when carried to its 
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logical conclusions such a stance implies a tolerance of 
all human action. Mennonites, surprisingly enough, 
understood this. C. E. Krehbiel told readers of Der 
Herold that "we really have to respect those young men 
who have volunteered [for military service] because it 
was their duty. If they really do it as a matter of 
conscience and feel it is a duty that they must perform, 
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then lets give them our respect for feeling that way." 
In one sentence, Krehbiel appeared to have undermined 
Mennonite reaffirmative rhetoric. For a religious group 
bent on emphasizing the importance of keeping the flock 
faithful, passages like these became enigmatic. If 
Mennonite leaders, like Krehbiel, were willing to make 
gross concessions to individual conscience, than the 
power of a group conscience lost much of its importance. 
But did Mennonites really believe that individuals were 
stronger than collectives? that an individual's moral 
code superseded church code? that, as in Meyer's mind, 
questions of faith were between God and the individual? 
The concerted efforts to maintain a Mennonite, as 
opposed to a mere personal, identity would suggest 
otherwise. 
This fundamental tension that Mennonites 
experienced between the self and the group, between 
spiritual autonomy and spiritual conformity, can be 
explained in sociological terms as a struggle between 
the "I" and the "Me" of each individual. George Herbert 
Mead writes that: "The .. I, is the response of the 
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organism to the attitudes of the others; the 'me' is the 
organized set of attitudes of others which one himself 
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assumes." These components of the self are often in 
conflict. The "I," the existential component of one's 
self, may at times be incongruent with one's "me," the 
socially prescribed component of one's self. Freedom of 
conscience represented the "I" for Mennonites. Church 
doctrine represented the "Me." That freedom of 
conscience was protected by church doctrine proved to be 
ironic on one level. On another level, it reflected a 
yearning that the two be one and the same, and that one 
being the socially prescribed component of the self. 
Mennonites recognized that freedom of conscience meant 
something more personal than affirming the essential 
principles of Mennonitism, but that they still engaged 
in heated arguments to persuade members either to keep 
their consciences relatively open or closed regarding 
war demands was testament to the fact that they believed 
church doctrine need not be in conflict with individual 
conscience; that one's "Me" and one's "I" were 
compatible in all essentials. 
The truth of the matter was that a church creed 
that sanctioned moral autonomy inherently created cause 
for disagreement within its body of believers. 
Mennonites had their share of controversy over war 
issues. One of the most divisive issues involved the 
Mennonite position on noncombatant duty. Daniel Kauffman 
held a staunch belief that all Mennonites should follow 
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the example of the MC's in refusing all forms of war-
related work. He urged all Mennonite draftees to respond 
to orders from the military by politely refusing. In 
this way, the Mennonite position would be consistently 
demonstrated to others and members could take comfort in 
cooperating with various Mennonite groups. He wrote: "We 
trust that their example [MC draftees] may be but a 
sample of what our brethren are doing in all the camps. 
97 
'In unity there is strength.'" 
Yet important as unity may have been for Kauffman, 
Mennonites did not draw the line at the same place on 
the issue of noncombatant service. In fact, on this 
issue, signs of disunity were as visible in Mennonite 
discourse as signs of unity. As has already been 
mentioned, the GC's generally accepted noncombatant duty 
as defined by President Wilson, and supported some 
additional patriotic acts that they did not consider 
directly under the control of the military, such as the 
Red Cross and Liberty Loans. The MC's, on the other 
hand, took an uncompromising position. They believed 
that complying with the Executive Order on noncombatant 
duty and supporting the Red Cross would only encourage 
the government to draft Mennonites into the service. 
Rather than allow for some diversity in interpreting 
what was militaristic and what was not, Mennonites of 
both Conferences engaged in heated debate on this issue, 
often overshadowing signs of cooperation. 
Aaron Loucks urged members to remain faithful to 
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the MC position on noncombatant service by using a 
guilt-producing tactic. He compared all Mennonites who 
forsook nonresistance by serving in a noncombatant 
capacity to the sinful biblical figure--Pontius Pilate. 
Posing a confrontative rhetorical question, Loucks 
began: 
When Pilate washed his hands and said, 'I find 
no fault in him,' did he absolve himself from 
the guilt of the death of Jesus? • But the 
people demanded that He be sentenced to death, 
and rather than incur the displeasure of the 
people he delivered Him to be crucified. 
When he gave his consent to have Jesus 
crucified he was therefore guilty of the 
murder of Jesus. Will I be guilty of 
manslaughter if I enlist and enter the non-
combatant service of any branch of the 
military forces? 
Louck's answer was all too clear: "In consenting to 
become a party in war, regardless of what kind of 
service you render, you bear responsibility in the 
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crimes that are committed in warfare." Loucks used the 
biblical story to inflict a harsh reprimand on those 
members of the faith ~ho, in his eyes, had strayed by 
compromising their position in a desire to remain loyal. 
Like Loucks, Kauffman remained convinced that those 
members performing noncombatant duties were "being 
deceived as to the real issue" and "missing the point." 
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He continued: "Even the authorities recognize that a man 
in hospitals, munitions factories, and other kinds of 
noncombatant service is just as valuable in the work of 
overcoming the enemy as is the man who who [sic] carries 
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the rifle and actually shoots." The only faithful 
stance for the Mennonite was, in Kauffman's view, so 
self-evident that any member who thought otherwise was 
sorely misguided. Kauffman did not confine his 
disapproval of those who took up noncombatant work to 
words of explanation regarding the "true" position. In 
one particularly caustic passage, he stated: 
Whenever the conscience breaks out only in 
spots you may depend upon it that it is either 
enveloped in dense ignorance or that there is 
more selfishness than conscience about it • 
• People who profess nonresistance but at the 
same time declare it their duty to 'do their 
bit' in the support of war ••• are either 
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misled or insincere. 
The Gospel Herald frequently printed such disapproving 
words for their fellow members of the faith who had not 
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emulated the posture of the MC's on all war matters. 
Attacks on fellow members who were not conforming 
to the position taken by a particular Conference were 
not one-sided. s. M. Grubb of the General Conference 
issued an equally sharp reprimand to "the absolute 
pacifists" of the Mennonite Church. In one article, he 
not only pointed out the absurdity of an absolutist 
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position, but charged that the position was downright 
cruel: 
There are those who would be so logical in 
their peace attitude that they would not even 
be of use in the military hospitals for fear 
that they would be helping to patch men up 
that they might be sent back again and fight. 
Aside from the positive cruelty that would let 
men die for fear that they might later, when 
cured, do that which could not be approved by 
us, there is a one-sidedness about it that 
calls for carrying the reasoning process 
further. They should not pay taxes, or till 
the ground, or raise cattle, or dig coal, or 
hew down trees, or spin yarn or weave a piece 
of fabric for all that would be helping win 
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the war. 
Grubb saw the MC's position as absurd. Kauffman saw the 
GC's position as misguided and unfaithful. Each wanted 
to see their own conscientious position taken by others 
and inscribed not only as a Conference position but as 
Church doctrine. Yet to use space in Mennonite 
periodicals to fire verbal shots at one another was 
highly detrimental to creating unity among all 
Mennonites. Open dissension among leaders of the faith 
only intensified the difficulty of remaining strong as a 
group in the face of adversity. Rather than put up a 
united front, which would have made congregations within 
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the church less vulnerable to public attacks of 
inconsistency and have made it easier for Mennonites to 
prove their faithfulness, the church elected to remain 
divided on the issue of noncombatant service. Mennonites 
wholeheartedly agreed with Kauffman that "In unity there 
is strength," yet they also agreed with GC delegates 
that no one "can formulate a man's conscience." 
Fortunately, for both Conferences, Mennonitism 
survived the fissures that were bound to occur in a 
church that granted co-legitimacy to the individual 
conscience and the collective conscience of the church. 
For the most part, Mennonite rhetors were successful at 
encouraging members of the faith to merge personal 
identity with church identity. With numerous strategies 
designed to make Mennnonites feel proud of their 
association with the church, they formulated impressive 
reaffirmative rhetoric. But then, in Kauffman's words, 
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Mennonites affirmed "an extraordinary position" which 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
EVALUATIONS OF MENNONITE RHETORIC 
Throughout the course of the war, Mennonites were 
confronted with a "supreme test" vastly different than 
that proposed by President Wilson. For Americans, the 
supreme test involved fighting to make the world safe 
for democracy, supporting the war efforts financially, 
and living frugally to help the Allied forces. For 
Mennonites, the supreme test involved a diplomatic 
confrontation with the government, a defense of their 
seemingly "unpatriotic" ways to a hostile public and a 
reaffirmation of an unpopular peace position to each 
other. Suddenly, with the onset of war, a people who had 
traditionally shunned a rhetorical engagement with 
anyone outside the fold were thrust into a position of 
juggling multiple rhetorical postures. As a religious 
lobby, they adopted the position of a people wronged by 
their government. As upright American citizens, they 
adopted the position that they had been misunderstood by 
the wider citizenry. As disciples of Christ, they 
adopted the position that they would have to become 
courageous witnesses, if not martyrs, in order to 
preserve an historic peace position in a world at war. 
As moral and political authorities on the international 
conflict before United States' intervention, Mennonites 
stiffened their rhetorical challenge considerably when, 
in subsequent efforts, they attempted to project an 
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apolitical image. 
Mennonites constructed a variety of appeals 
targeted for members and nonmembers alike in an attempt 
to uphold these postures. After identifying and 
analyzing these strategies, rhetorical appraisals are in 
order. From the rational perspective of the established 
order, the task of criticism is to weigh the cogency of 
arguments. From the perspective of the wider American 
public, critical inquiry concerns an assessment of the 
effect (success or failure) of their rhetorical efforts. 
From the symbolic perspective of an out-group, 
evaluation is based on an appreciation for how language 
functions to reveal motives. 
Mennonites As Rhetorical Failures:~ Rational Appraisal 
The rhetorical critic operating from a rational 
perspective, is an objective observer-- one who, removed 
from the perspective of the rhetors, is in a prime 
position to "judge" the merits of the case at hand. 
Rhetoric, from such a perspective, is defined as the art 
of reasoned discourse or argumentation. Hence, the unit 
of analysis is argument, not language, per se. The 
critical lens of the rational perspective is so 
positioned as to see a rational actor--that is an actor 
whose choice of action can be rejected or supported on 
the basis of the cogency of arguments--and a rational 
audience--those in an empirical or timeless setting who 
are predisposed to respond to logical proofs more 
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readily than other forms of proof. The critic, as a 
detached observer, conceivably can place him or herself 
as a member of such an audience. The rhetor-audience 
relationship so described necessarily requires a message 
that has an instrumental purpose. The critic's task, 
then, from this perspective, is to evaluate the rhetors' 
use of argument, to judge how cogent, valid, and 
consistent arguments are in demonstrating truths and in 
1 
justifing a particular course of action. 
Mennonite rhetoric fares poorly under the scrutiny 
of the rational perspective. As argument addressed to an 
outside audience for the purpose of convincing them of 
the rightness of the Mennonite position, Mennonite 
rhetoric is rivetted with weaknesses and 
inconsistencies. The first, and most obvious, weakness 
of the Mennonite position was their support of Germany 
in the European crisis prior to the United States' 
intervention. It was a blunder for GC Mennonites to 
reason that there were nonresistant ways to support 
Germany, and MC Mennonites to reason that there were 
nonresistant way to support Great Britain in the war, 
when, later, upon America's entrance into the war, some 
Mennonites refused to find nonresistant ways to support 
America on the basis that they were an apolitical and a 
pacifistic people. To their fellow citizens, that 
sequence of arguments appeared "cowardly" and 
"inconsistent." When GC Mennonites supported Germany 
from the safe distance of American shores, and then 
309 
refused to fight for America, their actions could only 
be interrupted as selfish and insincere. The doctrine of 
nonresistance was perceived as an expedient principle 
designed to protect Mennonites only when they felt 
threatened. Moreover, GC Mennonites who had originally 
supported Germany created an undeserved and unfortunate 
situation for MC Mennonites who did not support Germany. 
Americans did not distinguish between Mennonite groups 
that had cultural ties to Germany and those that did 
not. To most Americans, all Mennonites were pro-German. 
The efforts by the MC's to deny their cultural ties with 
Germany fell on deaf ears. German-Mennonites compounded 
the fateful blunder of taking up German patriotism by 
voicing reluctance at adopting the English language. 
When Americans were being taught to hate things German, 
speaking German only hurt the Mennonites' efforts to 
appear as loyal Americans. Finally, Mennonite support of 
Germany in the European crisis clearly demonstrated 
their political naivete. Mennonites had no inkling that 
America would be drawn into the ware Had they been more 
politically astute, they might have supported Germany 
privately or, in keeping with the dictates of their 
faith, remained neutral. 
A second weakness was that Mennonites failed to 
emphasize their historic peace stance prior to United 
States entry into the war. As a result, it was difficult 
for them to prove their sincerity as staunch, 
conscientious obJectors. Mennonite leaders recognized 
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that their failure to publicize the principle of 
nonresistance prior to the war made it difficult to 
prove their sincerity to the public and to keep members 
strong in the faith. s. M. Grubb admittted that because 
there had been such a long period of peace, young 
members did not know the scriptural foundations for the 
Mennonite confession of nonresistance. The memories of 
past wars had faded for these Mennonites, earning them 
the label of the "untroubled generation." Mennonites 
living in the early 1900's were untroubled by war-
related concerns. They were lulled into a false sense of 
security thinking they need not call attention to their 
nonresistant stance. 
Since Mennonites had lived for so long in a country 
at peace it is little wonder that Mennonite leaders 
feared that young members of the faith would falter in 
their explanations to the public. Their unpreparedness 
also explains why so many Mennonite articles instructed 
readers on the basics of the faith. Articles entitled: 
"What is Biblical Nonresistance," and "What is the 
Position of Our Church," were essential to prepare 
members for the criticism from the public. However, the 
sudden proliferation of articles addressing 
nonresistance, where there had previously been very few, 
could only raise the suspicion of non-members as to the 
sincerity of the Mennonites' refusal to participate in 
the war because of their religious doctrine. 
A third weakness in the Mennonites' self-defense 
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was over-extending themselves in efforts to identify 
with the wider American public as loyal citizens. 
Mennonites were so eager to affirm their Americanism 
that they claimed to be more loyal, more giving, and 
more caring than those who supported the war. For 
example, they could not suppress their belief that the 
farmer, not the man on the firing line, would do more to 
bring the war to an end. Mennonites also re-defined the 
meaning of patriotism so that their benevolent 
activities could be viewed as patriotic. Yet in changing 
the definition, Mennonites tended to pit their 
"constructive" form of patriotism against the 
"destructive" form of patriotism exhibited by their 
fellow Americans. Thus, instead of reinforcing their 
patriotic ties with the larger community, Mennonites 
only emphasized their differences. 
Moreover, Mennonites went so far as to look at the 
conscientious objector's stance from the government's 
perspective. However, acknowledging that it must be 
"difficult" and "embarrassing" to deal with the 
Mennonites, and that the government's course of action 
was justifiable from the viewpoint of the state, only 
gave the government additional reason to believe that 
Mennonites were a nuisance and their demand for complete 
military exemption unjustifiable. 
A fourth weakness in the Mennonites' self-defense 
was that they did not play the role of the martyr or of 
the Good Samaritan as well as the greater American 
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public. American enacted martyrdom on the battlefields, 
while Mennonites only talked about courageous ancestors 
who had sacrificed their lives for their faith. 
Mennonites realized that because no Mennonite had had 
the opportunity to make the ultimate sacrifice for the 
principle of nonresistance, many Americans would be 
skeptical about their sincerity. In frustration at being 
unable to convince non-members of the sincerity of the 
Mennonite position, Grubb remarked that he wished there 
had not been an Exemption Clause so Mennonites could 
enact their faithfulness. But neither the government nor 
the public gave Mennonites the opportunity to make the 
ultimate sacrifice. Even in the sporadic outbursts of 
mob violence, no Mennonite was killed. 
Although it was an uncomfortable situation, 
Mennonites were forced to watch other Americans make the 
noblest of sacrifices for their beliefs. In a feeble 
attempt to reduce that tension, J.E. Hartzler stated: 
"It is not a difficult thing to die for country; but it 
takes great faith and courage to live for God and our 
2 
country." This argument backfired because it 
contradicted a Mennonite conviction in the power of 
martyrdom. If it were not a difficult thing to die for 
one's God or country, why had Mennonites raised to 
heroic status those Mennonites who had made the ultimate 
sacrifice? The argument appears to be one made in 
desperation since they could not play the heroic role 
that would have proved their courage and their 
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sincerity. 
Mennonites also wanted to be seen as Good 
Samaritans. Yet those members who refused to serve in 
the Red Cross were upstaged by those Americans who 
risked their lives to save the lives of friend and foe 
alike. MC Mennonites contended that they could be Good 
Samaritans by performing good works dissociated from the 
military, but from society's perspective, and even from 
the perspective of GC Mennonites, MC Mennonites appeared 
not so much as Good Samaritans as callous individuals. 
A fifth weakness of the Mennonites' rhetorical 
defense was that they presented idealistic, but 
unworkable, solutions for ending all wars for all time. 
Living in a political world demanded political answers. 
It was not realistic for Mennonites to identify with 
democratic ends and then offer non-political means of 
achieving those ends. After negotiations failed with 
Germany, the only relevant political answer to the 
escalating European crisis was military intervention. 
Proposing as J. G. Ewert did that "loving one's enemies" 
would solve the international conflict, was a solution 
without political relevance, and only further 
substantiated the charge that Mennonites were 
politically naive. 
Mennonites not only constructed weak arguments, but 
contradictory arguments. First, Mennonites were ill-
prepared to maintain two contrary identities. Mennonites 
had become sufficiently acculturated into the American 
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way of life so it became increasingly difficult to 
distance themselves from worldly concerns. But when they 
suddenly wanted to affirm their citizenship ties with 
the wider community, they had no expertise for such a 
persuasive appeal, since their people traditionally 
shunned world affairs. When Mennonites tried to preserve 
their American identity, they ultimately abandoned their 
Mennonite distinctiveness. 
Gerald Dahlke, for example, abandoned religious 
justification and adopted secular justifications in his 
16-page defense of the Mennonites. Dahlke argued that 
Mennonites should not have to support the war because 
they had been promised exemption from military service. 
Moreover, he argued that they should not be criticized 
for failing to join the war because they were loyal 
citizens who supported many other, equally important, 
causes. Unfortunately, Dahlke was not reinforcing the 
Mennonites' American identity as much as he was 
forfeiting the biblical rationale for the Mennonites' 
aversion to war. Dahlke's tract was indicative of the 
problem Mennonites faced in trying to reconcile their 
American and Mennonite identities. Mennonites wanted the 
best of both worlds. They wanted to keep the essentials 
of the Mennonite faith and they wanted to keep those 
characteristics of American citizenship that they 
thought could be reconciled with their faith. But such a 
balancing act resulted in the severing of one or both of 
these ties. 
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A second inconsistency in Mennonite rhetoric was 
indecisiveness on how to describe the war. Since 
Mennonites refused to keep abreast of the international 
crisis, they, at first, refused to acknowledge America's 
entrance as anything but a "horrible dream." But the war 
was not illusory. It was very real. The Mennonites' 
failure to accept the realities of war may have been 
psychologically comforting, but it did not make the war 
any less real. Battles were fought, people were killed, 
and cities were destroyed. Mennonites also viewed the 
war as a "violent storm," a "darkening cloud," and "a 
crisis that threatened the very existence of the church" 
when they were forced to explain their opposition to the 
war to an unsympathetic public. But this description 
reflected negatively on them as courageous disciples of 
Christ. By granting the war such domination, Mennonites 
characterized themselves as controlled by the situation. 
This description did not help members see themselves as 
active Christian stalwarts in the face of adversity; 
rather, it portrayed them as meek individuals reacting 
to a situation beyond their control. 
Yet Mennonites later reversed this view of the war 
in describing it as "a day of opportunity," "a much 
needed test of faith," even a "blessing" in order to 
revitalize their image. In short, when the war caught 
Mennonites off guard, their immediate reaction was to 
ignore it, then grudgingly they saw the crisis as a 
serious threat to the movement because they had not 
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emphasized a pure Mennonite identity, then, in an 
attempt to re-affirm their Mennonite identity, they 
changed the negative perceptions of the war to positive 
ones in order to emphasize their stalwart discipleship 
and take control of the crisis. Both light and dark 
imagery, positive and negative views, were used to 
describe the situation. Holding such contrary 
perceptions was indicative of the fact that Mennonites 
were unprepared for the war. 
Another pronounced discrepancy in the Mennonite 
self-defense were the conflicting positions maintained 
by MC and GC members on where to draw the line on 
noncombatant service. It is unfortunate that the church 
could not come to an agreement on what the "correct" 
Mennonite position should be. Failing to present a 
unified front on this issue damaged their credibility 
with the public and the government in a number of ways. 
It was easy to charge that any religious group that 
evidenced internal faction on such a key issue must not 
be taking the nonresistant stance for religious reasons, 
but for the sake of expedience. It gave the government 
reason to doubt the convictions of individual members. 
Camp officials were convinced that because Mennonites 
could not establish a unified front, young Mennonite 
draftees could be persuaded to join the ranks of the 
army once they were separated from their over-
protective, conservative leaders. The disagreement 
threatened the cohesiveness of the church. When 
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Mennonites were being attacked for their "unpatriotic" 
actions, it only compounded the possibility of the 
church's dissolution when the two groups attacked each 
other for being "misguided" or "cruel." The divisiveness 
over noncombatant service was but another sign that 
Mennonites were unprepared~to make a public defense of 
themselves. 
The most glaring error in the Mennonite defense was 
their indecisiveness about addressing the public. At 
times, Mennonites desired to explain their position to 
the public, believing that the truth was self-evident 
and that once non-members heard the rationale for not 
supporting the war, they would be understood. This was 
especially true when Mennonites desperately wanted to 
dissociate themselves from other types of conscientious 
objectors. Mennonite writers were convinced that if 
distinctions were clearly made, "it would be but a short 
time until most of the present unpleasantness connected 
with the attitude of nonresistant people would be a 
3 
thing of the past." Despite their enthusiasm to make 
their position to outsiders known, Mennonites made 
virtually no efforts, outside of their own literature, 
to acquaint the public with their arguments. Ironically, 
the first Mennonite to go public with a definitive 
4 
defense of the church did so after the war was over. At 
other times, however, Mennonites were content to ignore 
the charges by the public for fear that any attempt at 
genuine argument would prompt additional attacks. MC 
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leaders advised their members to "avoid heated 
5 
controversy with those who do not agree with us." 
Similarly, Grubb said warily: "I cannot see how we can 
impress this feeling upon our countrymen now when they 
6 
are angry." Such comments reflected the Mennonites' 
fear that explaining their whole way of life to 
outsiders might backfire; Americans might become all the 
more hostile, and Mennonites would receive a deep 
psychological blow for letting their innermost 
convictions be set up for ridicule. 
Since there was no systematic effort to make their 
position known to the wider public, articles in 
Mennonite newspapers did not serve an entirely useful 
purpose. Few, if any, of the Mennonite strategies to 
repair their standing in the community reached the wider 
public. It is not surprising, then, that, for the most 
part, Americans did not separate Mennonites from other 
conscientious objectors in the positive manner in which 
they had hoped. On the contrary, when Mennonites were 
singled out by the public, they were bitterly reviled. 
Guilty As Charged:~ Public Appraisal 
With the advent of war, Mennonites promptly lost 
their respect as United States citizens in the eyes of 
the wider American citizenry. outraged at those out of 
step with the crusade spirit, the American public 
unleashed scathing indictments against the Mennonites, 
along with the rest of the conscientious obJectors. The 
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nation's newspapers became an appropriate and willing 
vehicle to hurl the myriad of epithets against them. 
One of the most denunciatory epithets given to 
conscientious objectors and to Mennonites was that they 
were pro-German. As one World War I historian observes: 
"For a man of German ancestry who happened also to be a 
conscientious objector, America was in some areas the 
7 
worst of all possible places in 1917-1918." By 1917, a 
full-scale assault on "hyphenism" was under way. Super-
patriots, like Theodore Roosevelt cast a derogatory 
meaning on the word, re-defining it as "an American 
citizen who is really doing everything to subordinate 
the interests and duty of the United States to the 
8 
interests of a foreign land." The New York Tribune 
contended that hyphenates, like the Mennonites, would 
rather see whole populations suffering in German slavery 
than to see men defend themselves with arms. "It is this 
strange callousness to suffering," the Tribune 
contended, "which sooner or later and often 
unconsciously betrays the pacifist into pro-Germanism; 
there is an affinity between his cruel willingness to 
see people suffer without striking back and the 
brutality of the German who wishes to strike the 
9 
helpless." A more pointed accusation greeted Mennonites 
in Iowa. The Wayland News directed Mennonite ministers 
in the area to forsake their ties with Germany 
immediately and become patriotic Americans: "As 
patriotic citizens," the paper's editor began, "we feel 
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that the time has fully come in the progress of the 
world war, for you to take a decided stand against our 
great enemy, Germany, and show your allegiance to our 
own government." The article concluded with the curt 
request: "We ask you to cease your work of making pro-
Germans and disloyalists out of the drafted boys of your 
10 
church." 
Mennonites only fueled the cries of pro-Germanism 
when some members decided to flee to Canada to escape 
military conscription. J. A. Stevenson, a commentator on 
u. s. Canadian border traffic during the war, was 
convinced that the Mennonite migration to Canada proved 
that "these people were pro-German reprobates 
masquerading as religious objectors." Selling his story 
to The Nation in an article entitled: "The Mennonite 
Problem in Canada," Stevenson went on to contend that 
Mennonite churches were experiencing a great boom in 
membership because slackers and pro-Germans saw the 
escape to Canada as an easy way out of the draft. 
Believing that all Mennonites would eventually leave the 
country, Stevenson demanded that the Wilson 
administration halt further emigration among such 
"inveterate shirkers." Since the war ended two days 
after the publication of the article, the furror over 
11 
pro-German emigrants quickly subsided. 
Journalists were not the only ones to suspect 
Mennonites of pro-Germanism. Camp officials, too, were 
convinced that Mennonites had political ties with 
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Germany. One camp official tipped off the Adjutant 
General in Washington that "[t]here is suspicion that 
the activity of this church is due to pro-German 
influence, and that it is using funds provided for this 
12 
purpose by pro-Germans." The Bureau of Investigation--
a government agency which conducted extensive 
surveillance of the Mennonites during the war also 
boldly asserted that "Mennonites might be a covert front 
for a pro-German underground [and] an international 
13 
movement with ties to Berlin." 
In many respects, these fantastic fabrications were 
brought on by the Mennonites themselves. They spoke 
German when English had become a test of one's loyalty. 
They courted obscurity when Americans were paranoid 
about underground seditious activities. They published 
periodicals in German when anything German came under 
suspicion, and, of course, they supported Germany prior 
to United States intervention. All of these actions gave 
a certain amount of legitimacy to the cries of pro-
Germanism. 
Another, more prevalent, criticism of conscientious 
objectors was that they were "cowards" and "slackers" 
and hence, "parasites." The Salt Lake Herald was 
convinced that "ninety-nine out of 100 of the young men 
who escape military duty on the plea of conscience are 
moved to take this course solely by physical cowardice." 
The newspaper added: "Investigation will prove that a 
majority of them are afraid not only of Germans but of 
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14 
the dark." The Cleveland Plain Dealer was no less 
disgusted at the "cowardly" conscientious objectors. The 
paper singled out the Mennonites and Amish as "stubborn 
pacifists and probably cowards. Their cowardice [being] 
15 
liberally mixed with laziness." Similarly, the 
Columbus Dispatch observed that "It is almost 
unbelievable that we should have living under the 
protection of the American flag, any sect of people, so 
narrow and so stubborn as to center criticism upon 
themselves, in a time like this, by refusing to do even 
the smallest thing required of them, whereby they might 
16 
show just an atom of patriotism." 
The charge of cowardice and stubborness inevitably 
led to the charge that C. o.•s were parasites. One angry 
citizen writing in The New York World described c. o.•s 
as "parasites" who "continue to fatten on the bread of 
America, to skulk behind the bodies of brave men who are 
17 
sent forth to die that they may live in safety." An 
infuriated Urbana, Illinois citizen concurrred. Lashing 
out at "the peace-at-any-price-pacifists" for being 
"parasites," this writer let fellow readers of the 
Urbana Citizen know that Mennonites "want privileges and 
escape from tyranny without paying the price." They are 
content, the writer continued, "to have their security 
18 
bought with the blood of others, not with their own." 
The popular sentiment that Mennonites were "parasites" 
was stated most succinctly and simplisticly by an Ohio 
citizen who wrote: "All [C. O.'s] like to do is eat and 
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hold religious exercises." 
Since the "peace-at-any-price-pacifists" refused to 
come to the aid of their country for fear of violating 
their religious beliefs, they were often attacked for 
appearing morally superior. One writer understood the 
religious objector's exemption status as public notice 
of their "superior quality" in keeping the "fine visions 
of humanity" and "the humanist ideals" alive. To which 
he responded: "This position can hardly be matched for 
cool and self-satisfied moral egotism," a sign "of some 
who think themselves heaven chosen guardians of a 
wayward world which still refuses to be turned aside 
20 
from its sins." Commenting on the "moral egotism" of 
the nonresistant a Bishop of a Methodist Church writing 
in The New York Times flatly remarked: "His claim to 
21 
moral superiority is the wildest of absurdity." The 
New York Tribune also disapproved, claiming that 
"[t]hese pacifists usually do not recognize their own 
chill callousness for what it really is: they pretend 
22 
superior morality." 
What irked Americans the most, however, was that 
the military exemption clause implied the moral 
superiority of the nonresistant. One minister in 
Memphis, Tennessee, expressed his discontent over the 
government's "soft" military policies in a way that 
epitomized the feeling of most Americans. He said: "The 
clause in the draft act exempting men from military 
service on the grounds of religious belief is equal to 
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saying that our cause is irreligious •••• I resent the 
implication that [our soldiers] are doing an irreligious 
23 
or un-Christian thing." The lenient treatment by the 
government only intensified the outpouring of hatred 
toward conscientious objectors. The public and the 
government perceived the conscientious objector's stance 
as disgraceful and cowardly. Yet in granting them 
exemption from combatant duty, the government had made 
their stance appear acceptable, even righteous. Many 
Americans felt that those who had failed to meet the 
"supreme test" had not been reprimanded enough for their 
unpatriotic action; they interpreted the ruling as a way 
for men who refused to serve their country to salvage 
respecto 
Related to the charge that religious objectors were 
pretending to be morally superior was the charge that 
they were also pretending to be martyrs. Conscientious 
obJectors "make their unworthy conduct a point of 
conscience, and then assume the role of the martyr when 
patriotic men and women hold them up to scorn and 
24 
ridicule," stated The Salt Lake Herald. The Washington 
Post was quick to remind objectors who posed as martyrs 
that "[r]eligious liberty, one of the fundamental 
principles of this republic, was purchased with the 
25 
blood of Christian martyrs." Americans were not about 
to perceive the "unpatriotic" nonresisters as morally 
superior or as stoic martyrs. 
The public was not oblivious to the seemingly 
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inconsistent positions taken by the conscientious 
objectors who refused to support the war yet agreed to 
serve in a noncombatant capacity. The New York Times 
realized that the government's ruling on noncombatant 
service could not allow for a consistent position on 
objecting because the ruling "draws the line at one 
place--no pretense or reality of conscientiousness will 
enable him to get exemption from the common duty of 
rendering public service in one form or another." 
Therefore, the C. o. "will not be allowed to be really 
consistent in his objecting--to refuse participation in 
activities that even indirectly are connected with the 
26 
conduct of the war ••.. " In addition to pointing out 
the inconsistency, the Times ridiculed those who 
embraced such an illogical stance. "What common people 
will never understand," the Times caustically stated, 
"is how a man whose conscience will not permit him to 
assist in the actual destruction of his country's 
enemies can persuade that section of his 'psyche' to let 
him participate in activities that are just as 
essentially those of war as is that of going over the 
top or of firing a machine gun at an advancing German 
regiment. Consistency and conscientious objecting do not 
27 
seem to go together." William Hard of The New Republic 
carried the ridicule still further. Recounting the 
heroic feats of one C. o. in camp, Hard could not 
resist poking fun at the absurdity of an absolutist 
pacifist. "In Fort Leavenworth today, sometimes in 
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solitary confinement, there is a c. o. who is a regular 
professional hero, accoladed by the Carnegie Hero 
Commission for risking his life saving the life of a 
drowning girl. He did it on his own impulse." Hard went 
on to surmise: "I suppose that if his sergeant had told 
him to jump in he would have stood rooted to the spot. -
If you are an 'absolutist• your capacity for refusing 
28 
military orders is infinite." 
The Mennonite position was so incomprehensible to 
Americans that they were often labeled "backward," 
"unintelligent" people. At a loss for understanding 
their actions, The Columbus Dispatch inquired: "What 
kind of a mental process would one have to undergo to 
imagine he was 'worshiping an idol' when he salutes the 
29 
flag? The Mennonites' refusal to participate in any 
activity associated with the military was interpreted as 
a sign of mental deficiency by government officials who 
drilled Mennonites at draft boards, in camp, and in 
front of the Board of Inquiry, in the hope of cracking 
their armor. In the psychological report on Mennonites 
conducted at Camp Sherman, Texas, the examining doctor 
observed that Mennonites had lived "a life of seclusion 
in communities apart from the healthy, normal social 
atmosphere" and, therefore, "fail to comprehend the 
30 
meaning of it all [the army environment]." Another 
psychological report on the Mennonites taken at Camp 
Dodge, Iowa, revealed that Mennonites were so mentally 
deficient that they really did not even understand the 
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tenets of their faith. "His knowledge of the creed of 
his Church and his understanding of the Bible are very 
limited," perceived this examiner, adding the evaluation 
that, "He has a pious attitude which does not impress 
one as being genuine. • He lacks push, moral fiber, 
31 
persistence of motive and courage." 
Camp officials were not the only governmental 
figures who saw Mennonites as psychologically inferior. 
Walter Guest Kellog, a member of the Board of Inquiry, 
whose job it was to test the sincerity of those taking a 
noncombatant stance, in order to determine whether they 
deserved to be furloughed for farm work or court-
martialed and sent to Ft. Leavenworth, had little 
tolerance for the Mennonites' way of life. "It is 
difficult to realize," Kellogg exclaimed, "that we have 
among our citizenry a class of men who are so 
intellectually inferior and so unworthy to assume its 
burdens and its responsibilities." He continued: "I 
doubt extremely if fifty percent of the Mennonites 
examined, because of their ignorance and stupidity, ever 
32 
should have been admitted into the Army at all." The 
Military Intelligence Division (MID)--a government 
agency assigned surveillance duty on the Mennonites--
echoed Kellogg's sentiments, calling the Mennonite 
draftee "narrow, bigoted, pig-headed, ignorant, 
slovenly, and selfish" and one who was "unaccustomed to 
thinking for himself but follows stupidly along the 
33 
lines of the traditions of his clan." 
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While the public and government officials attacked 
nonresisters for their illogical stance in accepting 
some form of noncombatant service, some government 
officials believed that verbal chastisement was not 
enough. Grand plans were launched on the state level to 
expose the "traitorous" element of their activities. By 
threatening Mennonites with the Espionage Act, officials 
reasoned, Mennonites would receive their "just" 
punishment for their lack of patriotism. 
In Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, where most of 
the flurry of activity surrounding criminal indictments 
of the Mennonites took place, state officials, in 
cooperation with the Justice Department, worked 
diligently to get Mennonite leaders behind bars. R. E. 
Proctor, an enterprising representative of the Indiana 
State Council of Defense, recognized that if he were 
ever to secure approval from his superiors to conduct an 
official investigation of the Mennonites he would need 
concrete incriminating evidence. In September of 1918, 
he informed the chairman of the State Council of Defense 
of two disturbing instances: one in which a Mennonite 
minister refused to preach a funeral service over the 
body of a deceased soldier because the young man had 
died in the service of his country, and another in which 
Mennonite ministers were stirring up controversy for 
"giving spiritual advice to draftees of their sect," and 
for securing work for their own sons "in Belgian service 
or some other camouflaged work out of Philadelphia." 
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Proctor used these events to emphasize the storm of 
protest that was brewing in his district over the 
conscientious objectors. He warned his superior that, 
"Unless something is done to satisfy our committees you 
need not be surprised if a sort of Klu Klux Klan moves 
out in this vicinity some night and gives these people a 
coat of tar and feathers." Adding somewhat callously, "I 
would not endorse this action but I would not disapprove 
it after it was done." Proctor then included in his 
letter a copy of the "Yellow Creek Statement"--the MC 
church statement on military service that was formulated 
at a meeting in Yellow Creek, Indiana, in hopes that it 
was invincible evidence to initiate criminal charges 
against them. "As you can see from the inspection of the 
Yellow Creek Statement," Proctor concluded, "they are 
banding together for the purpose of advising with one 
another regarding [military] service." Unabashedly, 
Proctor went on to suggest that his superiors in the 
Council of Defense "write me a letter empowering me as 
representative of the State Council of Defense to make 
such investigation and require attendance of witnesses 
34 
as may be necessary." M. E. Foley, the Chairman of the 
Indiana Council of Defense, was sufficiently impressed 
by his subordinate•s collection of evidence that he, 
without hesitation, shot a memo back stating: "I feel 
that it is time to report to the Federal authorities all 
persons who are openly opposing this war or seeking to 
influence young men not to do their duty in the war." 
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Taking care to legitimize his recommendation, Foley 
added: "I am sending you a copy of the Espionage Act •• 
. • An examination of this act will disclose the fact 
that persons talking against the government of the 
35 
United States at this time are in dangerous business." 
Mennonites were in such "dangerous business" that 
before Proctor and Foley could even get their criminal 
proceedings under way, the Justice Department had 
publicly exposed the illegalities of the Yellow Creek 
Statement. Operating on a lead from a federal agent, The 
Goshen News Times covered the front page of the August 
19, 1918 issue with the story: "Obstruction of Draft Is 
Investigated: One Hundred and Eighty-five Mennonite 
Bishops And Minister Are Involved." The story attracted 
particular interest in Goshen, Indiana, because Yellow 
Creek was a neighboring town. Specifically, the paper 
explained that the Yellow Creek statement fell under 
suspicion of violating the Espionage Act because it 
instructed Mennonite draftees "that under no 
circumstances can you consent to service, either 
combatant or non-combatant, under the military arm of 
the government." That statement, according to Federal 
Agent, F. R. Fortune, of Wooster, Ohio, could be 
interpreted as insubordination and disloyalty to the 
United States, which the Espionage Act strictly forbade. 
The paper went on to report that Fortune had summoned 
local members of the church who had signed the 
resolutions of the Yellow Creek statement to the court 
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house for questioning. Fortune was interviewed as 
saying: "[I]f sufficient evidence is secured, an 
endeavor will be made to have the Mennonites who signed 
these resolutions indicted in the federal court at 
Cleveland. If found guilty," he added for good measure, 
36 
"a fine of $2,000 and other punishment is possible." 
s. H. Miller, one of the ministers summoned for inquiry, 
feared the worst for the Mennonite Publishing Company. 
Writing to Aaron Loucks, the president of the Publishing 
House, Miller explained: "I have about twenty-five 
[Yellow Creek statement] pamphlets yet and a federal man 
is coming after them tomorrow. I think it means trouble 
for the (Publishing] House for sending any more through 
37 
the mails." 
Federal investigation did mean trouble for Loucks 
and the Publishing House. In addition to the Indiana 
case, for which Loucks was summoned, the District Court 
of Pennsylvania had already begun court procedures 
against him for another pamphlet--tract no. 153 
entitled: "Nonresistance." Roger Knox, United States 
Commissioner issued the indictment against Loucks and 
the Mennonite Publishing House via the Unites States 
Marshal for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Citing 
the tract and its author for "committing a felony under 
the statutes of the United States," Knox went on to 
enumerate the serious charges that the tract had 
violated, which included: 
"[T]he felony of unlawfully, knowingly and 
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willfully conveying false reports and 
statements with intent to interfere with the 
operation and success of the military and 
naval forces of the United States; and the 
further felony of causing insubordination, 
[sic] disloyalty, mutiny and refusal of duty 
in the military and naval forces of the United 
States, and the further felony of obstructing 
and attempting to obstruct the recruiting and 
the enlistment service of the United States to 
the injury of the service and to the injury of 
the United States, and the further felony of 
willfully uttering, printing, writing and 
publishing language intended to incite, 
provoke and encourage resistance to the United 
States and to promote the cause of its 
enemies; and the further felony of willfully 
advocating, teaching, defending and suggesting 
the acts and things herein before referred to 
in violation of Section 3, Title I, of the Act 
38 
of Congress of June 15, 1917. 
Rhetorical overkill for a "harmless" "apolitical" 
statement, Mennonites must have reasoned. Under the 
commissioner's scrutiny, the tract was transformed from 
a handy Bible guide for nonresisters, to a subversive 
political document of the most devious kind. 
Just when a mass trial of Loucks and many other 
Mennonite leaders appeared imminent in several states, 
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officials in Washington called the proceedings to a 
halt, explaining to various state councils of defense 
that the case against the Mennonites was not entirely 
clear, that the War Department was currently negotiating 
with Mennonites and anticipated a satisfactory solution 
to the misunderstanding, and that further publicity of 
the Mennonites might give them the martyred status they 
39 
so desperately wanted. Yet despite the stalled court 
action, the threat of Espionage violation was successful 
in getting Mennonite leaders like Aaron Loucks and J. s. 
Hartzler to substitute caution for their bold advice on 
40 
how to respond to war demands." This is not to suggest 
that the various actions on the state level were 
successful in getting Mennonites to recant their beliefs 
concerning military service, but they did dampen the 
characteristic verve and directness with which leaders 
instructed their members. 
Rather than weaken the Mennonite position through 
the court system, the government was content to 
capitalize upon the discrepant positions taken by the 
two major Mennonite groups in regard to noncombatant 
duty in the hope that they might self-destruct under the 
pressure of their own scrutiny. The Military 
Intelligence Division, for instance, believed that if 
Mennonites failed to maintain a unified front on key war 
issues, individual members would be more vulnerable to 
the influences of the military. Working together with 
the Bureau of Investigation and The American Protective 
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League, the MID attempted to drive a wedge of fear and 
uncertainty into Mennonite communities in an attempt to 
force even the most stalwart defenders of the faith to 
41 
re-evaluate the strongest of their positions. In hope 
of further widening the rift between the two groups, the 
MID reported with guarded optimism that "The older 
members--the elders--are rock ribbed in their 
obstinancy; the younger ones are however disposed to cut 
loose from the narrow prejudices that circumscribe them, 
and seem disposed to buy bonds and aid in many war 
42 
activities." The feuding between Mennonites on whether 
there were nonresistant ways to serve their country gave 
camp officials a glimmer of hope that once the Mennonite 
draftee was free from his isolated community, he would 
become a good soldier if enough pressure were applied. 
Between the treatment meted out by the public, 
state officials and the federal government, Mennonites 
found themselves in a no-win situation. GC Mennonites 
who went along with the President's ruling on non-
combatant service were not able to prove their loyalty, 
but were attacked by the public for not being 
consistent. MC Mennonites were threatened with the 
Espionage Act by state officials for remaining 
consistent in their position. Both groups were targeted 
by the Federal government as potential converts to the 
military as evidenced by their vacilating position on 
noncombatant service. 
Although the government spared few derogatory 
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remarks for conscientious objectors, threatened them 
with criminal indictments, and placed extreme pressures 
on them to conform to the law, officials did not deal as 
harshly with the c. o. as the greater American public 
would have liked. Consequently, citizens proposed their 
own "just" solutions for dealing with such "slackers." 
Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, a staunch militarist and one 
of the most vocal public figures who denounced c. o.•s, 
suggested "testing the c. o. by placing them on mine 
sweepers or by allowing them to dig front-line 
43 
trenches." One minister writing in The New York Times 
proposed that the c. o. should go off to some desert 
island and live by himself, for nowhere else can he 
remain without taking advantage of conditions that were 
brought into being by men who did not hesitate to fight 
44 
for what they wanted." Another penalty devised for c. 
o.•s was subjecting them to a special tax. Perhaps in 
remembrance of the way Mennonites were treated in the 
Civil War, this citizen suggested that: "It would only 
be fair, that those of our otherwise eligible citizens 
who secure exemption because of their consciences should 
45 
each pay $300 into the public treasury." Finally, one 
writer, who lost all sense of democratic justice, wrote 
to The Cleveland Plain Dealer that "a dose of Prussian 
medicine would be timely, appropriate prescription ••• 
46 
Mennonites incited the anger of many patriotic 
Americans by refusing to participate in the "righteous 
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crusade." Such anger was fueled by the government's 
"soft" treatment, which made Americans who supported the 
war look less religious. The scathing criticisms from 
the public were damaging enough to Mennonites struggling 
to maintain two identities, but when the public began to 
express its anger in more visible ways, Mennonites were 
faced with a serious problem. Mob action occurred 
primarily during the drives for the Red Cross and 
Liberty Bonds. The unfortunate results of these 
exercises in intimidation has prompted historian 
Frederick Luebke to observe that "No group of Germans in 
America suffered more because of the Liberty Loan 
47 
campaigns than members of several Mennonite sects." 
Homes, businesses and churches were regularily streaked 
with yellow paint with such expressions as: "You love 
48 
the Kaiser." In Pennsylvania and Ohio, Mennonite 
churches and homes of church leaders were decorated by 
flags placed there by hostile neighbors. Worshipers of 
the Oak Grove Church near West Liberty, Ohio found paper 
49 
flags pasted on every window of the church. Some 
Mennonites were threatened with vicious ultimatums. 
Citizens of a small Kansas town were greeted by a sign 
placed prominently in the public square which read: 
"Speak the American Language. If you don't know it--
50 
learn it. If you don't like it--move out." Mennonites 
of Little Rock, Arkansas were confronted with the 
threatening notice: "Any man or woman in this town, who 
does not take all the Liberty Bonds that he or she 
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possibly can buy, is in exactly the same class with 
those wretched creatures of feeble brain and feeble 
spine, those cowards we call ~SLACKERS'. Such men and 
women are not fit to live in this community, or anywhere 
51 
else in America. They are not fit to live at all." 
Mennonites in Jasper County, Missouri, were sent a 
letter by the "All American Strong Arm Squad." This 
intimidating group issued the warning: "You have been 
reported to the All American Squad as a person who has 
failed in your obligation. YOUR COUNTRY IS AT WAR! This 
committee does not tolerate SLACKERS. Do your full duty 
to your country NOW! Or get out of Jasper County or 
suffer the consequences." The consequences were 
sometimes a humiliating and painful tar and feathering, 
a yellow paint job, or destruction of private 
52 
property. 
Mob action was visible enough that President Wilson 
felt compelled to address the subject. In a national 
address devoted to the denunciation of mob violence, 
Wilson stated: "No man who loves America, no man who 
really cares for her fame and honor and character, or 
who is truly loyal to her institutions, can justify mob 
action .••• Every mob contributes to German lies about 
53 
the United States •••. " Yet while the President 
urged citizens to refrain from mob violence, such action 
did occur sporadically throughout the war. Even on 
Armistice Day, one Mennonite in Burton, Kansas, suffered 




Both the verbal and physical abuse directed at the 
c. o. substantiated the fact that Mennonites did not 
defend themselves satisfactorily to outsiders. Steering 
a middle course in an attempt to preserve two 
conflicting identities was not an option in the public's 
mind. As The Goshen Democrat simply put it: "There is no 
middle road, you are either for your country or against 
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it." Mennonites were closely scrutinized by the public 
and the government for weaknesses and inconsistencies in 
their actions. Americans expected super human 
consistency from those that objected to the war. 
Mennonites were well aware that the public expected an 
infallible witness from them, even though Mennonites had 
never claimed to be perfect in their actions. Daniel 
Kauffman, writing in the Gospel Herald, explained: 
"Personally, we have never laid claim to infallibility, 
and our imperfections are apparent in times of peace as 
56 
well as war." Nonetheless, Mennonites were judged 
severely for ostensible blunders. 
Yet despite the Mennonites' inability to repair 
their tarnished image in the eyes of the greater public, 
not all Americans let the spirit of militaristic 
patriotism cloud their sense of justice. There were some 
Americans who believed that conscientious objectors were 
subjected to undeserved verbal and physical abuse. One 
newspaper that attempted to set the record straight on 
the historic peace stance of the religious obJect was 
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The St. Louis Globe Democrat. The paper explained: 
"There are some religious societies in America that have 
long made opposition to all warfare one of their 
cardinal tenets. The Society of Friends and The 
Mennonites are among these. They preach the doctrine of 
nonresistance, and as a rule practice it in their 
57 
private as well as public relations." Although the 
Globe did not condone the Mennonites' practice of 
nonresistance, the facts were reported objectively. The 
New Republic also cleared Mennonites of suspicion on 
charges of insincerity. "Being a Mennonite, you are a 
member of a sect which has existed ever since Conrad 
Grebel thought of it at Zurich in 1525," the magazine 
explained, adding "As a Mennonite, you are readily 
58 
beyond suspicion." One citizen went so far as to 
defend the Mennonites as upright American citizens. He 
wrote: "I have known ••• a big majority of the older 
members of the Mennonite Church for most of their lives 
and I know that we have no better men, nor more useful 
citizens in this country •••• You have only to know 
them and enjoy their open, friendly hospitality, to be 
59 
convinced that they are honest, sincere and safe." The 
Detroit Free Press also made a point of differentiating 
the sincere religious objector from the insincere 
objector. The paper argued that Mennonites were "a 
different class from those who merely use the cloak of a 
new-founded conscientious objection to evade service." 
Dissatisfied with the unjust treatment that sincere 
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conscientious objectors were receiving from the public, 
the paper reminded Americans that they were "ignor[ing] 
the very basis of the religious freedom which cradled 
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our country and upon which our Americanism is built." 
Mennonites were also defended by a few Americans as 
not being pro-German. One citizen, writing in The Topeka 
Daily Capital, explained that Mennonites, "while 
speaking German are really immigrants from Russia and 
wholly out of sympathy with the Kaiser and his 
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policies." There were even those who defended 
Mennonites as patriotic citizens. The New York Times, 
which typically voiced dissaproval of the Mennonites, 
wrote: "The C. o. who does well his duty as a stretcher 
bearer need never fear to be accused of cowardice and he 
will not lack opportunities for the display of heroism." 
Finally, the Times commented: "The moral difference 
between being a soldier and serving a soldier is not 
obvious, but then none of us is logical all the time, 
and it would be absurd, unjust, and cruel to expect a 
super human consistency from the conscientious objector. 
If they are willing to do anything but direct killing--
and if they are not too numerous--the country will 
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manage to get along well enough." This surprisingly 
calm, objective, even sympathetic, attitude coming from 
a non-member was a rarity. 
Far more typical, when the Mennonite position was 
given even an ounce of legitimacy by non-members, it was 
with grudging recognition at best. When it became public 
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knowledge that many Mennonite draftees had returned 
their military earnings to the government, one Indiana 
resident summed up the still smoldering bitterness of 
many when he wrote: "The return of the money because 
they feel they did not earn it is perhaps their 
stammering tribute to the boys who did. In any event, it 
merits respect. And that is something which hitherto 
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has been a little difficult to accord them." 
While there were a few Americans who attempted to 
discredit the unfounded accusations about Mennonites, 
members of the faith cannot take credit for these rare 
demonstrations of objectivity and compassion, because 
their rhetoric did not reach the wider American public. 
Americans who came to the defense of Mennonites did so 
because they were knowledgeable about the church's 
history and the government's obligation to uphold 
religious freedom, and they wanted to rectify a grave 
injustice. 
From the standpoint of the public, the government, 
and the critic operating from a rational perspective, 
the Mennonite attempt to get non-members to understand 
biblical nonresistance and to find grounds for 
identification with their fellow Americans was an abject 
failure. However, before hastily labeling Mennonites as 
inept rhetors, it is important to understand that the 
outside evaluation of them as rhetorical failures was 
all but inevitable given the psycho-social, historical, 
and ideological obstacles discussed in chapter four. 
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These were formidable problems to rhetorical 
effectiveness with the wider American public. Moreover, 
a recognition of the rhetorical difficulties tempers a 
harsh evaluation of the Mennonites' rhetorical 
competencies. To be sure, Mennonites did not purify 
their image to the wider American public, nor prove 
themselves as seasoned negotiators to the government, 
but, Mennonites constructed rhetorical postures that did 
not conflict with the dictates of their faith. As a 
result, they were able to show remarkable resiliency 
through an otherwise debilitating and humiliating 
experience. 
Mennonites As Rhetorically Inventive: 
A Symbolic Appraisal 
It did not take a critic scrutinizing the 
argumentative cogency of Mennonite rhetoric to recognize 
that contradictoriness was commonplace. The average 
citizen understood all too clearly that "consistency and 
conscientious objecting do not seem to go together." The 
Mennonite position against war was perplexing and 
peculiar to non-members. Through Mennonite eyes the war 
was both "a violent storm" that threatened the very 
existence of the church, and "a day of opportunity to 
shine for the Master." Mennonite leaders wanted both to 
publicize their defense in order to "make our position 
clear" and to shun public exposure and give out 
information "in a quiet and unassuming manner." 
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Mennonite rhetors defended themselves by presenting both 
doctrinal Justifications for political issues and 
secular justifications for their own biblical image. 
Members of the faith expressed both a willingness to "go 
the extra mile" to identify with American people and an 
"abhorence to compromise" to identify against American 
policy. Gerald Dahlke's "Defense of the Mennonites 
Against Recent Attacks Made Upon Them" and Aaron Loucks' 
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"Nonresistance" serve as "representative anecdotes" 
selective rhetorical reflections-- of these polarized, 
yet compatible views. The latter tract, a secular 
defense of a biblical people, viewed the crisis 
situation as an opportunity for an outpouring of 
benevolence, aimed to clear up misunderstandings about 
the Mennonites to outsiders, and overextended itself in 
identifying with loyal Americans. The former tract, a 
faith statement to help members survive a chaotic world, 
viewed the war as evil, destructive, and the work of 
greedy, barbaric leaders, aimed to strengthen an 
unpopular position among members of the faith, and 
magnified the chasm between Mennonitism and militarism. 
By all appearances there is little that coheres among 
these disparate rhetorical choices. One might be 
inclined to shrug off the contradictions by invoking 
Burke's dictum that "man's responses are normally of a 
contradictory nature" and that "contradictoriness of 
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response is basic to human psychology. " While 
this may be true, a critic's task from a symbolic 
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perspective, as Burke himself has written, is to view 
the rhetoric on the rhetors' own terms in order to 
unravel the apparent oddities and peculiarities. A 
symbolic, or dramatistic, analysis "shifts the critic's 
attention from argumentation to language as its most 
fundamental assumption is that rhetorical discourse 
influences by changing verbal behavior, a consequence of 
defining man as the symbol-using or signifying 
66 
animal." Moreover, because a dramatistic perspective 
is interested in how rhetors describe situations in 
order to determine what view of the world rhetors want 
their audiences to accept; it does not presume a single 
audience or purpose, nor for that matter an external or 
instrumental purpose. In short, a critic operating from 
a symbolic perspective is not so interested in the 
effects or the efficiency of discourse, as he or she is 
in fleshing out that which is rhetorically inventive or 
aesthetically pleasing about discourse. 
To understand the aesthetic qualities of Mennonite 
rhetoric requires knowledge of the "frames" from which 
it operates. "Reference frames," as coined by Burke, are 
the symbolic structures by which human beings impose 
order upon their personal and social experiences. A. 
Cheree Carlson expounding upon Burke's discussion of 
frames suggests that "[f]rames serve as perspectives 
from which all interpretations of experience are made. 
In their broadest sense, Carlson continues, "frames are 
applied as a chart for social action, because they 
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constitute attitudes and motives." In essence, the 
frame from which the Mennonite church operated 
determined its form of symbolic action. 
Frames of reference, as they apply to groups 
removed from the larger social order, are of two sorts 
according to Carlson. Rhetors of out-groups will operate 
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from either a tragic or a comic frame. Comedy, as 
Burke succinctly explains, deals with man in society; 
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tragedy with man in the cosmos. When applied to 
Mennonite rhetoric, however, Carlson's dichotomy is 
flawed6 Since Mennonites enacted a biblical paradox--a 
dictum requiring that they be in the secular and the 
sacred world--their perspective was neither tragic nor 
comic, but peculiarly tragi-comic. An understanding of 
the rhetorical choices that contributed to both the 
tragic and the comic dimensions of Mennonite rhetoric 
reveals how members attempted a precarious enactment of 
this tenet of their faith. 
Rhetoric of a tragic frame, according to Northrop 
Frye, is characterized by a sense of inevitability, a 
belief that individuals have nothing to do but sit and 
wait for what is destined to occur. It is the discovery 
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of limits and the story of an isolated rhetor. Burke 
adds that the tragic frame pursues a ritual called "the 
cult of the kill" wherein social problems cause guilt, 
guilt requires redemption, and redemption takes the form 
of a sacrifice. Rhetors operating from this perspective 
must purge their guilt through sacrifice because it is 
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only through suffering and death that we can be atoned 
for our guilt. Social change is not possible in the 
tragic frame without some form of violence. Hence, 
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tragedy tends to magnify a single devil figure. 
Strains of resignation and inevitability are 
evidenced in Mennonite rhetoric in an effort to downplay 
the significance of the present and focus on the 
church's tumultuous past and its predestined future. 
Rhetors reminded members of the faith that their's would 
always be a "suffering church." They would always be 
"sheep among wolves,"Just as their Anabaptist forebears 
had described themselves. GC Mennonites observed that 
the problem of coping in a sinful world "is rising 
before us once again." Their hope was that the world 
crisis signaled the Second Coming. They could take 
comfort in knowing that "life here is a little thing 
compared to life over yonder." In a world of 
inevitability, there was little room for rhetorical 
influence. 
In order to purge their guilt of failing to be a 
positive witness to their fellow citizens, Mennonites 
attempted to redeem themselves by playing the role of 
the martyr. By stoically accepting the physical and 
verbal abuse from outsiders, and by expressing a 
willingness to give their lives if need be to 
demonstrate their faithfulness to the principle of 
nonresistance, Mennonites appealed to the power of 
martyrdom. Some Mennonites were frustrated that 
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Americans did not give them the opportunity to fulfill 
this role. Since Mennonites were unable to sacrifice 
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their lives (the most eloquent of sacrifices) , they 
had to settle for silently enduring "false" charges. 
As a way to emerge from the crisis with their faith 
principles intact, members chose to magnify the 
differences between Mennonitism and militarism. Loucks' 
tract polarized the two world views as a conflict 
between good and evil, the kingdom of God and the 
kingdom of man. In distancing themselves from the 
crusade mentality, Mennonites placed the antagonism 
between competing scenes, and not between agents. Hence, 
rhetorical exchanges, which we presume occur between 
people, became of secondary importance. 
A final element of tragic consciousness in 
Mennonite rhetoric was that they chose to become 
isolated rhetors. Presenting apologetic statements to 
themselves accentuated the rift with the larger 
community. Yet in constructing arguments designed for 
non-members that were, in actuality, addressed to 
members of the faith, Mennonites gave witness to the 
importance of symbolic action. For instance, it appeared 
ridiculous for Mennonites to argue that the public was 
currently misinformed on the Mennonite position and 
would assume an entireley different attitude once they 
knew the facts about them, and then refuse to make these 
facts known to the broader community. But from a 
Mennonite standpoint, it was not important that they act 
348 
on these words; it was important for Mennonites to make 
such statements because it re-affirmed among members 
that the truth of their position was self-evident to 
anyone willing to examine it. For Mennonites, their 
rehearsal of arguments sufficiently refuted the charges 
from the wider public. Rhetoric functioned as an end in 
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itself; the symbolic act was the whole act. That 
symbolic action functioned as the entire act also 
explains why it was not important for Mennonites to find 
ways to implement their "idealistic" solutions to the 
world crisis. It was enough that Mennonites proposed an 
alternative way to solve the problem that reflected 
their image as a people of the Bible. 
Second, rhetorical isolation prevented Mennonites 
from becoming the focus of attention and the center of 
controversy. Mennonites realized that if they publicized 
their righteous stance, they would be telling Americans 
that participating in war was sinful. Sensing that they 
could only alienate themselves further from the wider 
citizenry if they roused the wrath of militant patriots, 
Mennonites displayed caution and skepticism in 
expressing their views to non-members. The fear of 
becoming the center of controversy outweighed their 
desire to refute the false charges publicly and, 
ultimately, outweighed their desire to be understood by 
non-members. 
Third, rehearsing arguments symbolized the 
willingness of Mennonites to suffer in a truly 
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nonresistant way. Passively enduring unfounded verbal 
abuse against themselves was a way to prove to non-
members that they were sincere in their devotion to the 
doctrine of nonresistance. In Burkean terms, they 
"deflect[ed] attention from scenic matters" [the charge 
that Mennonites were cowards and insincere] "by 
situating the motives of an act" [nonresistance] "in the 
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agent" [unconditional peace advocates]. In enacting a 
silent, but stoic role in the face of damaging 
accusations by angry citizens, Mennonites demonstrated 
that nonresistance demanded concrete behavioral 
affirmation, and was a permanent way of life, not 
merely an abstract belief in a set of dogmas that was 
conveniently adopted when the war broke out. 
Finally, in rehearsing their self-defense, 
Mennonites preserved their view of the world. Since they 
did not engage in debate with Americans who could only 
define loyal citizenship in relation to the Great 
Crusade, they were not forced to choose between their 
two identities, a move that the wider citizenry demanded 
of them. 
Each characteristic of the tragic frame, an outlook 
marked by inevitability, the purgation of guilt through 
sacrifice, the magnification of a devil figure, and the 
isolation of rhetors, found its application in Mennonite 
rhetoric. Through this perspective,~Mennonites could 
uphold Christ's command to be "strangers" and shun the 
things of this world. To be simultaneously "Good 
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Samaritans" in the world required the comic frame to be 
superimposed upon the tragic. 
If comedy deals with man in society, than rhetoric, 
by virtue of its essential function of using language as 
a symbolic means of inducing cooperation, is comedic. In 
Burke's words, rhetoric is a moralizing process whereby 
"the individual person striv[es] to form himself in 
accordance with the communicative norms that match the 
cooperative ways of his society." Identification, is the 
titular term in the lexicon of rhetoric from a symbolic 
perspective, because in viewing humans as actors, one is 
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also viewing how they act-together. This means how 
they act together with friend and foe alike. Carlson 
stipulates that identification with the enemy is an 
essential comic strategy for social change. Members of a 
group identify with their opponents even in the act of 
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resisting them. From a comic frame, individuals accept 
human beings as human and therefore imperfect. Because 
humans are considered error-prone, a rhetor operating 
from a comic perspective will "note his own foibles," 
and "have charity for the enemy." In sum, "conflict 
exists, but it is humanized by the actor's consciousness 
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of his own foibles." Since the aim of rhetoric from a 
comic frame is to minimize conflict by finding points of 
identification, a key strategy is transcendence--a 
desire to resolve the conflict between persons by 
discovering a larger generalization that will encompass 
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both ends of the conflict. The rhetor's ability to 
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transcend conflict, to make language work for him or her 
is an important element of the comic frame because, as 
Frye notes, a rhetor must give the impression that he or 
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she has control over the situation. 
Mennonites yearned to match the cooperative ways of 
their society, and, thus, they strove desperately to 
identity with their fellow citizens. Their persistent 
negotiating efforts with the government stand as clear 
testimony to that. For an apolitical people to besiege 
Washington with letters, form three committees as 
official liasons with the government, use the right of 
petition, reject emigration as a viable solution as it 
might hamper negotiating efforts, and convey a sense of 
understanding the government position while couching 
their demands in gracious tones, demonstrated 
unequivocally that Mennonites wished to establish 
communicative bonds with civil authorities. Moreover, 
Mennonites viewed themselves as successful negotiators 
because they were able to devise a clever strategy to 
diffuse the conflict with government officials. That 
strategic move was to encourage Mennonite draftees to 
register and report to camp. Since provisions had not 
been made for non-combatant service when the first men 
reported to camp, Mennonites might have refused to enter 
a military system that had no definite policy for non-
resisters. But Mennonite men did report to camp--a move 
that had significant ramifications for government-
Mennonite relations; for in reporting to camp, 
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Mennonites helped the government meet their goal of 
getting all American draftees through the draft boards 
as quickly and efficiently as possible. In bowing to the 
demands of the government in this situation, Mennonites 
had a better opportunity to make exemption demands 
later. More importantly, Mennonites removed the conflict 
with the government from their communities to the army 
camps. Had Mennonites failed to report to camp, they 
would have had to deal with the government in their own 
communities, which would have attracted much more 
hostile attention to them. Mennonite draftees protected 
the majority of the faithful at home from becoming the 
focal point of heated controversy. 
That Mennonites drafted apologetic statements 
further suggested that they sought understanding and 
even approval from their accusers. To be sure, Mennonite 
rhetoric of self-defense was unique in that the target 
audience (outsiders) was not the immediate audience 
(themselves) and rhetors inhibited any medium of 
transmission. But its very existence indicated that 
Mennonites desired to repair their image as loyal 
American citizens. By dissociating themselves from other 
conscientious objectors, denying charges of pro-
Germanism and insincerity, and identifying with the 
American values of patriotism, peace, and sacrifice, 
Mennonites gave notice to the ways in which they 
intended to cooperate with the wider citizenry. 
In accordance with a comic perspective, Mennonites 
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took control of the unpleasant situation by redefining 
American values in order that they might identity with 
them. Expanding the meaning of patriotism to include 
benevolent activities was one way in which Mennonites 
transcended the conflict. If a patriot were viewed as a 
Good Samaritan than both the soldier and the pacifist 
could be perceived as one. Mennonites further 
demonstrated their mastery over a threatening crisis by 
interpreting the war as a challenge, as a test of faith, 
even as a "day of opportunity." This was a day to "shine 
for the Master" and to, perhaps, attract new members to 
the faith. Mennonites voiced optimism that the test of 
faith "had already got people to thinking." 
Accompanying these symbolic efforts at inducement, 
were behavioral changes. Mennonites tried to accommodate 
the demands from the public by adopting the English 
language, flying the American flag, serving in the Red 
Cross, contributing to Liberty Loan and Red Cross 
Drives, serving in noncombatant capacities, living 
frugally, and contributing their own farm products to 
Americans in need. These were important outward signs of 
identification with the "enemy." 
Mennonites were able to identity with those who did 
not believe in nonresistance because they recognized 
their opponent's right to be treated fairly and with a 
full measure of respect. More crucial yet, they 
recognized their own shortcomings. Der Herold encouraged 
its readers "to respect those young men who have 
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volunteered [for military service] because they thought 
it was their duty." The Mennonite cautioned its readers 
to avoid lecturing outsiders on the rightness of the 
nonresistant position when "they are angry and smarting 
under unprovoked injuries imposed upon them by a 
devilish foe." H. D. Penner went so far as to 
acknowledge candidly that Mennonites, too, were 
misguided sometimes, and not superior to non-members. In 
his July 4, sermon, Penner philosophically observed: 
The fact that the state often misuses its 
power or its authority is not argument to go 
against the state. Even the Holy Scripture is 
misused without even half trying. We sometimes 
use the words in the Bible with the wrong 
interpretation. And that causes people to 
doubt. So when the state officials put forth 
certain efforts and they fail, it isn't up to 
us to hold it up against them--to criticize 
them the rest of their lives--on account of 
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it. 
These brave, far-sighted admissions were evidence 
of a comic consciousness in the face of intimate danger 
to their church's very existence. 
When viewed through a comic lens, even the 
Mennonites' strategy to isolate themselves rhetorically, 
if not socially, from the wider community, had comic 
overtones. For in defending themselves to each other, 
members preserved the belief that if Americans knew the 
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real facts about them, they would not be hostile toward 
them. Mennonites withstood the scathing criticism by 
believing that their fellow citizens were being 
misguided by the vicious lies circulated in the press. 
Americans were really "well-meaning people," as Daniel 
Kauffman and Gerald Dahlke had described them, who had 
been led astray about the "real" Mennonite position. In 
failing to publicize these strategies, Mennonites could, 
in their own minds, preserve ties with the wider 
community, and strengthen their ties with the church. 
Dahlke, for instance, would not have been able to 
construct the exaggerated account of Mennonite civic 
loyalty with any serious intent of convincing outsiders 
of their worthiness had he not harbored the belief that 
outsiders were mistaken, not vicious. 
Finally, Mennonites were able to identity with 
outsiders because they diffused the tension between an 
us versus them mentality. By envisioning the conflict 
between Mennonitism and militarism, Mennonites defined 
the dispute as one between scenes, not agents, thereby 
deflecting the confrontation. Resistance vs. 
nonresistance was at stake, not Mennonites versus 
Americans. Burke's idea that movements will "materialize 
the spiritual," and create an identifiable devil figure, 
fails to account for a comic view of the opposition. 
Mennonites did not want to foster antagonism by 
projecting the image of a despicable foe who would be 
easy to rally against. Even in Dahlke's magnification of 
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the accusations against the Mennonites, not once did he 
attribute the "barbaric" actions to specific 
individuals. 
Both the tragic and the comic dimensions of 
Mennonite rhetoric explain its inventiveness and its 
apparent contradictoriness. The Mennonite allegiance to 
the church required that their rhetorical strategies for 
dealing with the war and the backlash from the wider 
citizenry be consistent with the tenuous task of being 
in the world but not of it. While the war ostensibly 
forced Mennonites to make a choice between two 
conflicting identities, Mennonites refused to make that 
choice, believing instead that it was possible to remain 
loyal to God and country. As people in the world, 
Mennonites could be Good Samaritans, but as people apart 
from this world, they could not be soldiers or do good 
works in connection with the military. From a Mennonite 
perspective, there was no discrepancy between arguing 
that they "must set their sights on higher things" and 
arguing that they "must do more toward relief and 
reconstruction than can possibly be done through 
military avenues." Mennonites did not think that their 
attempts to identify with loyal citizens were 
inconsistent. Mennonites believed that they were 
patriotic, even though this meant expanding the meaning 
of patriotism. Mennonites thought that if they supported 
democratic ends, they could be considered good Americans 
even though they could not support military means. 
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Mennonites believed that if Americans knew that they 
were industrious farmers, they would not be looked upon 
as parasites, even though many of them would not serve 
in the Red Cross or donate to Liberty Bond drives. 
Moreover, when Mennonites vowed to "go the extra mile" 
and do more for those in need than those who supported 
the war militarily, they did not think that this 
argument proclaimed their moral superiority; they 
thought it was an appropriate response since they would 
not fight in America's battles. To Mennonites these were 
persuasive strategies. When Mennonites enumerated all 
the ways that they were "doing their bit" for their 
country while remaining faithful servants of the Lord, 
it was proof that Mennonites were not shirking their 
responsibility to be in the world but not of it. 
For a people untrained in public address, 
Mennonites demonstrated surprising adeptness at 
synthesizing a tragic and comic perspective. Yet even 
Mennonites recognized the fragility of combining these 
two frames of reference. As Mennonites watched the 
European crisis with increasing interest, it was not 
long before they dropped all pretense of neutrality and 
openly supported one side or the other. Deliberative 
rhetoric from an apolitical people was a shocking 
recognition of just how much national loyalties were 
important. In the comfortable years before U. s. 
intervention, Mennonite abandoned their Mennonite 
identity temporarily to express their cultural identity. 
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In the process, they also abandoned tragic 
consciousness. When C. Henry Smith went so far as to 
proclaim that "Mennonitism and American democracy were 
overlapping movements of the common people," he lost 
sight of the foundations of Mennonitism as a suffering 
church separated from the world. Mennonite theologian, 
J. L. Burkholder further explains why the biblical 
paradox by which Mennonites live is so very difficult to 
uphold: 
Discipleship demands a return to a disciplined 
and socially separated church of true believers. 
It demands complete withdrawal from the 
relativities of the passing order. It means a 
new social order living eschatologically in 
accordance with the 'new age.• This answer has 
been clearer in theory, however, than in 
practice. It has been clearer theologically 
than sociologically. It has seemed more likely 
for small minorities than for majorities. It has 
been clearer to the first generation of Anabaptists 
than to their descendants. It has seemed more 
reasonable in a political order conducted by a 
nobility than in a democracy in which everyone 
is theoretically responsible for the political 
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order. 
American Mennonites who lived through the Great War 
wrestled with how they could make the concept of a 
suffering church relevant in a country that cherished 
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religious freedom. Maintaining the tragi-comic 
consciousness, so essential for upholding Christ's 
dictum to be in the world but not of it, was, in these 
times, a daunting task. 
While Mennonites did not always succeed in 
maintaining tragic consciousness, they did survive the 
test of war with minimal losses precisely because they 
were sufficiently able to isolate themselves from the 
outside world, recall their separatist tradition, and 
emphasize other worldly goals-- important strategies of 
the tragic perspective. First of all, Mennonites showed 
remarkable resiliency in the midst of this crisis 
because their church, not unlike an "enduring movement," 
embraced broad, idealistic goals that were not 
attainable in the near future. Therefore, it had a 
greater chance of surviving tumultuous times than a 
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movement that embraced specific, short-term goals. Not 
only were Mennonites able to withstand the test of war 
because their goals could not be realized in this 
lifetime, but the tumultuous history of the church 
provided members with renewed strength to face the 
crisis. Members had throughout the centuries become 
hardened to the threats from the outside world. 
Similarly, Mennonites living during the world war were 
willing to endure harsh treatment and resist great 
pressure to conform to a militaristic patriotism in 
order to preserve their rich religious heritage, which 
included the idea of a suffering church. 
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The church's survival and the persuasiveness of its 
rhetoric for members, in spite of negative evaluations 
from non-members, is, according to Roberta Ash and Mayer 
Zald, a function of the fact that the enduring movement 
"is less constrained by the definitions of reality of 
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the broader society." Since the church was not 
dependent on society for its survival, Mennonites 
constructed what sociologist Joseph R. Gusfield calls 
their own "paradigm of experience" by which events were 
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judged to be right, just, and proper. Members 
formulated their own interpretation of which world 
events were worth highlighting, of what acts could be 
considered patriotic, and, ultimately, of what it meant 
to affirm an American and a Mennonite identity in war 
time. Anthropologists Luther Gerlach and Virginia Hine 
explain that it is important for movements to operate 
from a distinct reality base in order to "reinterpret 
even what objectively is failure as redirection by God, 
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••• or a temporary testing of devotion and courage." 
During the war, the church was perceived as illegitimate 
by most Americans, but members did not accept this 
status. Rather, Mennonites believed that the war gave 
them the opportunity to test their dedication to God and 
to re-affirm the legitimacy of their church. Since the 
established order perceives the world in a different 
light, Gerlach and Hine note, "It characteristically 
misjudges the ability of the movement and its members to 
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persist in the face of setbacks." 
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The Wilson Administration misjudged the ability of 
Mennonites to endure the presence of military life. 
Mennonites did not become "fairly good soldiers" as 
Newton Baker had assumed. Similarly, the public 
misjudged the Mennonites' ability to withstand the 
threats of mob violence and the barrage of unfounded 
accusations that were perpetuated by the press. That 
Mennonites maintained tragic consciousness during the 
war by operating from a distinct reality base explains 
how Mennonites could see successes in ostensible 
failures. 
Conclusion 
Mennonites were relieved when Wilson announced on 
Armistice Day that it now became America's "duty to 
assist by example, by sober, friendly counsel and by 
material aid in the establishment of just democracy 
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throughout the world." Mennonites enthusiastically 
affirmed this challenge, since their benevolent 
activities were once again in conformity with peace time 
norms. As soon as the war was over, Mennonites stepped 
up their peace witness. The Mennonite Central Committee, 
which still functions as a world-wide enterprise to help 
those in need, was created. Many Mennonites felt that, 
having refused army service, they should do equal time 
in reconstruction. This helped to reinforce the positive 
witness that Mennonites could give to the world. As one 
Mennonite remarked: "It did a great deal to quiet 
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criticism and help me in my standing in the 
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community." 
Mennonites could take comfort in the fact that 
their standing in the wider community did improve 
substantially after the war. As quickly as Americans 
adopted the crusade spirit, they returned to the task of 
picking up where they left off. The most rabid of war 
supporters now became more understanding and even 
sympathetic of the conscientious objector. The New 
Republic, which had condemned c. o.•s during the war, 
pleaded their case by 1919. When in June of that year, 
and many c. o.•s still in.prison for violation of the 
Espionage Law, the magazine stated emphatically that 
"The Espionage Law .•• has certainly no more reason 
for remaining on the statute books than war time 
prohibition." It further inquired why Baker had delayed 
action, responding argumentatively: "Is it mere 
inertia?" In indignation the magazine concluded: "[M]en 
are being held out of their liberty; they are being 
denied the opportunity to share in the work of the 
89 
world, and never was there more work to do." The press 
also made amends for their distorted coverage of the 
psychological testing of the conscientious objector by 
reporting the accurate findings. One editor remarked: 
"Many people who were familiar with the kind of 
newspaper comment on conscientious objectors that was 
current during the war will probably be surprised to 
learn that fewer than 18% of political objectors and 19% 
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of religious objectors fell below the "average" in 
intelligence. [which] excelled the percentages of both 
90 
the drafted and enlisted men." One reporter laid to 
rest the fear generated by army officers during the war 
that "the c. o. would make the worst possible kind of 
criminal," by publicizing the statistic that "only six-
tenths of one percent of c. o.•s have served prison 
terms." Adding for good measure, "It does not seem 
likely that we need to fear much from the future 
91 
criminal activity of conscientious objectors." For the 
most part, in the years immediately following the war, 
the American public did not harbor hostility or 
resentment against Mennonites and other conscientious 
objectors. The Mennonites' decision to assist in the 
work of reconstruction, no doubt, healed their 
relationship with the outside public considerably. 
The war experience also brought MC and GC members 
of the Mennonite church closer together. Members of both 
conferences joined together to send petitions to the 
Wilson Administration, to serve on committees for war 
concerns, and stepped up their correspondence with each 
other. Though the two groups had differed on the issue 
of non-combatant service, it is easy for a non-member to 
attach undue significance to this fact. Mennonites such 
as H.P. Krehbiel saw the conflicting stances, not as a 
major flaw in their self-defense, but as "a slight 
difference in method of attack." The GC position was in 
agreement with the MC position "in all essentials," 
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Krehbiel concluded. 
Perhaps, most importantly, the war strengthened the 
faith of members. The war was, as Mennonites had argued, 
"a test of faith." The majority of Mennonites survived 
the test and emerged from the war with a renewed 
commitment to their faith. Yet in strengthening their 
faith commitment, the war also proved to be a harsh 
lesson that taught Mennonites to emphasize their peace 
stance even in peace times. Never again would Mennonites 
be lulled into a false sense of security that America 
would not disturb their isolated communities or demand 
total commitment to a cause that violated their 
religious freedom. 
In retrospect, the Mennonite experience in the 
world war was not a heroic moment in their history. 
Nonetheless, Mennonites must be admired for surviving a 
no-win rhetorical situation. As the Military 
Intelligence Division aptly stated: "The Mennonites have 
furnished the material for a very interesting chapter in 
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the history of the war." For government officials and 
American citizens alike, Mennonites exhibited a peculiar 
witness that was unacceptable in war time. Courting 
obscurity and calling for biblical nonresistance in the 
midst of a righteous American military effort was a 
position that could never be comprehended by the greater 
American public as anything other than grossly 
irrelevant. Walter Guest Kellogg, a member of the Board 
of Inquiry, expressed a common impression when he wrote: 
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"They remain a curious and an alien survival of an old-
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world people, an anachronism amid the life of today." 
Mennonites of the untroubled generation probably would 
have been satisfied with Kellogg's characterization of 
themselves. For Mennonites had survived the supreme test 
without forfeiting the essentials of a 400-year faith. 
They had been purified by the fire of war, as H.P. 
Krehbiel envisioned. And they had emerged from the heat 
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